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“Ô la belle histoire! le beau livre que l’Esprit Saint écrit présentement!
Il est sous la presse, âmes saintes, il n’y a point de jour qu’on n’en arrange les lettres,
que l’on n’y applique l’encre, que l’on n’en imprime les feuilles.”
— Jean-Pierre de Caussade, L'abandon à la providence divine, Ch. XI.
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Introduction*
“When the Young White King gained victory over his enemies everywhere, the Blue 
King was saddened, and won and bought once more, with his great wealth, a mighty 
captain, the greatest that the Young White King had with him, and promised him much 
more  money,  and  also  castles,  fortresses  and  land;  that  captain  would  furthermore 
eternally have and rule the land and people of the Young White King. That captain 
abandoned the Young White King, and drew to himself evil people, a great number of 
crowds, among whom there were many great criers, and he gave that people a lot of 
money, and promised to make them all lords for ever. They accepted this, and they were 
also called the Black and Fallen White Company.”1
So  goes  the  explanation  that  Maximilian  of  Austria  (1459-1519)  gives  in  the  pseudo-
autobiographical Weißkunig, of the origin of his struggle with the Netherlandish nobleman Philip of 
Cleves (1459-1528).2  After the death of duchess Mary of Burgundy left the four year old Philip the 
Handsome (1478-1506) duke of the Burgundian Netherlands, Maximilian struggled between 1482 
and 1492 against a coalition of the Flemish cities and a handful of the most important noblemen for 
the  regency,  which  in  1483-1485  and  1488-1492  erupted  into  the  Flemish  Revolts.3 Philip  of 
Cleves,  as  presented  here,  was  bought  by  the  king  of  France  with  the  ambition  to  reign  in 
Maximilian's stead; while the king's notorious enemies, the Flemish, are presented as the Brown 
Company,  Philip  and  his  men  are  the  Fallen  Whites,  apostates.  The  Weißkunig  presents 
* I wish to thank Jelle Haemers for allowing me to read and make use of the manuscript of his latest book, De strijd 
om het regentschap over Filips de Schone. Wiel Dorssers, Thérèse Peeters and Vanessa Abeyawardena have helped 
me clear up many difficult passages and correct many errors.
1 Maximilian and Marx Treitzsaurwein, Der Weiß Kunig. Eine Erzehlung von den Thaten Kaiser Maximilian des  
ersten (Vienna 1775 (written ±1513)) 225: “Als der Jung Weiß kunig gegen seinen veindten allenthalben den Sig 
behilt, das verdroß den blaben kunig, und gewann, und erkauffet abermals, mit seinem großen gelt, ainen mechtigen 
hauptman, den maisten den der Jung weiß kung, bey Ime het, und versprach Ime darzu Insonnderhait, viel mer gelt, 
auch Purg Sloß unnd Lannd, derselb hauptman solle auch Ewiglichn haben, unnd Regiren, des Jungen weißen 
kunigs Lannd und leut, derselb hauptman viel von dem Jungen weißen kunig ab, unnd hennget an sich von 
schlechten leuten, ain grosse anzall volcks, darunder der grossen schreyer gar vill waren, und er gab denselben 
volckh gar vill gelts, und versprach Inen, Sy alle zu Ewigen Zeiten herren zu machn, das namen Sy also an, und 
wurden auch genennt, die Swartz und abgefallen weiß geselschaft[.]” 'Schreyer' or in Dutch 'roepers' and 'krijsers' 
were common terms to indicate a mob of foolish and spineless rebels: Jan Dumolyn,  'Marginalen of radicalen? Het 
vertoog over de 'roepers en krijsers' tijdens stedelijke opstanden, voornamelijk in het laatmiddeleeuwse 
Vlaanderen.', Tijdschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis, 2 (2005) 29-53.
2 The commentary of the first edition from 1775 is severely mistaken in identifying the Hauptman as Jan van 
Coppenhole.
3 The term 'Flemish Revolt' is from Jelle Haemers and Louis Sicking, 'De Vlaamse Opstand van Filips van Kleef en 
de Nederlandse Opstand van Willem van Oranje', Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis 119, 3 (2006) 328-347. I shall be 
referring to two of them to more easily distinguish and compare between them. 
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Maximilian's life as the struggle of a ruler beset by unrelenting misfortune as a result of being born 
under an unlucky constellation, yet victorious through divine grace.4 But he did not just see himself 
confronted  with  traitors;  some  hated  him  from  the  get-go.  The  Theuerdank,  the  other  of 
Maximilian's  writings,  offers  us  a  glimpse  into  the  thoughts  of  the  Burgundian  nobility  upon 
hearing of the Austrian's  journey to the Netherlands to marry the duchess Mary:  “Many in the 
country were much saddened in their hearts, thinking 'if the hero comes to our lady the queen, he 
will immediately take from us our rule.'”5 And so, three evil councillors of the queen attempt to 
thwart the noble hero — until they end up beheaded, hanged and thrown off of a balcony. The 
relationship between Maximilian and the nobility he found in the Netherlands was not always rosy, 
if  these writings are any indication.  But unlike Theuerdank's  adversaries Fürwittig,  Unfallo and 
Neydlhart, and in spite of rebellion being a capital crime, all but one of the members of the high 
nobility who opposed Maximilian died of natural  causes. Some, like Louis of Gruuthuse, faced 
prison sentences; others, like Philip of Beveren, never saw their actions mentioned again. And the 
young king's  greatest  captain,  Philip  of  Cleves,  underwent  a  ritual  of  humiliation  before being 
receiving a pardon. Why were Maximilian's political enemies not eliminated in the harshest ways, 
like those of the  Theuerdank were? Was there more  to the relationship than a winner-takes-all 
struggle over rule?
The composition of the aristocracy in the Netherlands looked quite different before and 
after the regency of Maximilian of Austria over his son Philip the Handsome (1482-1494). In 1477, 
Adolf of Cleves was lieutenant-general of the Netherlands to Mary of Burgundy; in 1493, his son 
Philip  could not find employment  and left  for an Italian adventure in French service.  Louis  of 
Gruuthuse, the lieutenant of Holland, had been the other of the 'guardian angels' of the Burgundian 
state and Mary's  chevalier d'honneur; his son ended up in France and his territories fell into the 
hands of other families. Wolfert of Borsele succeeded Louis as lieutenant in the North shortly after 
in  1478;  his  house  died  out  a  handful  of  years  later,  ending  several  centuries  of  the  family's 
dominance of Zeeland and Holland.  Instead,  we find by the reign of Philip the Handsome that 
power has shifted to the families that would hold it during the reign of Charles V and some up to 
the Dutch Revolt:  the houses of Nassau, Egmond,  Glymes-Bergen, Burgundy,  Croÿ.6 What had 
4 Heinz-Otto Burger, 'Der Weisskunig als Literaturdenkmal' in: Heinrich Musper (ed.), Kaiser Maximilians  
Weisskunig (Stuttgart 1956) 15-33, there 19-33; Larry Silver, Marketing Maximilian. The visual ideology of a Holy 
Roman emperor (Princeton 2008) 1-7.
5 Maximilian, Marx Treitzsaurwein and Melchoir Pfintzing, Die geuerlicheiten und eins teils der geschichten des  
loblichen streyparen und hochberümbtes helds und ritters herr Tewrdanncks (Vienna 1888 (first print 1517)) 29-31: 
“Etlich dasselbig in dem lanndt // Verdross an Irem hertzen seer // Gedachten khümbt der Held die her // Zu unnser 
frawn der Künigin // So wirdet Er gleich nemen hin // Von unns als unnser regiment[.]”
6 Jean-Marie Cauchies, '«Croit conseil» et ses «ministres». L'entourage de Philippe le Beau (1494-1506)', in A. 
Marchandisse (red.), À l'ombre du pouvoir. Les entourages princiers du Moyen Âge (Luik 2002) 391-411. More than 
half of the provincial governorships between 1503 and 1572 were held by the families Croÿ, Nassau, Egmond, 
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happened during the regency of Maximilian? Partially we can explain this by the simple fact of 
noble  families  dying  out.  This  was  (and  maybe  still  is)  a  universal  phenomenon  in  European 
nobility.7 But no power shift is entirely by accident. It is no coincidence that all those top noblemen 
of the Burgundian reign had, at some point, taken part in the Flemish Revolts, and it is just as little 
of  a  coincidence  that  the  new elite  consisted  more  or  less  of  the  men  who had been  loyal  to 
Maximilian during that period.
John  Armstrong  asked  himself  at  the  1962  Anglo-Dutch  conference  whether  the 
Burgundian  government  had  'a  policy  for  the  nobility'.8 What  he  considered  one  of  the  most 
important elements of the relationship between the dukes and their nobility was the punishment of 
insubordination of any kind. The Habsburg successors are left outside of the scope of the article, but 
Armstrong made a quick summary of what he thought to be the primary difference: “After 1477, 
Maximilian duke of Austria  continued with zest  the jousts  of his  Burgundian predecessors, but 
either could not or would not continue their tradition of strict order at court. In fact the revival of 
private feuds among the nobility both provoked and complicated public disturbances of a more 
serious character. Here as in other matters the troubles of the Burgundian-Habsburg period proved 
the sound judgment of the preceding régime.”9 If this period was the watershed between a loyal 
Burgundian nobility and an out-of-control Habsburg nobility,  the punishment of insubordination 
should be the ideal test case for determining the relationship between Maximilian and his nobles. 
The aim of this thesis is to use the punishment of several noblemen after the rebellions against 
Maximilian  of  Austria  to  determine  the  archduke's,  later  king's,  position  vis-à-vis  the  nobility, 
including  not  only  conflicts  of  interest,  but  also  dependency  and  propaganda  purposes.  What 
considerations had to be taken into account in finding the proper judgment, and what methods were 
employed to take advantage of the victory over these men?
Justification
There  is  at  present  no publication  that  deals  systematically  with  how nobles  in  the 
Lalaing, Bergen, Lannoy and Montmorency: Henk Van Nierop, 'The nobles and the revolt', in: Graham Darby (ed.), 
The origins and development of the Dutch Revolt (London and New York 2001) 48-66, there 50; Paul Rosenfeld, 
'The provincial governors from the minority of Charles V to the Revolt', Standen en Landen, 16 (1959) 1-63, there 
17.
7 Jonathan Dewald, The European nobility, 1400-1800 (Cambridge 1996) 17; Paul Janssens, De evolutie van de 
Belgische adel sinds de late middeleeuwen (Brussels 1998)185-189; Raymond van Uytven, 'Vorst, adel en steden: 
een driehoeksverhouding in Brabant van de twaalfde tot de zestiende eeuw', Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis, 59 
(1976) 93-122, there 110; Paul de Win, 'Queeste naar de rechtspositie van de edelman in de Bourgondische 
Nederlanden', Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis, 223 (1985) 223-274, there 266.
8 John Armstrong, 'Had the Burgundian government a policy for the nobility?', in: idem, England, France and 
Burgundy in the fifteenth century (London 1983) 213-236.
9 Armstrong, Policy for the nobility, 218.
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Burgundian lands were, or were not, punished, and to what degree, as the studies of Bellamy and 
Cuttler do for England and France.10 Perhaps this is because Louis XI made much blue blood flow 
after  spectacular  show trials  in  parliament,  sometimes  with  the  peers  called  from all  over  the 
country, whereas none of the rebellious high nobles in the Netherlands were sentenced to death. 
They  were, furthermore, already partially or entirely judged in the peace treaties that ended the 
wars.  Although  this  means  that  their  'trials'  have  been  given  some  attention  in  studies  of  the 
conflicts that surrounded them, it will be more useful to look at the conflicts in the context of a 
judicial combat.11
Andreas Walther, writing in 1911, was the first modern historian to pay attention to the 
nobility in the conflicts with Maximilian of Austria, and he connected it to other processes, such as 
the exodus of court  members  to France:  “Die Kämpfe Maximilians in den Niederlanden waren 
keineswegs nur gegen die flandrischen Städte gerichtet.  Vielmehr wendet sich fast  der gesamte 
hohe Adel von ihm ab und macht mit Frankreich gemeinsame Sache.”12 Arie de Fouw, in his 1937 
thesis  on Philip  of Cleves  criticised  this  generalisation.  In his  opinion,  Walther's  eagerness  for 
creating a clear system made him overlook the specific reasons for opposition and the forms that it 
took. The nobles of the Flemish Revolts always professed a loyalty to Philip the Handsome and 
tried to maintain independence from France. De Fouw's research was meticulous and he had a good 
eye for sentiments. Where the book fails as a piece of modern history, is in its bias; he sought to do 
justice  to  Philip  of  Cleves  by  defending  him  as  a  man  guided  by  honour  defying  Habsburg 
absolutism. He regarded Philip as having had to succumb to Maximilian's will, but his tenacity in 
his own righteousness earned him an honourable peace treaty without repression.13
The post-war decades were not kind to the history of the nobility. Under the influence 
first  of  Henri  Pirenne,  then  of  Charles  Tilly,  Flemish  historiography  focused  foremost  on  the 
relationship between the prince and his cities.14 As a result, Robert Wellens'  'Revolte brugeoise' 
10 J.G. Bellamy, The law of treason in England in the later Middle Ages (Cambridge 1970).; S.H. Cuttler, The law of  
treason and treason trials in later medieval France (Cambridge 1981).
11 Cf. Johan Huizinga, 'Uit de voorgeschiedenis van ons nationaal besef', in: idem, Verzamelde werken, II, (1948-1953) 
97-160, there 106-107.
12 Andreas Walther, Die Anfänge Karls' V. (Leipzig 1911). 10-20: “Die Kämpfe Maximilians in den Niederlanden 
waren keineswegs nur gegen die flandrischen Städte gerichtet. Vielmehr wendet sich fast der gesamte hohe Adel 
von ihm ab und macht mit Frankreich gemeinsame Sache.”
13 Arie Fouw Philips van Kleef. Een bijdrage tot de kennis van zijn leven en karakter (Groningen and Batavia 1937) 
see p. 65-66, 184-186 for his discussion of Walther's standpoint. Johanna Oudendijk summarised De Fouw's thesis 
in 1941, but tried to nuance the view by pointing out that not all of Philip's actions were defensible. It too, is a moral 
judgment of the man: Johanna Oudendijk, Een Bourgondisch ridder over den oorlog ter zee. Philips van Kleef als  
leermeester van Karel V (Amsterdam 1941).
14 Jan Dumolyn, 'Henri Pirenne en het particularisme van de laatmiddeleeuwse Vlaamse steden: een deconstructie', 
Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, 86 (2008) 709-733; Maarten Prak, 'Charles Tilly: de kunst van het 
samenleven', Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis,  119 (2006) 559-564. Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique, III (Brussels 1923), 
considers the Revolt at an end at Ghent's surrender at Cadzand, and ignores Philip of Cleves' struggle in the next 
months. To Pirenne, this is the end of the era of particularistic urban revolts, now triumphed over by the modern and 
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(1965) and 'Etats généraux' (1974), as well as Wim Blockmans' 'Autocratie ou polyarchie?', which 
are today still some of the best overviews of the period in time, have very little to say about the role 
of the nobles in the conflict.15 The renewed interest in the nobility from the late eighties onwards 
has  shifted  the  balance,16 but  only  in  2000  did  Hans  Cools  pick  up  where  Walther  left  off, 
combining all the insights that had been gathered over the last century and molding them into a 
chapter in which the position of the aristocracy as a rival to Maximilian was emphasised.17 The view 
of Helmut Koenigsberger in his history of the Estates-General,  written in 2001, was almost the 
complete opposite. To him, Maximilian's rule was “erratic” and not indicative of an understanding 
of the Netherlands, and the nobles were easily convinced to switch to any side. It was the Estates-
General and its collective will to keep the Burgundian state together that saved the day.18 Since 
then, Jelle Haemers has almost singlehandedly brought the study of the regency to life. He views 
the  conflicts  not  as  being  between  a  prince  and  his  subjects,  or  between  progression  and 
conservation, but as a clash between two ideologies of statecraft. In this, we find noblemen on both 
sides.  By  virtue  of  their  considerable  wealth,  prestige  and  contacts,  they  populate  the  upper 
echelons of the parties, not driven into a standpoint by class, but often by personal interest and 
financial incentives.19
Most revolt stories have the peace as the final result of the narrative, only mentioning it 
at the end of the story. The prince has won, order has been restored, and everyone lives happily ever 
after — or at least until the next time the Ghenters feel they are paying entirely too much tax. In 
part, this is because that is exactly the objective of such peace treaties: to give a sense of closing, 
both in the eradication of those directly responsible, and in the remission of all others. That is why a 
spectacular party can be thrown immediately afterwards. But the theme of peace has been gaining 
centralised monarchy.
15 Wim Blockmans, 'Autocratie ou polyarchie? La lutte pour le pouvoir politique en Flandre de 1482 à 1492, d'après 
des documents inédits', Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire, 140 (1974) 257-338; Robert Wellens, Les Etats  
generaux des Pays-Bas des origines a la fin du regne de Philippe le Beau (1464-1506) (Heule 1974); idem,  'La 
révolte brugeoise de 1488', Handelingen van het genootschap voor geschiedenis, 102 (1965) 5-52.
16 A recent overview of the historiography of the Low Countries nobility in the middle ages can be found is Jan 
Dumolyn and Thérèse de Hemptinne, 'Historisch adelsonderzoek over de late middeleeuwen en de vroegmoderne 
periode in België en Nederland: een momentopname', Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der  
Nederlanden, 123 (2009) 481-489.
17 Hans Cools, Mannen met macht. Edellieden en de moderne staat in de Bourgondisch-Habsburgse landen (1475-
1530) (Zutphen 2001) 119-129.
18 Helmut Koenigsberger, Monarchies, States Generals and parliaments. The Netherlands in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries (Cambridge 2001) 52-72.
19 For a summary of his own views, Haemers, De strijd om het regentschap over Filips de Schone. Opstand, facties en 
geweld in Brugge, Gent en Ieper (1482-1488) (Ghent 2014) 10. The other important works are idem, For the 
common good. State power and urban revolts in the reign of Mary of Burgundy (1477-1482) (Turnhout 2009); idem, 
'Philippe de Clèves et la Flandre. La position d'un aristocrate au coeur d'une révolte urbaine (1477-1492)' in: idem, 
Céline van Hoorebeeck and Hanno Wijsman (eds.), Entre la ville, la noblesse et l'état: Philippe de Clèves (1456-
1528). Homme politique et bibliophile (Turnhout 2007) 21-100; idem, 'Factionalism and state power in the Flemish 
Revolt (1482-1492)', Journal of social history, 42 (2009) 1009-1039.
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some traction in the last few years. In 2007, Lucien Bély nuanced the focus of Charles Tilly and 
Geoffrey Parker on war as the primary driving force of modernisation, and called attention to a 
diplomatic revolution with the aim of establishing an 'art of peace'.20 In the Netherlands, this has led 
to a study by Violet Soen on the (failed) attempts of Dutch noblemen and the Habsburg government 
at  reconciliation  during the  Revolt.21 We need to  see peace  from a broader  perspective  than a 
diplomatic history and within the full light of relationships of power and dependency. A concluded 
peace treaty was read aloud on the market squares of all the towns of the participating states. We 
are hard-pressed to find any form of text that had a more widespread audience. As such, we can't 
ignore  the  significance  of  such  documents  and  associated  rituals  for  the  culture  at  large. 
Accompanying punishments must be seen within the context of the more recent historiographical 
cultural turn towards memory and identity.22 
Method
The objective here is not to look at the judicial position of a nobleman in revolt. That 
approach would face two dangerous pitfalls: firstly, 'the nobility' as a concept is much easier used 
than defined. Various regional and temporal differences make and made it impossible to actually 
give a clear and indisputable definition of the term and of the people belonging to it. Rather than 
apply  a  legalistic  demarcation,  historians  now mostly  agree  that  a  nobleman  is  someone  who 
manages to keep up the life of a nobleman.23 The second reason is that the demarcation line might, 
in this case, sooner be drawn between those nobles who were members of the Order of the Golden 
Fleece, and had their own judicial statute, and those who did not.24 Instead, I shall look at the eight 
most  important  noblemen  who  revolted  during  the  years  1482-1492,  whose  status  was 
unquestioned. In addition to the seven aristocrats of the Flemish regency councils, I will also look at 
John of Montfort, a nobleman who led Utrecht against Maximilian in 1483 and seized the important 
border town of Woerden in 1488. Since his position was not connected to any of the other nobles, 
and his struggles were almost entirely independent of the Flemish situation,  he serves as a 'test 
20 Lucien Bély, L'art de la paix. Naissance de la diplomatie moderne (XVIe-XVIIIe siècles) (Paris 2007).
21 Violet Soen, Vredehandel. Adellijke en Habsburgse verzoeningspogingen tijdens de Nederlandse Opstand 
(Amsterdam 2012).
22 Marc Boone, 'Le dict mal s'est espandu comme peste fatale. Karel V en Gent, stedelijke identiteit en staatsgeweld' 
Handelingen van de maatschappij voor geschiedenis en oudheidkunde te Gent, 53 (2000) 31-63.
23 Antheun Janse, Ridderschap in Holland : portret van een adellijke elite in de late Middeleeuwen (Hilversum 2001). 
19-42; Janssens, De evolutie, 103-125; De Win, Queeste, passim.
24 Frédéric, baron of Reiffenberg, Histoire de l'ordre de la Toison d'or depuis son institution jusqu'à la cessation des 
chapitres généraux. Tirée des archives m^mes de cet ordre et des écrivains qui en ont traité (Brussels 1830) XLIX-
L; Françoise de Gruben, Les chapitres de la Toison d'Or à l'epoque bourguignonne (1430-1477) (Louvain 1997) 41-
43; De Win, Queeste, 231-232.
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case'; that  the conclusions drawn from the others can be applied to him too, argues for a more 
universal policy.
The  cultural  turn  was  mentioned  above.  Any  study  on  culture  in  the  medieval 
Netherlands will at some point come into contact with the legacy of Johan Huizinga. The portrait of 
the aristocratic  lifestyle  painted in his  Waning of the middle ages is that  of a court  filled with 
ceremony  that  has  lost  any  connection  with  practical  considerations.  There  is  a  “disharmony 
between the form and life and reality.”25 Huizinga's harsh terms have bothered historians ever since, 
and many have attempted to show the use of chivalric forms. Wim Blockmans and Walter Prevenier 
coined  the  Burgundian  'theatre  state';  the  dukes,  in  their  view,  employed  the  lavish  rituals  as 
medieval mass media that showed a “grandiose mystification of power.”26 Peter Arnade worked out 
the concept, focusing on a case study of Ghent, and integrated the submissions and punishments of 
revolting cities  into this  model.  He argued that ceremony and public  display were the building 
blocks of Burgundian politics, and he was the first to study the punishments of rebellions as an 
event with a propagandistic purpose.27
While  the  recognition  that  ceremony  and  ritual  were  not  empty  husks  is  of  major 
importance,  the term theatre state is not without issues. It was borrowed from Clifford Geertz's 
study of Bali,  Negara. Recently,  however, Andrew Brown has called out “a near reversal of the 
term's original meaning.” Whereas in Negara, “power served pomp”, and not the other way around, 
the Burgundian theatricality is usually described as legitimising state formation.28 Those who have 
studied the relationship between pomp and power for Maximilian of Austria found that he did not 
see the two as separate concepts.29 Looking at one concept as serving the other is an anachronistic 
mode of analysis. A more subtle direction of argument may be found when going back to Huizinga. 
In a 1921 he delivered a lecture called 'La valeur politique et militaire des idées de chevalerie à la 
fin de moyen âge'. It is more positive on the importance of 'pompous' mentalities for medieval lives. 
25 Johan Huizinga, Herfsttij der middeleeuwen. Studie over levens- en gedachtenvormen der veertiende en vijftiende  
eeuw in Frankrijk en de Nederlanden (21st print; Amsterdam 1997 (first print Haarlem 1919)) quote p. 141.
26 Wim Blockmans and Walter Prevenier, De Bourgondiërs. De Nederlanden op weg naar eenheid, 1384-1530 
(Amsterdam and Louvain 1997) 223-227.
27 Peter Arnade, Realms of ritual. Burgundian ceremony and civic life in Late Medieval Ghent (Ithaca and London 
1996).
28 Clifford Geertz, Negara. The theatre state in nineteenth-century Bali (Princeton 1980); Andrew Brown, 'Bruges and 
the Burgundian “theatre-state”: Charles the Bold and Our Lady of the snow', History, 84 (1999) 573-589, there 574-
576, quote p. 575. Idem, 'Ritual and state-building: ceremonies in late medieval Bruges', in: Jacoba van Leeuwen 
(ed.), Symbolic communication in late medieval towns (Louvain 2006) 1-28, there 4-8; Cf. Koziol, 'Review article: 
The dangers of polemic: Is ritual still an interesting topic of historical study?', Early medieval Europe, 11 (2002) 
367-388, there 371-372 n.13, where the author even claims that “if one corectly understands Geertz, one know that 
one cannot apply his model of the Balinese Negara anywhere else.”
29 Herman Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I. Das Reich Osterreich und Europa an der Wende zur Neuzeit, pt. I,  
Jugend, burgundisches Erbe und Romisches Konigtum bis zur Alleinherrschaft 1459-1493 (München 1971) 29; 
Paula Fichter, 'The politics of honor: Renaissance chivalry and Habsburg dynasticism', Bibliothèque d'humanisme et  
renaissance. Travaux et documents, 19 (1967) 567-580.
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In it,  Huizinga asked his  audience to  consider the importance of chivalry in the way in  which 
medieval nobles and lords understood their world: “C'est la formule par laquelle les hommes de ce 
temps réussirent à comprendre, tant soit peu, la complexité effrayante des événements.”30 Modes of 
comprehension were not much of a subject back when the lecture was given, but much has changed 
since then. The study of pardon letters has led the way.
Pardon and grace in regular trials have a long historiography. The methodology that has 
been developed there is impressive and useful to this research. Pardon letters had been important 
sources on the life of common people who would never get voices in court chronicles, but in 1987, 
Natalie Zemon Davis's Fiction in the archives changed the field by  focusing on such letters not as a 
gateway to a world to be studied, but rather studying the form of such letters themselves.31 She 
argues that, since life presents itself in events and not in concrete stories, the narratives of these 
documents were carefully crafted and employed literary techniques to achieve certain goals. Walter 
Prevenier has picked up this method for pardon letters in the Netherlands.32 He rejects the idea that 
the  truth  is  the  representation  of  reality,  and  allows  for  multiple  truths  to  be  found  in  trials 
documents in the form of contradictions.
Davis made use of the theories of historical theorists and applied them to the 'history-
writers' of the past. Louis Mink had argued that narrative was a mode of comprehension that is 
“primary  and  irreducible”.  While  we  live  separate  events,  human  thought  connects  them in  a 
narrative.33 Hayden White initiated a theory of historical writing by pointing out that every history 
uses modes of emplotment,  explanation and ideological implication.  The very arrangement of a 
narrative is, according to him, highly significant for its meaning.34 In Davis' view, the writers of 
pardon requests and grants were very aware of this, and carefully employed specific structures and 
tropes  in  their  narratives  of  events  to  make  events  plausible  or  understandable.  We may  then 
reinterpret in these terms Huizinga's sentence that medieval nobles find in chivalry “la formule par 
laquelle  les  hommes  de  ce  temps  réussirent  à  comprendre  [...]  la  complexité  effrayante  des 
événements.”
A power struggle involves the employment of symbolic violence; that is, powerholders 
30 Johan Huizinga, 'La valeur politique et militaire des idées de chevalerie à la fin de moyen âge', in: idem, Verzamelde  
werken, III, Cultuurgeschiedenis I (1949) 519-529, quote p.522.
31 Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the archives. Pardon tales and their tellers in sixteenth-century France (Stanford 
1987).
32 Walter Prevenier, 'Les multiples vérités dans les discours sur les offenses criminelles envers les femmes dans les 
Pays-Bas méridionaux (XIVe et XVe siècles)', in: Sylvain Gouguenheim a.o. (eds.) Retour aux sources. Textes,  
études et documents d'histoire médiévale offerts à Michel Parisse (Paris 2004) 955-964; idem, 'Vorstelijke genade in 
de praktijk. Remissiebrief voor Matthieu Cricke en diens mede-acteurs voor vermeende vrouwenroof in oktober 
1476, slechts geïnterneerd na kritische verificatie door de raadsheren van het Parlement van Mechelen', Bulletin de 
la commission royale d'histoire, 175 (2009) 225-258.
33 Louis Mink, 'History and fiction as modes of comprehension', New literary history, 1 (1970) 541-558 quote p.557.
34 Hayden White, 'Interpretation in history', New literary history, 4 (1973) 281-314.
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will try to direct what is considered possible and natural, and define dichotomies.35 As such, writing 
and re-writing history are terrific political tools.36 Few examples show this better than Maximilian 
of Austria's Theuerdank and Weißkunig, which aimed at legitimising his actions by molding them 
into the plot structure of a traditional chivalric romance. I will take the method one step further: if 
the arrangement of events into a narrative is an act that in itself creates meaning, then it follows that 
one  would  want  to  manipulate  the  events  in  such  a  way  that  they  have  a  'natural'  order  or 
prominence and interconnect with other events. In the following, I shall argue that the pompous side 
of the submissions did not just involve a 'self-representation'37 but that, in addition, the rituals and 
symbolism that ended such conflicts or were employed afterwards, sought to impose a version of 
the story upon everyone; that the emplotment of White is not merely an act by the historian, but also 
one forced upon events by various rituals and ceremonies: it is clear that rites of manhood or the 
sacraments of marriage and priesthood demarcate the various chapters in a life and give meaning to 
them. So, too, does a ritual of submission after a revolt serve to cement the moment as a happy 
ending to a story of war, after which the bond between prince and subject is restored and the next 
chapter may be one of social order. Ritual, read like this, is an imposition of truth. A struggle over 
legitimacy,  then,  is  both  one over  which  truth  would  be accepted,  and  also  over  who has  the 
authority to decide which truth was to be universalised in a troubled state where none could hold 
absolute claim to legitimacy.
Methodologically  I  employ  an  uncommon  combination  of  techniques.  To  write  a 
cultural history of grace, one must resort to Thick Description, according to Prevenier, and the same 
goes when rebellious noblemen are the subject.38 The term Thick Description was coined by Gilbert 
Ryle and expanded upon by Clifford Geertz..39 Thick Description is based on the idea that meaning 
is something that is attributed to certain actions or symbols, and that we must interpret an account 
by looking deeply into the intended meaning of such actions and symbols.  Using this method on a 
set few historical actors almost necessarily brings us within the realm of microhistory. This brand of 
research  stems  from the  principle  that  “microscopic  observation  will  reveal  factors  previously 
35 Pierre Bourdieu, 'Rethinking the state: genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field', Sociological theory, 12 (1994) 
1-18, there 3-4.
36 Frederik Buylaert, Jelle Haemers, Tjamke Snijders and Stijn Villerius, 'Politics, social memory and historiography 
in sixteenth-century Flanders: towards a research agenda', Publications du centre européen d'études  
bourguignonnes, 52 (2012) 195-215.
37 Blockmans, Wim and Esther Donckers, 'Self-representation of court and city in Flanders and Brabant in the fifteenth 
and early sixteenth centuries' in: Wim Blockmans and Antheun Janse (eds.), Showing status: representaion of social  
positions in the late middle ages (Leiden 1999) 81-111.
38 Walter Prevenier, 'The two faces of pardon jurisdiction in the Burgundian Netherlands. A royal road to social 
cohesion and an effectual instrument of princely clientelism' in: Peter Hoppenbrouwers, Antheun Janse and Robert 
Stein (eds.), Power and persuasion. Essays on the art of state building in honour of W.P. Blockmans (Turnhout 
2010) 177-195, there 193-194.
39 Clifford Geertz, 'Thick Description: toward an interpretive theory of culture' in: idem, The interpretation of cultures.  
Selected essays by Clifford Geertz (New York 1973) 3-30.
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unobserved.”40 Building up a system from historical individuals to create a larger picture means that 
none of them can really defy a pattern, because their behaviour forms the basis for any observed 
pattern.41 In this  case,  it  is  important  to see the personal relations  between Maximilian and the 
noblemen manifest. We must try to find and interpret the messages that are not immediately clear to 
us, but would have been by contemporaries.
These methods, however, can be painfully subjective. The interpretation of an event is 
unmeasurable and unverifiable (or falsifiable).42 Therefore, to counteract such uncertainties, I will 
employ  a  comparativist  method,  which  allows  the  historian  to  see  the  many  possibilities  and 
disprove  certain  theories  by referring  to  other  situations.43 While  the  main  objective  here  is  to 
compare the eight noblemen discussed with each other, I will also compare the conclusions drawn 
therefrom with historiographical  analyses  of both Burgundy under Charles the Bold and of the 
kingdom of France during the reigns of Louis XI and Charles VIII (1461-1498).
The division of this thesis is twofold: the first half forms the background, and aims to 
answer in three chapters the question of  What happened?, Why would or would not Maximilian  
want to punish a nobleman? and What tools and traditions could he employ? The second half deals 
with the actual events of punishments and grace. I make a distinction between  punishments after  
participation in urban rebellion, which were impersonal or unofficial, the punishments in the Order  
of  the Golden Fleece,  which were the result  of  actual  trials,  and  punishments for feuds,  which 
involved both the qualities of diplomacy and of personal trial. The latter needs some explanation in 
its definition: since John of Montfort from 1488 and Philip of Cleves from 1490 onwards were 
considered, by themselves and by the court, to be acting as individuals, rather than as members of 
an impersonal revolt, both the negotiations and the punishments differ in form from those dealing 
with revolts in the proper sense.
40 Giovanni Levi, 'On microhistory', in: Peter Burke (ed.), New perspectives on historical writing (Cambridge 1991) 
93-113. 97-98.
41 Brad Gregory, 'Is small beautiful? Microhistory and the history of everyday life', History and Theory, 38 (1999) 
100-110, there 103.
42 Levi, On microhistory, 98-99.
43 Stefan Berger, 'Comparative history', in: idem, Heiko Feldner and Kevin Passmore (eds.), Writing history: theory 
and practice (London 2003) 161-179, there 164-165; Charles Tilly, Big structures, Large processes, huge 
comparisons (New York 1984) esp. p. 81-83.
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I. Background
1. Historical overview
1.1 The first Flemish revolt, 1483-1485
The death of Mary of Burgundy on March 27th 1482 was not the first  time the subjects  in the 
Netherlands protested against the policies of her husband Maximilian of Austria,44 but it was the 
immediate cause for a full-blown crisis that, with a break, spanned eight years of his twelve year 
regency.  The right to the throne of the ducal  couple's  son Philip (the Handsome) as “prince et 
seigneur naturel” was undisputed,45 but at not yet four years of age, the Burgundian lands were 
expecting a long regency, and the question was how to fill it. The marriage contract of Mary and 
Maximilian from 1477 stipulated that the archduke was not eligible to inherit anything from his 
spouse,46 although an amendment made a month later annulled this clause.47 He did demand the 
“tutelle, mambournye, garde et gouvernement” over his children Philip and Margaret.48 Mary's last 
will had indeed included this, but only the Estates-General could actually appoint Maximilian.49 A 
gathering was thus organised in April 1482.50 It quickly became clear that the Estates were divided 
over the issue. The chancellor of Brabant, traditionally first to speak, voiced the opposition of the 
duchy to the war with France that had been going on since 1477 and stated that the acceptance of 
the archduke would depend on his foreign policy plans. The Ghent pensionary William Rijm made 
largely the same argument on the behalf of the county of Flanders.51 That same day — April the 29th 
44 Blockmans, Autocratie, 259-261; Blockmans, 'Vlaanderen 1384-1482' in: D.P. Blok (ed.) Algemene geschiedenis  
der Nederlanden, pt. IV, Middeleeuwen (Haarlem 1980) 201-223, there 223; Haemers, For the Common Good, 
passim.
45 Jean-Marie Cauchies, Philippe le Beau. Le dernier duc de Bourgogne (Turnhout 2003). 25-29; Louis Prosper 
Gachard, Lettres inedites de Maximilien, duc d’Autriche, roi des Romains et empereur, sur les affaires des Pays-Bas 
I: 1478-1488. II: 1489-1508, II (Brussel 1851-1852) 249 (quote).
46 Jean Dumont, Corps univsersel diplomatique du droit des gens; centenant un recueuil des traitez d'alliance, de 
paix, de treve, de neutralité, de commerce, d'echange, de protection & de garantie; de toutes les conventions,  
transactions, pactes, concordats, & autres contrats, qui ont été faits en Europe, depuis le regne de l'empereur 
Charlemagne jusques à présent;, tome III. pt. 2 (Amsterdam 1726) 10. Referred to in Bibliothèque Nationale de 
France (BNF) manucrits francais (ms. fr.) nr. 18997 7-1, 7-2.
47 Haemers, For the Common Good, 1.
48 BNF ms. fr. 18997 10-2.
49 Blockmans, Autocratie, 264; idem, De volksvertegenwoordiging in Vlaanderen in de overgang van middeleeuwen 
naar nieuwe tijden (1384-1506) (Brussel 1978) 313; Cools, Mannen met macht, 119; Wiesflecker, Maximilian I., 
160-162; The text of Mary's last will is edited in Eduard, lord of Lichnowsky, Geschichte des Hauses Habsburg, 
VIII, Kaiser Friedrich III. und sein Sohn Maximilian. 1477-1493 (Vienna 1844) 732-737.
50 Wellens, États-généraux, 186-190; Gachard, 'Analectes historiques. Huitième série', Bulletin de la commission 
royale d'histoire, 3rd series, 2 (1860) 311-341.
51 For William Rijm, Haemers, For the common good, 238-239.
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— the deputies of Holland, Hainault and Valenciennes decided to support Maximilian, and Brabant 
followed suit the next day.52 Flanders and Maximilian were at an impasse at this point, with the 
Three Members still concerned over the latter's policy towards France, the position of the French 
king as suzerain over crown Flanders, and the uncertainty that surrounded the laws of regency in the 
county.53 No compromise could be found with the Flemish for the time being.54 The weak position 
of Maximilian also had a great deal of influence on the foreign policy of the Netherlands; the peace 
with France, signed in Arras on the 23rd of December 1482, was for a large part dictated by the 
Flemish  cities.55 Louis  XI  even spoke  of  it  as  a  treaty  “avec  ceulx  de  Flandres.”56 The  treaty 
stipulated that Margaret of Austria, Philip the Handsome's younger sister, was to be married to the 
dauphin, with several counties and lordships serving as dowry.57 The archduke had little say in the 
matter, since his children were being held in Ghent, away from his reach, and he was forced to send 
a plenipotentiary delegation to sign. Where he was accepted, Maximilian harshly made his position 
known; a group of five deputies of the Estates of Brabant was executed for having conspired with 
the  Flemish  “contre  sa  personne,  haulteur  et  seigneurie”  and the  abandonment  of  his  daughter 
Margaret.58
In the mean time, trouble was brewing in the North and Maximilian sought to pacify the 
neighbouring prince-bishropric of Utrecht by military means to guarantee the safety of Holland. 
The campaign would require his presence there, which would undoubtedly have spelled trouble for 
his relationship with Flanders. Therefore, in order not to let the situation escalate, he ratified on the 
fifth of June 1483 part of the regency council that the Flemish had created earlier that year.59 It 
52 Blockmans, Autocratie, 262-264; see Hans Smit, Vorst en onderdaan. Studies over Holland en Zeeland in de late  
middeleeuwen (Louvain 1995) 567-568 for the oath, taken on the 21st of May.
53 Blockmans, Autocratie, 265-266. Holland, Hainaut and Brabant, Blockmans argues, had more experience with 
minorities and other difficult successions than did Flanders, ibidem 258-259. That said, the Brabantine custom was 
to install a regency council rather than appoint a tutor; John the Fearless was bought off of the regency during the 
minority of his nephew John IV in 1415. Perhaps this is a partial explanation for why the duchy rallied behind 
Maximilian later than Hainaut and Holland, where no such custom existed.
54 Haemers, De strijd, 46-55.
55 Haemers, De strijd, 55-58.
56 Jean-Marie Cauchies, 'Maximilien d'Autriche et le traité d'Arras de 1482: négociateurs et négociations', in: Denis 
Clauzel, Charles Giry-Deloison and Christophe Leduc (eds.), Arras et la diplomatie européenne, XVe-XVIe siècles 
(Arras 1999) 143-164, quote p.155-154; J. de Saint-Genois, Lettres adressées par Maximilien Ier, archiduc 
d'Autriche, depuis empereur, à l'abbé de Saint-Pierre à Gand et à quelques autres personnages (1477-1487) (Ghent 
1845) 46-47. See also a song from that period which repeats the phrase “C'est France et Flandre et la paix entre 
deux”, Antoine-Jean Leroux de Lincy, Recueil de chants historiques français depuis le XIIe jusqu'au XVIIIe siècle,  
avec des notices et une introduction, pt. I, XIIe, XIIIe, XIVe et XVe siècles (Paris 1841) 402-403.
57 Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, III, 100-107; Leo Kooperberg, Margaretha van Oostenrijk, landvoogdes 
der Nederlanden (tot den vrede van Kamerijk) (Amsterdam 1908) 17-24.
58 Hoccalus, 'Histoire des Païs-Bas, depuis 1477 jusqu'en 1492, écrite en forme de journal par un auteur contemporain' 
in: J. J. de Smet (ed.), Recueil des chroniques de Flandre, pt. III (Brussels 1856) 689-742, there 271; Blockmans, 
Autocratie, 277-278.
59 Edited in Blockmans, Autocratie, 339-341. According to Marc Boone, the structure of the council reflected that of 
the one the rebellious Flemings instated in 1379: Marc Boone, 'La justice politique dans les grandes villes 
flamandes: étude d'un cas, la crise de l'État bourguignon et la guerre contre Maximilien d'Autriche (1477-1492)' in: 
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consisted  of  representatives  from the  Three  Members  of  Flanders  of  three  noblemen  that  had 
already served as councillors to Philip: Adolf of Cleves, lord of Ravenstein, Philip of Burgundy, 
lord of Beveren and Louis of Bruges, lord of Gruuthuse — always in that order, since Adolf and 
Philip were 'nobles of the blood', that is, related to archduke Philip.60 Over the course of the next 
month,  Jacob  of  Savoy,  count  of  Romont,  Wolfert  of  Borsele,  lord  of  Veere,  who  had  been 
appointed by the Flemish, but not accepted by Maximilian, were added, and Adrian Vilain, lord of 
Rassegem also  joined  the  council.61 The  words  of  the  document  make  it  clear,  however,  that 
Maximilian did not intend to hand over what he perceived as his rights to tutorship in the county; 
the council was only charged with the “cure, charge et conduite des affaires d'icellui notre pays et 
conté de Flandres tant qu'il nous plaira.”62 It was a stop-gap measure that also required the county to 
pay 20,000 crowns annually.63 What did give the council a good deal of authority was the fact that 
Philip the Handsome himself resided in Ghent, and was not allowed to leave.
Holland's old tradition of party strife had been reinvigorated after the death of Charles 
the Bold in early 1477. The Hook and Cod wars had been more or less subdued by the Burgundians, 
but after the last duke died the crisis was followed up by Hook coups in several cities. The new 
lieutenant  (stadholder),  Wolfert  of  Borsele,  was  driven  into  the  camp  of  the  Hooks,  and  his 
lieutenancy culminated in the plundering of the houses of the Cods in the Hague with an army that 
he had gathered to relieve the court from a siege by the Cod leaders. After many failed attempts by 
Maximilian at reconciliation and the installation of a neutral lieutenant in the person of Josse of 
Lalaing, the archduke finally chose to support the Cods. Many of those that were banished moved 
to Utrecht, which was pressured by Maximilian to uphold a 1430 treaty stating that it would not 
house refugees from Holland. Before the bishop could evict them, the Hooks, under the leadership 
of John of Montfort,  took Utrecht in 1483. Maximilian was forced to lay siege to the city.  He 
reconciled with Montfort, but by then the late Lalaing had been replaced by the front man of the 
Cods, John (III) of Egmont, finally solidifying the position of that party in Holland.64
After the defeat of Utrecht, Maximilian's attention quickly shifted Southwards again to 
Yves-Marie Bercé (ed.) Les procès politiques (XIVe-XVIIe siècle) (Rome 2007) 183-218, there 215.
60 Blockmans, Autocratie, 279, 288; Cools, Mannen met macht (2001), 120-121.
61 Haemers, De strijd, 57-58, 64-65.
62 Blockmans, Autocratie, 341; Louis-Prosper Gachard, 'Les archives royales de Düsseldorf. Notice des documents qui 
concernent l'histoire de Belgique', Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire, 4th series, 9 (1881) 267-366, there 
306. The formulation “tant qu'il nous plaira” was common in the nomination of councillors: Jean-Marie Cauchies 
and Hugo de Schepper, Justice, grâce et législation (Brussels 1994) 58.
63 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 138-139. Bruges took the burden of 19.000; Ghent refused to pay up at all
64 Michel van Gent, Pertijelike saken. Hoeken en Kabeljauwen in het Bourgondisch-Oostenrijkse tijdperk (Den Haag 
1994) 164-328; S.B.J. Zilverberg, David van Bourgondië, bisschop van Terwaan en van Utrecht (±1427-1496) 
(Groningen 1951) 50-70; Marius Pieter van der Linden, De burggraven van Montfoort in de geschiedenis van het  
Sticht Utrecht en het graafschap Holland (± 1260-1490) (Assen 1957) 145-162. The document of Egmont's 
appointment is edited in Yvonne Bos-Rops, Hans Smit and Ed van der Vlist, Holland bestuurd. Teksten over het  
bestuur van het graafschap Holland in het tijdvak 1299-1567 (The Hague 2007) 391-392.
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Flanders. In a stroke of luck for the archduke, his nemesis Louis XI of France had died the day 
before the peace was signed in Utrecht. France, suzerain of the Flemish county and supporter of any 
enemy of Maximilian, was plunged into a regency crisis of its own as the newly crowned Charles 
VIII  was  a  mere  13  years  old.65 If  ever  there  was  a  time  to  act,  this  was  it.  The  archduke 
immediately annulled the peace of Arras of 1482, thus effectively restarting the war, and disbanded 
the Flemish regency council in October 1483, as it was net yet four months into office.66 But what 
was supposed to be a swift seizure of power by the archduke turned into the first of the Flemish 
revolts  when the  lords  of  the  regency council  and  the  Members  of  Flanders  refused  to  accept 
Maximilian's authority.67
Interestingly, the next step was taken by the 'grand bâtard' Anthony of Burgundy, the 
illegitimate son of Burgundian duke Philip the Good, who had fulfilled important positions during 
the reign of his father and his half-brother Charles until the latter died in 1477 and Anthony traded 
in the Burgundian court for that of France.68 Anthony's position as father to Philip of Burgundy, one 
of the original three members of the regency council, and as family member of Philip the Handsome 
made him closely related to the conflict, while his stay in France for the last seven years meant he 
was far enough away from local politics that he could be considered a fairly impartial observer. He 
assembled  the  members  of  the  Order  of  the  Golden  Fleece  in  Dendermonde  in  early  June  to 
arbitrate  between  the  Order's  sovereign  Maximilian  and  five  of  its  members  who  formed  the 
Flemish regency.69 The Flemish held on to their demands of an autonomous regency council, and 
asked that the knights guarantee the rights of Philip in the territories that had accepted Maximilian 
of Austria as regent. They furthermore asked Antony of Burgundy and Philip of Cleves — son of 
65 Cools, Mannen met macht (2001), 122; Koenigsberger, Monarchies, 60; Yvonne Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII. Le 
vouloir et la destinée (Paris 1986) 29-36; Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-bas, 704 speaks ironically of a “petit discord 
qui estoit lors en France entre aucuns princes.” There are interesting comparisons to be made between the 
Netherlands and France in this period. A major factor in complicating the succession in France, that eventually led 
to open conflict in the 'Guerre folle', was, as in the North, the centralising tendencies of the (previous) monarch. It 
was the (former) Burgundian Philippe Pot, addressing the Estates-General of France, who argued that it was the 
right of this body to appoint the king's council during his minority: Helmut Koenigsberger, 'Monarchies and 
parliaments in early modern Europe. Dominium regale or dominium politicum et regale', Theory and society, 5 
(1978) 191-217, there 193. A comparative study might be able to shed light on the differences or lack thereof 
concerning centralisation and succession in the 'composite' Burgundian state and the 'unified' French state. 
Kooperberg, Margaretha, 36, makes a comparison between Maximilian and Anne of Beaujeu.
66 Raymond van Uytven, 'Crisis als cesuur' in: D.P. Blok (ed.) Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden, pt. V, Nieuwe 
tijd (Haarlem 1980) 420-435, there 423. Maximilian blamed the French for breaking the peace: Gachard, Lettres  
inedites, I, 62.
67 For the letters of discussion, BNF ms. fr. 18997, f.1r-24r, the relevant parts of which are edited in Joseph Kervyn de 
Lettenhove, Joseph, Histoire de Flandre, pt. V, Ducs de Bourgogne. 1453. -1500. Depuis la paix de Gavre 
jusqu'aux traités de Damme et de Cadzand (Brussels 1850) 526-546.
68 Cools, Mannen met macht, 165-166.
69 Blockmans, Autocratie, 284; idem, Handelingen van de leden en van de Staten van Vlaanderen : excerpten uit de 
rekeningen van de Vlaamse steden en kasselrijen en van de vorstelijke ambtenaren. Regeringen van Maria van 
Bourgondie en Filips de Schone : 5 januari 1477-26 september 1506 (Brussels 1982) 331-332.
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Adolf,  who was still  in Maximilian's  service — to oversee this.70 The archduke maintained the 
claims that he had been making since the death of his spouse. To the first of the Order's points, the 
symbolism of his  status of guardian instead of sovereign,  Maximilian was willing to consent.71 
What broke down the negotiations was the difficulties between the archduke and the city of Ghent. 
Two of the city's magistrates, William Rijm and Daniel Onredene, retired to their quarters when 
things went Maximilian's way at the gathering.72 The chronicle of Despars says that “it was all a 
waste of effort, since the aforementioned archduke did not answer other than that he would have 
nothing to do with those peasants and rascals of Flanders, but that he would be custodian and tutor 
of the persons and goods of his underage children, whether those people would like it or not, with 
more such propositions and threats.”73 Nothing came of the arbitration, but what can be concluded 
from this episode in Dendermonde, is the influence and the position that was awarded to the Order 
of the Golden Fleece. Rather than an organ to tie the aristocracy to the sovereign,74 it manifested 
itself here as a guardian of a 'national'  well-being and both parties expected it to play a neutral 
part.75
With negotiations  failing,  Maximilian decided in  November  that  military campaigns 
were to solve the issue.76 The archduke had seen it coming: a year earlier he complained to his 
nephew that he had really wanted to spend some time dancing and hunting, but he would have to 
kill ten thousand Flemings before he could do so in peace.77 Philip of Burgundy, realising that the 
force of arms of Flanders was no match for that of Maximilian, switched sides.78 Furthermore, an 
aggressive blockade of the Brabantine economy of the county rallied the other territories behind 
Maximilian, officially so in a meeting of the Estates-General in December 1484.79 War commenced 
70 Blockmans, Autocratie, 285. The document is edited there pp.344-349.
71 Blockmans, Autocratie, 286, 350-353.Cools, Mannen met macht, 122-123
72 Blockmans, Autocratie, 287; Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-bas, 703; Gruuthuse said so too in his defense in 1491: 
Bernhard Sterchi, Über den Umgang mit Lob und Tadel. Normative Adelsliteratur und politische Kommunikation im 
burgundischen Hofadel, 1430-1506 (Turnhout 2005) 611.
73 Nicolaes Despars, Cronycke van den lande ende graefscepe van Vlaenderen, pt. IV, J. de Jonghe (ed.) (Bruges 
1840) 241-242. “twas al verloren aerbeit, duer dien dat hem die voornoemde eerdsthertoghe anders gheen 
antwoorde: en ghaf dan dat hij met die boeren ende bijnghels van Ghendt niet te doene hebben wilde, maer dat hij 
voocht ende momboir wesen zoude van de persoonen ende goedinghen van zijne onbejaerde kynderen, ofte 
hemlieden lief ofte leedt ware, met meer andere dierghelijcke propoosten ende dreeghementen.” cf. Cornelius 
Aurelius, Cronycke van Hollandt, Zeelandt ende Vrieslandt [Divisiekroniek] (Leiden 1517) f.396r.
74 De Gruben, Les chapitres, 6-11.
75 Armstrong, A policy for the nobility, 231.
76 Blockmans, Autocratie, 289.
77 De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 78.
78 Haemers, De strijd, 113-114; Cools, Mannen met macht, 123. Cools is mistaken when he states that Adolf of Cleves 
also jumped ship. A curiosity is that Aurelius, Divisiekroniek f. 397r mentions that Maximilian forgives Beveren 
only with the subjection of Ghent.
79 Van Uytven, Crisis als cesuur, 424; Koenigsberger, Monarchies, States general, 61. For example, archduke Philip 
was to reside in a different location every four months, but Ghent refused to let him leave, to the dismay of the 
Brabanters: Olivier de la Marche, Memoires d'Olivier de La Marche, maitre d'hotel et capitaine des gardes de 
Charles le Temeraire, Henri Beaune en Jules d'Arbaumont (eds.) (Paris 1888) 260-261.
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late in that year when Brabantine troops took Dendermonde disguised as monks.80 Court chronicler 
Monstrelet mentions that Maximilian made a speech in the castle of Oudenaarde, which he seized 
on the third of January the following year, in which he explained that he had taken the city “pour 
garder l'heritage de son filz et ne volloit quelque mal faire à nulz des manans en habitans.”81 The 
punishment, it seems, was to be reserved for the actual perpetrators. On the side of Flanders, Jacob 
of Savoy was made 'lieutenant et capitaine général'. His campaign into Brabant was devastating to 
“pluseurs villages non accoustumés d'estre persecutéz de guerre”, but the flu quickly forced him and 
his army to retire to Flanders.82 The council had succesfully used its connections to the French court 
to persuade the king to send the marshall  Philip of Crèvecoeur,  lord of Esquerdes — who had 
served the Burgundians until the demise of Charles the Bold — to the Netherlands, but his army 
quickly found itself  at odds with the Flemish burghers.83 Their disagreement led to the Flemish 
army marching out on its own and being annihilated on the 22nd of May,  1485.84 This, in turn, 
caused the French to retreat from Flanders altogether.85
In addition to the Wim Blockmans's  'Great  Tradition  of Revolt'  of  the Flemish and 
Brabanters against the various overlords throughout the centuries, Marc Boone and Maarten Prak 
have  coined  a  'Little  Tradition'.  They  noticed  that  urban  revolts  would  almost  invariably  be 
preceded by a takeover of the city magistracy by the lower classes.86 But as the internal revolts of 
the  burghers  against  the  urban  elites  fuelled  the  larger  ones  against  the  state,  so  too  did  the 
surrenders of the Flemish cities depend on a retaking of power by those elites. In Ghent, William 
Rijm,  the  pensionary  whom we have  encountered  as  the  speaker  on  behalf  of  Flanders  at  the 
80 De la Marche, Mémoires, 266-268; .Molinet, Jean Chroniques de Jean Molinet, I, Georges Doutrepont en Omer 
Jodogne (eds.) (Brussels 1935) 437-438 speaks of December, the Histoire des Païs-bas, 704 of November 25th. 
81 Molinet, Chroniques, I, 438-441; see also Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-bas, 704; De la Marche, Mémoires, 270-271. 
The populace was similarly put at ease during the capture of Dendermonde (De la Marche, Mémoires, 268). Charles 
VIII, however, reprimanded Maximilian for having “êtes entré à puissance d'armes, & y avez fait & souffert faire 
tous exploits de Guerre & hostilité, tuer & meurtrit plusieurs des pauvres habitans, butiner & piller leurs biens & 
maisons[.]” Dumont, Corps universel, III/2, 138.
82 Gachard, Lettres inedites, I, 52-53; Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-bas, 704; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 438; Alphonse 
Wauters, Histoire des environs de Bruxelles, ou description historique des localités qui formaient autrefois  
l'ammannie de cette ville, pt. II, (Brussels 1855) 39-41.
83 Cools, Mannen met macht, 123; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 446-447. On the strained relations between the French and 
the Flemish, see Koenigsberger, Monarchies, States generals, 59-60, 61. On d'Esquerdes, see Marie-Thérèse Caron, 
'Philippe de Crèvecoeur, connu sous le nom de seigneur ou maréchal d'Esquerdes' in: Raphaël de Smedt (ed.), Les 
chevaliers de l'Ordre de la Toison d'or au XVe siècle. Notices bio-bibliographiques (Frankfurt 2000) 161-163; 
Mikhael Harsgor, Recherches sur le personnel du conseil de roi sous Charles VIII et Louis XII, 4 pts. (Lille 1980) 
1077-1116.
84 Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-bas, 705; Jean Molinet, Chroniques, I, 449-450;. Molinet has no more than 60 Flemings 
get away out of a total of 20.000-24.000.
85 De la Marche, Mémoires, 272.
86 Marc Boone and Maarten Prak, 'Rulers, Patricians and Burghers: the Great and the Little Tradition of Urban Revolt 
in the Low Countries', in: Karel Davids en Jan Lucasssen (eds.) A Miracle Mirrored: The Dutch Republic in 
European Perspective (Cambridge 1995) 99-134; Wim Blockmans, 'Alternatives to Monarchical Centralisation: the 
Great Tradition of Revolt in Flanders and Brabant.' in: Helmut Koenigsberger (ed.), Republiken und 
Republikanismus im Europa der Fruhen Neuzeit (München 1988).
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gathering of the Estates-General in 1482, and whom the chroniclers of the court accused of breaking 
down the mediation by the Order of the Golden Fleece, was imprisoned, as were Daniel Onredene, 
Jan  van  Coppenhole  and even Rassegem,  member  of  the  regency council.  The  first  two were 
executed  by  the  aldermen  in  June.  They  were  held  responsible  for  the  break  with  France.  In 
addition, word had it that Rijm meant to sell Philip's jewellery to pay for the war effort, and some 
even said that he wanted to send the young archduke to Paris to be married to a French lady.87 It was 
the  impoverished  merchant  elite  of  Bruges  that  called  for  negotiations  with  Maximilian.88 The 
archduke was received in Bruges late in June, where he made peace with the Three Members on the 
28th.89 He entered Ghent early in July, finally reuniting with his son after several years, “dont les 
coers de ceulx qui les veoyent furent sy esprins de joye qu'ilz en plouroyent à grosses lermes.”90 The 
punishment of the city was rather mild, but when the Ghenters rioted against Maximilian's troops in 
the city a few days  later,  they were forced to  beg the archduke “to prefer grace and mercy to 
strictness or rigour of justice.” The city was extended his grace, but the new treaty that was drawn 
up for it included terms from the harsh peace that Philip the Good had made with the city after its 
revolt in 1453.91 Flanders was pacified, for the time being.
87 Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-bas, 707; De la Marche, Mémoires, 274-275; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 459; 't Boeck van 
al 't gene datter gheschiedt is binnen Brugghe sichtent jaer 1477, 14 Februarii, tot 1491, Charles Carton (ed.) (Gent 
1859) 78.
88  Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-bas, 707; De la Marche, Mémoires, 277. They explicitly mention that the initiative 
came from the “marchands et les notables” and “les gens de bien”.
89 Verzameling van XXIV origineele charters, privilegien en keuren van de provincie van Vlaenderen van de XIII.e,  
XIV.e, XV.e en XVI.e eeuw (Ghent 1788) 131-135; Blockmans, Handelingen, I, 350-356; An abridged French version 
can be found in Molinet, Chroniques, I, 460-462, which is also included in Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, 
III/2, 145.
90 Molinet, Chroniques, I, 463.
91 Dagboek van Gent van 1447 tot 1470, met een vervolg van 1477 tot 1515, pt. II, Victor Fris (ed.) (Ghent 1901-1904) 
262-263; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 464-467; SAG OV 835: “[...] ghebeden dat prefererende gracie ende ghenade voor 
strancheit ofte rigeur van justicien hem ghelieven willen[...]”
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Image 1: The Burgundian Netherlands between 1477 and 1493
2.2 The Second Flemish Revolt, 1488-1492
With Flanders pacified and France in turmoil, Maximilian was able to turn to matters of 
the empire.  In February 1486, he was elected king of the Romans.  The coronation followed in 
April.92 The war with France, which had still been going on since 1483, but fought without much 
vigour by either parties,  flared up again as the newly crowned king optimistically sought allies 
among the now openly rebelling  pairs de France.93 Despite Maximilians best attempts, however, 
Philip of Crèvecoeur booked many successes against the Habsburg army in this period, taking St.-
Omer en Therouanne, and capturing a handful of the most important nobles during the disastrous 
battle of Béthune in 1487.94
All  of  this  required  a  lot  of  money  from the  subjects,  who  already  suffered  from 
shortages in foodstuffs. To obtain such sums, the government tried to bypass the big cities and levy 
taxes from the smaller villages, and it also decreased the amount of silver in the coinage to make 
more profit minting.95 This was not only just as damaging to the economy as the aides were, but it 
also undermined the negotiating position that the cities had.96 The atmosphere in the Flemish urban 
centres especially was very volatile; it took only a spark to become explosive. The two sparks were 
some old familiars, Jan van Coppenhole, the Ghent populist who had fled to France, and Adrian 
Vilain, formerly part of the regency council, who had been imprisoned in Vilvoorde until a family 
member set him free in the summer of 1487, returned to Ghent and immediately replaced the city's 
government.97 Philip  of  Cleves  (the  son  of  Adolf),  Anthony  of  Burgundy  and  his  son  Philip 
attempted to reconcile the city and the king, but to no avail.98 A chronicle describes the situation as 
such:  “Et,  en  effet,  se  démonstrèrent  rebelles  et  désobéyssans  au  roy  des  Rommains,  sans 
toutesvoies encoires faire ouvertement la guerre d'un party ne d'autre, jusques à ce qu'ils eurent 
prins la ville de Courtray[.]”99 That assault on Kortrijk had taken place on the night of the 9th of 
92 Molinet, Chroniques, I, 479-516 is especially lengthy on these episodes. Cools, Mannen met macht, 123, seems to 
be wrong dating the coronation in June; that's when Maximilian returned to the Netherlands.
93 Van Uytven, Crisis als cesuur, 425; Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique, III, 42-43.
94 't Boeck, 168-169. Molinet, Chroniques, I, 571-577.
95 Blockmans, De volksvertegenwoordiging, 617-618; Koenigsberger, Monarchies, States generals, 62-63; Peter 
Spufford, Monetary problems and policies in the Burgundian Netherlands, 1433-1496 (Leiden 1970) 141-146. Cf. 
Gachard, Lettres inedites, I, 63-64, in which Maximilian promises the aldermen of Ypres to find other ways than 
aides to pay for the war.
96 Wouter Ryckbosch has argued that it was not so much the sums of money that were asked that led to discontent, but 
the lack of influence in the spending of it: Ryckbosch, 'Stedelijk initiatief of hertogelijke repressie? Financiële 
hervormingen en kredietbeleid te Gent (1453-1495)', Tijdschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis 4, 2 
(2007) 3-28, there 11-12.
97 Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-bas, 718; Koenigsberger, Monarchies, States general, 62; Power was now in the hands 
of the weaver's guild. Their problems with Maximilian are described in a letter to the city of Mons: Gachard, Lettres  
inedites, I, 68-72; cf. Wellens, Revolte brugeoise, 14-18.
98 De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 106.
99 Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-bas, 718.
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January 1488. Perhaps Ghent at that time felt confident enough to establish its dominance over the 
countryside after Charles VIII of France had officially expressed a few days earlier that he would 
protect the city.100
Maximilian decided to call together the Estates-General in Bruges to discuss the matter 
in early 1488.101 The contingent of German troops that he brought with him to the city did much to 
agitate the Brugians, however.102 Furthermore, he expanded the 'conseil des finances', the control of 
which was left to six high noblemen:103 Philip of Cleves, Philip of Beveren, John III of Bergen, 
Baldwin and John of Lannoy, and Martin of Polheim. Bruges was stirring and Maximilian ordered 
nearby troops to advance towards the city.104 When he neared the gate to let them in on the 31st of 
January, the gatekeepers closed off the city, locking the troops outside and the king of the Romans 
inside. He was told to return to his stay.105 During that night, the Bruges guildsmen assembled and 
captured  a  number  of  the  city's  magistrates,  who  were  gruesomely  tortured  and  executed.106 
Maximilian sent Philip of Beveren and John of Lannoy out to promise the guildsmen that if they 
ceased their insubordination, they would not be punished.107 But rather than a stand down, the fifth 
of  February  saw  the  now  fully  mobilized  citizens  capturing  the  king  and  placing  him  in  the 
apothecary house Craenenburg by the Great Market.108 The law in Bruges was renewed with the 
help of Ghenter deputies on the 12th, and the Franc was dismembered.109 Most spectacular, perhaps, 
was when the Brugians beheaded the hated maître d'hôtel Pieter Lanchals, on the city square right 
before Maximilian's eyes;110 “ilz ne furent mains joyeulx de sa prinse que s'ilz eusistent tenu le 
100Wellens, États généraux, 200-201; idem, Revolte brugeoise, 12. Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique, III, 44, speaks of a 
“république autonome sous la suzeraineté royale.”
101Wellens, États-généraux, 458.
102De la Marche, Mémoires, 287-288; Wellens, Revolte brugeoise, 14; cf. De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 105.
103Hugo de Schepper, 'De burgerlijke overheden en hun permanente kaders, 1480-1579' in: D.P. Blok a.o. (eds.). 
Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden V (Haarlem 1980) 312-334, there 334; Andreas Walther, Die 
burgundischen Zentralbehörden unter Maximilian I. und Karl V. (Leipzig 1909), 53-57. The text of the ordinance is 
found there on pages 193-195.
104Wellens, Revolte brugeoise, 21.
105Jean Surquet 'Mémoires en forme de de chronique, ou histoire des guerres et troubles de Flandres, mutations et 
rébellions des flamens contre Maximilien, roy des Romains, d'après un manuscrit de la bibliothèque d'Arras' in: J.J. 
De Smet (ed.), Recueil des chroniques de Flandre, pt. IV (Brussels 1856) 503-586, there 509; Wellens, Revolte  
brugeoise, 21-22, cf. 33-34.
106Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-bas, 719; Wellens, Revolte brugeoise, 29.
107Molinet, Chroniques, I, 589.
108Surquet, Mémoire en forme de chronique, 509. Wellens, Revolte brugeoise, 11, mentions an Austrian manuscript by 
Johan Roll dealing with the events of Maximilian's capture which hadn't been used and, to my knowledge, hasn't yet 
been almost fifty years later. I believe he might be referring to Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Cod. 3083.
109't Boeck, 183-184, 185-186; Wellens, Revolte brugeoise, 29; 
110't Boeck, 205-209; Marc Boone, 'La Hollande, source de capital social pour un Flamand ambitieux? Les intérêts et 
les aventures de Pierre Lanchals, grand commis de l'État Burgundo-Habsbourgeois (vers 1441/42-1488)' in: Peter 
Hoppenbrouwers, Antheun Janse and Robert Stein (eds.), Power and persuasion. Essays in the art of state building 
in honour of W.P. Blockmans (Turnhout 2010) 197-223; idem 'La justice en spectacle. La justice urbaine en Flandre 
et la crise du pouvoir «bourguignon» (1477-1488)', Revue historique 308/1 (2003) 43-65, there 59-62. Cools, 
Mannen met macht, 247-248; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 638. In addition to being an agent of governmental 
centralisation, Lanchals had also been responsible for the condemnation of the revolutionary Bruges burgomaster 
23
Grant Turc”, says Molinet.111 
The event — a king detained by his own subjects! — shocked the whole of Western 
Europe. The pope, after having sent an observer, excommunicated the inhabitants of the county of 
Flanders, citing it as a case of  lese majesty. He warned, moreover, that those who would persist 
would invoke the “secular arm of the emperor”.112 Maximilian's father Frederick did indeed attempt 
to come to his aid, bringing with him many German princes and an army of approximately 16,000 
men.113 The  Estates-General  had  gathered  with  Philip  the  Handsome  in  Malines,  and  in  great 
numbers  too;  even  the  usually  less  than  enthusiastic  Luxembourgers  and  Brabantine  clergy 
attended. Unlike the Germans, most were determined to resolve the situation peacefully.114 Perhaps 
this was on the instigation of Maximilian himself, who had an assassination attempt against him 
barely foiled and who was afraid of being sent to Ghent or even to France.115 The Venetians — 
Europe's foremost republicans — had sent the Bruges magistracy a little note containing the advice 
that “dead men make no war.”116 On May the 12th, the Estates of Brabant, Flanders, Hainaut and 
Zeeland, gathered in Ghent, signed a treaty of union for themselves and for the other of Philip's 
lands,  which  also  re-instituted  the  regency  council  in  Flanders.  It  moreover  gave  the  Estates-
General more authority and stipulated that it would assemble yearly.117 By ratifying the treaty on the 
Louis Steylin and others in 1485 as baillif of the city: 't Boeck, 92-93. The executions are mentioned by Huizinga as 
an example of the 'carnivalesque joy' that the people derived from punishment: Johan Huizinga, Herfsttij der 
middeleeuwen. Studie over levens- en gedachtenvormen der veertiende en vijftiende eeuw in Frankrijk en de 
Nederlanden (21st print; Amsterdam 1997 (first print Haarlem 1919)) 38.
111Molinet, Chroniques, I, 637.
112Molinet, Chroniques, I, 642-642, II, 1-6; Some letters sent to the archbishop of Cologne by the Three Members can 
be found in Romboudt de Doppere, Fragments inédits de Romboudt de Doppere découverts dans un manuscrit de 
Jacques de Meyere, Henri Dussart (ed.) (Bruges 1892) 76-77.
113Die Geschichten und Taten Wilwolts von Schaumburg, Adelbert von Keller (ed.) (Stuttgart 1859) 79; Molinet, 
Chroniques, II, 38-42. Gachard, Lettres inédites, 92-93 also mentions the army, but the bailiff of Hainaut estimates 
it at 10,000-12,000 combatants. The 30,000 that Wellens, Revolte brugeoise, 47, mentions is unlikely.
114Wellens, États-généraux, 203-204, 459-462; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 614-618. Wiesflecker, Maximilian, I, 215, is 
less than appreciative of the Estates' pacifism.
115De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 126; Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-bas, 722; Inge Wiesflecker-Friedhuber, Quellen zur 
Geschichte Maximilians I. und seiner Zeit (Darmstadt 1996) 49. A letter by Maximilian to Adolf of Cleves, 
Beveren, Gruuthuse, Bergen, Molembais and Aymeries contained the grim line “Et se je meurs, je recommande mon 
filz à mon père.” BNF ms. fr. 11590, f.259v. He asked Philip of Cleves in Sluis to demand of the soldiers “qu'il 
veullent avoir encore tousiours pascience de point courre ou faire nul dommaige au pays de Flandres jusques que 
l'espoir de la paix soit passé.”, BNF ms. fr. 18997 f. 76v. cf. f.103v; Gachard, Lettres inédites, I, 86.
116Jan van Naaldwijk, 'Eerste kroniek van Holland' [Transcription of London, British Library, MS Cotton Vitellius F 
xv], in: Sjoerd Levelt, Jan van Naaldwijk's chronicles of Holland. Continuity and transformation in the historical  
tradition of Holland during the early sixteenth century, CD-ROM (Hilversum 2011) 547. The chronicle claims that 
the information came from Jean Lemaire de Belges (“meester jan meijer van belges”), who also noted that 
Maximilian obtained and kept the letter. Perhaps he remembered it during his later wars with the Serenissima 
Repubblica.
117Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, III/2, 199-200; Koenigsberger, Monarchies, States generals, 64;Molinet, 
Chroniques, II, 24-31; Verzameling van XXIV charters, 137-148; Wellens, États généraux, 212-213;  Jan Burgers, 
Hans Smit and Ed van der Vlist, Bronnen voor de geschiedenis der dagvaarten van de Staten van Zeeland, 1318-
1572, pt. II, Teksten 1479-1536 (The Hague 2011) 450-452; Blockmans, Handelingen, 458-463. The Estates of 
Holland were absent, but had planned to come. Their delegates were ready to leave when on the 13th of 14th of April, 
news came of the excommunication of the Flemish, and the question of whether it was even allowed to open 
negotiations with them arose. When a delegation finally arrived in Malines on the 25th, the archduke and his council 
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16th, Maximilian won his freedom.118 To ensure that the peace would be kept, the cities of Ghent and 
Bruges demanded a number of hostages from the king of the Romans, among whom was Philip of 
Cleves.119 Philip swore to go to Ghent and to defend the county against Maximilian if the king 
should break the treaty.120
Mere weeks later, Philip of Cleves and Maximilian were indeed at odds and up in arms. 
Who went wrong at what point, is an issue that has often been reduced to a history of the two men, 
ignoring the forces around them. Considering that the issue of blame would be the primary point of 
contention for Philip for the next four and a half years, it is worth looking into the situation more in-
depth. Though Maximilian had agreed not to persecute the Three Members for their actions, the 
emperor Frederick had not. Philip the Handsome had revoked the right of the Estates-General to 
secure peace without consent of the emperor, but the message arrived a day after they had already 
done so.121 Frederick was determined to wage war against the Flemish; he wrote to the duke of 
Bavaria to come to Flanders to punish them for the “grossen unmensclichen Handel, und wir der 
ongestrafft bleiben solt,  was Schimpfs und Schadens das uns [...] dem Heiligen Reiche, dir und 
einem jeden so Regirung und Eberkeit  hat.”122 Maximilian  himself  seems to  have opposed the 
campaign of his father at first, and asked him several times not to continue.123 He even suggested to 
Bruges that the city should appease the emperor by gaining the support of some German princes and 
by releasing the German hostages.124 His advice was not taken up. The king of the Romans then 
forbade the Hollanders to travel to Ghent, relying on the other lands to make a good deal soon: Hendrik Kokken en 
Marjan Vrolijk, Bronnen voor de geschiedenis der dagvaarten van de Staten en steden van Holland voor 1544. pt. 
IV 1477-1494, tweede stuk: Teksten (Den Haag 2006) 799, 800-801.
118BNF ms. fr. 17909, f. 67r-72v;Verzameling van XXIV charters, 149-159; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 6-24. For the 
ceremony, De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 139-140; 't Boeck, 222-224.
119As was usual in when a prince was released as part of a peace treaty: Randall Lesaffer, 'Peace treaties from Lodi to 
Westphalia', in idem (ed.), Peace treaties and international law in European history (Cambridge 2004) 9-44, there 
28-29. Philip's status as a 'hostage' is peculiar, since he was at the same time expected to form part of the regency 
council in Flanders. The May 12 orders the council to consist of the nobles of the blood; Philip Wielant, 'Recueil des 
antiquités de Flandre, par le président Ph. Wielant, d'après divers manuscrits de la bibliothèque de Bourgogne'' in: 
J.J. De Smet (ed.), Recueil des chroniques de Flandre, pt. IV (Brussels 1856) 1-442, there 332, specifies this as 
Adolf and Philip of Cleves and Philip of Burgundy “et aultres”.
120De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 140-148; Gachard, Lettres inédites, 101-102; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 15.
121Gachard, Lettres inédites, I, 88-89.
122Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 61 n. 261. See Paul-Joachim Heinig, 'Ein bitter-freudiges Familientreffen.: 
Maximilian I. und sein Vater in Löwen (24. mai 1488)' in: Jacques Paviot (ed.), Liber amicorum Raphaël de Smedt, 
pt. III, Historia (Louvain 2001) 183-195, there 188-192, for the ways in which Frederick tried to motivate the 
imperial Estates.
123Isidore Diegerick, Correspondance des magistrats d'Ypres députés à Gand et à Bruges pendant les troubles de 
Flandre sous Maximilien, duc d'Autriche, roi des Romains etc. (Bruges 1853) 233-234; Geschichten und Taten, 79; 
Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-Bas, 724-725; De la Marche, Mémoires, 294-295; Naaldwijk, Eerste kroniek, 555; Jean 
Devaux, Jean Molinet, indiciaire bourguignon (Paris 1996) 561-568, sees this as a later, official version to imply 
Maximilian's good intentions. That is not impossible, but it is odd that he would both rewrite the history of the 16 
May treaty and at the same time forbid its mentioning a month later.
124Diegerick, Correspondence, 230-231; De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 151-152; Joseph Grünpeck has Maximilian give 
the following little speech outside the gates of Bruges: “You Brugians have forced me to make a peace, which is 
made according to your will; I have promised to keep it, on conditions, and I shall keep it for so far as I am able. But 
I believe that my father, the imperial majesty, will not confirm it. He stands in Brabant right now with a mighty 
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changed his mind and joined his father's expedition on the 24th of May, and on the 5th of June, the 
imperial army began its forty day siege of Ghent.125 Philippe of Cleves had sworn loyalty to the 
Estates  of  Flanders  just  the  day  before,  and  did  so  again  on  the  26th of  May.126 While  both 
Maximilian and Philip were to take up the following struggle with earnestness and determination, 
they were essentially both dragged into a conflict between Frederick III and the Flemish cities; the 
king even assured the Estates of Hainaut that this was a war of the emperor for the benefit of Philip 
the Handsome and had nothing to do with the Peace of Bruges.127
The issue: Maximilian had solemnly sworn the Peace of Bruges on the 16th of May and 
had taken up arms against the cities of Flanders the week after. Did he break his oath? If so, was he 
allowed to? June seemed national letter writing month, and we have correspondence from Philip of 
Cleves to Maximilian, Frederick, the king of Portugal, and Christoph of Bavaria, as well as letters 
of  reply  from the  king  of  the  Romans.  The  emperor  had  written  to  Ghent  that  he  demanded 
obedience for the parts of the county that were held as an imperial fief.128 Maximilian justified this 
to Philip of Cleves, pointing out once more that the emperor's war had nothing to do with the 16 
May peace, but was a matter between the cities of Bruges and Ghent and the respect they were due 
their  sovereign  and the  Holy Roman  Empire.  It  was,  moreover,  undertaken  by the  advice  and 
consent of the nobles of the blood and the council of Philip the Handsome. Maximilian himself was 
obliged to join his father's cause, since he had sworn to uphold the imperial majesty when he was 
crowned king of the Romans.129 Louis Pynnock, chamberlain and mayor of Louvain, argued that the 
oath was imposed on Maximilian by rebels, and as such, he was not obliged to honour it130  — 
which was technically true, as Medieval law stipulated that oaths made under threat were of no 
value.131 This was a matter that the Flemish had foreseen, and they had made it clear even before 
releasing Maximilian that “many princes have often made great treaties while being imprisoned, 
that have always been kept,” followed by some examples.132 Maximilian used the same imperial 
army; for that reason I advise you to take all care to reconcile with him.” Wiesflecker, Quellen zur Geschichte, 50.
125De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 159; Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 51; Heinig, Bitter-freudiges Familientreffen, 
193-195; Lichnowsky, Geschichte des Hauses Habsburg, VIII, 739-740.
126Diegerick, Correspondence, 235; Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 51. Philip was also awarded a salary of 4800 lb. 
par. at this time. a confirmation dated the 9th of June is edited there on pages 87-88; Blockmans, Handelingen, 465.
127Gachard, Lettres inédites, I, 100.
128De Doppere, 79.
129BNF ms. fr. 18997, f.14r-15r, 17v-18r; Diegerick, Correspondence, 238-239; P.-J. Van Doren, Inventaire des  
archives de la ville de Malines, pt. III, Lettres missives (Malines 1865) 28-30; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 48-50 (quote 
p.49). See Theodor Meron, 'The authority to make treaties in the Late Middle Ages', The American journal of  
international law, 89/1 (1995) 1-20, for the theoretical underpinnings of 'the inalienability of sovereignty'.
130Edmond Poullet, Sire Louis de Pynnock, patricien de Louvain, ou un maieur du Xve siècle. Etude de moeurs et  
d'histoire de la période bourguignonne (Leuven 1864) 257.
131Meron, The authority, 13-20; Friedrich Thudichum, Geschichte des Eides (Tübingen 1911) 48.
132Diegerick, Correspondence, XXIX; See also Allan Hertz, 'Medieval treaty obligation', Connecticut journal of  
international law, 6 (1991) 425-443 for difficulties surrounding treaties as oaths bound by religious ceremony.
26
reasoning to accuse Philip of Cleves of treason. As a member of the house of Cleves and related to 
the  house  of  Burgundy,  he  was  “totallement  suject  audit  Saint  Empire.”  What  could  be  more 
honorable than to serve his emperor in defending Philip the Handsome and his lands against the 
Ghenters, who had always been disobedient towards their princes?133
Philip  of Cleves  never  bought the 'separate  conflict'  argument;  it  seemed to him an 
excuse to start the war in spite of the peace treaty. The Three Members of Flanders were not even 
directly answerable to the emperor — nor in fact, to their true sovereign, the king of France — but 
only their  count was,  and Philip  the Handsome had never deemed to injure the majesty of the 
empire. As for himself, as a vassal of Philip the Handsome he was to be absolutely loyal to his 
immediate prince first and foremost.  Their  sovereign Frederick made war upon archduke Philip 
without reason and “en ce cas, le vassal est tenu de deffendre son seigneur naturel contre icellui 
souverain, et tous sermens et fidelitéz d'entre le seigneur et le vassal sont reciprocques.” Philip of 
Cleves, moreover, was bound by the oath that he had sworn upon the release of Maximilian, to 
defend the signers from anyone who would break the peace. Philip had to take the actions that he 
did for his soul and for his honor: “par ledit serment je me suis obligié à Dieu, mon createur, le 
souverain roy des roix, de l'entretenir,  meismement que ce que ay fait ledit serment, ce a esté à 
vostre  commandement  et  très  instante  requeste[.]”134 He was  careful  to  express  himself  in  this 
manner to Maximilian, but in letters to Frederick and especially in those to his relative John II of 
Portugal he also made it clear that a lot of nobles at court were envious of him and sought his 
downfall.135 To the Ghenters, he referred to either Frederick or Maximilian — it is not made clear, 
perhaps deliberately — as a “vicious tyrant” (valschen tyranten).136 On the 6th of July,  Philip of 
Cleves was declared enemy of the state — or more correctly, enemy of Philip the Handsome, the 
lord  whom he  claimed  he  was  defending  all  along.137 Just  as  we cannot  say for  sure  whether 
Maximilian had intended to discard his oath before taking it, we also cannot say whether Philip of 
Cleves had accepted to being a hostage with the prospect of switching sides.138
The month of June had also seen the regency council being reinstated for Flanders. It 
contained a handful of old familiars, such as the lords of Beveren, Gruuthuse and Rassegem, as wel 
133Molinet, Chroniques, II, 48-50 (quote p.49).
134BNF ms. fr. 18997, f.13r-13v, 15r-17v, 18r-19r; Blockmans, Autocratie, 355-357; Diegerick, Correspondence, 257; 
De Doppere, Fragments, 80-83; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 46-48, 50-54, 55-56 (quotes pp.47, 51).
135De Doppere, Fragments, 78-80, 82-84.
136Gachard, Lettres inédites, I, 104.
137Van Doren, Inventaire, 28-30.
138De Fouw, Philip van Kleef, 139-153, pleads for the breaking of the oath by Maximilian to be the thing that forced 
Philip to act in service of the Three Members. Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 49 and idem, De strijd, 196 n.1049, 
argues that everyone saw Maximilian's turn coming, and one could not reasonably have been surprised that he did 
not keep his oath. 
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as Philip of Cleves, who served as its most active member and lieutenant general of the count.139 
The Habsburg war effort was off to a disastrous start and 1488 turned out to be a very good year for 
the revolt. The imperial siege of Ghent failed miserably in its aims, and the German troops left the 
Netherlands in October. The French, under the leadership of the lord of Esquerdes, were already in 
a  state  of  readiness  before  Maximilian  was  released,  and  immediately  joined  up  with  the 
Ghenters.140 Louvain  and  Brussels,  declaring  that  they  wanted  to  honour  the  treaties  made  in 
Bruges, joined with Philip of Cleves and the Flemish. The rest of Brabant followed suit, or had 
already done so.141 Already in July, the city of Middelburg in Zeeland — and presumably many 
others — had received a “letter in the form of a placard” urging them to join the Flemish within 
eight  days,  but  it  was  in  vain.142 At  a  meeting  of  the  Estates-General  in  Antwerp,  meanwhile, 
Frederick had declared Philip to be an enemy of the empire; his goods were to be confiscated.143 
The Netherlands were pitted into a civil war. The Revolt had on its side most of Flanders and the 
Southern cities of Brabant, which included five of the duchy's seven major cities, supported by the 
French. On Maximilian's side were Hainaut, Zeeland, Malines and the North of Brabant,  which 
mainly meant Antwerp, and whatever Imperial help could be gotten. Little help was to be expected 
from the other territories.
Holland was  firmly  on  Maximilian's  side,  but  it  soon faced  its  own problems.  The 
confusion in the South proved to be the ideal opportunity for the Hooks to try and retake power. 
Francis  of Brederode,  the younger  son of the illustrious  family,  had given up his  education  in 
Louvain and gathered troops and supplies in Flanders throughout spring and summer.144 Philip of 
Cleves,  as  the  regency  council's  lieutenant-general  of  the  archduke,  named  Francis  lieutenant 
139Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 52-53; see also the oath sworn on the 9th of June, ibidem 87-88.
140De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 138, 155; Surquet, Mémoire en forme de chronique, 533; See also P. Pélicier, P., 
Lettres de Charles VIII, roi de France, pt. II, 1488-1489 (Paris 1900) 207-210.
141De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 168, 182-183; Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 61-62; Alexandre Henne and Alphonse 
Wauters, Histoire de la ville de Bruxelles, pt. I (Brussels 1845) 305-306; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 68-70.
142Burgers, Smit and Van der Vlist, Dagvaarten Zeeland, II, 457-458.
143General State Archives, Brussels (GSAB) Rekenkamer (RK) nr. 104 f.93r-100v; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 65, 71; 
Wellens, Etats-généraux, 214-217; 
144Willem van der Sluys, 'Verhaal van den Jonker Fransenoorlog (1509)' in: Unger, J.H.W. en W. Bezemer (eds.), 
Bronnen voor de geschiedenis van Rotterdam. pt. II: De oudste kronieken en beschrijvingen van Rotterdam en 
Schieland (Rotterdam 1895) 53-173. 66, 67; Kornelis van Alkemade, Rotterdamse heldendaden onder de 
stadvoogdy van den jongen heer Frans van Brederode, genaamt Jonker Fransen Oorlog (Rotterdam 1724) 74; Van 
der Sluys says that the Hooks had applied to Philip of Cleves for help already in February 1488. Van Alkemade 
knows it was the 12th of that month. Both mention that Francis arrived in Sluis on the 14th of april. before Philip's 
falling out with Maximilian. The status of Van der Sluys's chronicle, also one of the main sources for Van 
Alkemade, as genuine is unsure, and his dates are almost with exception wrong: M. Carasso-Kok, Repertorium van 
verhalende historische bronnen uit de middeleeuwen. Heiligenlevens, annalen, kronieken en andere in Nederland 
geschreven verhalende bronnen (Den Haag 1981) 442-443; Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 376 n. 26. While it does not 
say that Francis and the Hooks went to Philip of Cleves immediately, a contemporary poem by an anonymus does 
state that they started their activities during the time that Maximilian was a captive in Bruges: A.J., Kort verhaal, 31. 
For its dating, see Unger, De oudste kronieken, 29-30; Carasso-Kok, Repertorium, 282-283. Diegerick, 
Correspondence, 461 suggests that they  instead hid in Ghent before sailing out, which is much more likely.
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(stadholder) of Holland and sent him on his way to keep Holland occupied.145 In the night of 18 
November,  he  landed  near  Delfshaven  and  took  control  of  Rotterdam.146 On  the  night  of  the 
December the 26th our old familiar, the Utrechter John of Montfort had taken Woerden, a city with a 
“strong fortress,  that  was impregnable”  with ease because only one watchman had manned the 
battlements.147 Although allied to the Flemish,  the Hooks did not base their  cause on the same 
ideology. While the regency council sought to install a government without Maximilian of Austria, 
Brederode and Montfort had no qualms asking for the king to confirm and sign a treaty as father 
and tutor of Philip the Handsome. The demands, as they were submitted in February 1489, mostly 
concern a return to balance and to peace between the Hooks and Cods. They required a neutral 
lieutenant to replace John of Egmont, the leader of the Cod faction, and a redistribution of offices to 
Brederode and his supporters to create an equilibrium.148 John of Montfort's demands were of an 
even more  personal  nature.  In a letter  to the Estates  of Holland,  he justified his  occupation of 
Woerden  at  length.  The  Sticht  War  of  1483  was,  in  his  view,  to  blame  on  the  “counterparty 
(wederpartie)  of my lord of Montfort.” The surrender of Utrecht stipulated that Montfort would 
receive Maximilian's grace, and the goods of his that were confiscated during the war would be 
returned  to  him.  Therein  lay  the  problem;  he  expected  to  be  be  handed  back  the  lordship  of 
Purmerend, which was taken from him in 1481, but never saw it again. The Estates of Holland 
reasoned that the lordship was taken from him when he was banished from Holland, before the 
actual Sticht War, and thus was not included in its peace treaty. What made matters worse was that 
it had, by then, been bought by John of Egmont and added to his newly elevated county.149 It is 
noteworthy  that  while  the  demands  of  both  Brederode  and  Montfort  essentially  constituted  a 
reversal  of  Maximilian's  policy  in  Holland since  1477,  the  Hooks  never  questioned  the  king's 
authority  or legitimacy.  These demands were,  however,  completely unacceptable  to the leading 
Cods, and now Holland was embroiled in civil war as well.
145Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 376. Van Alkemade, Rotterdamse heldendaden, 306-307 contains a safe conduct in 
which Brederode calls himself lieutenant.
146Van der Sluys, Verhaal, 70 and Van Alkemade, Heldendaden, 78, 84 misdate the event on the 20th. Aurelius, 
Divisiekroniek, f. 399v and A.J. Kort Verhaal, 31 name the 18th, which is confirmed by archival sources: Kokken 
and Vrolijk, Dagvaarten Holland, IV, 848-851.
147A.J., Kort verhaal, 33; Van Alkemade, Rotterdamse heldendaden, 102-103; Aurelius, Divisiekroniek, 400r (quote); 
Van der Sluys, Verhaal, 84; Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 377.
148Regional Archives Dordrecht (RAD) Oud archief (OA) 639 3, f. 1-2v; an edition is found in M.P. Van den 
Brandeler, 'Geschiedkundige bijdrage over het jaar 1490', Berigten van het historisch genootschap te Utrecht, 2e 
serie, 2 (1859) 79-127, there 115-119, and part of it are edited in Kokken and Vrolijk, Dagvaarten Holland, IV, 891-
892. The Brandeler edition is very useful, since the original piece is quite damaged in areas. Critical analysis in Van 
Gent, Pertijelike saken, 380-381.
149RAD OA 639, 2. The first 5 out of 18 points are edited in Kokken and Vrolijk, Dagvaarten, IV 895. Critical 
analysis in Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 381-383. See also Idem,  'Jan van Egmond (1438-1516), een Hollands 
succesverhaal', Handelingen van de koninklijke kring voor oudheidkunde, letteren en kunst van Mechelen, 95, 1 
(1991) 259-279, there 267; Aurelius, Divisiekroniek, f. 395v-396r.
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In early 1489, after having dropped by himself in Holland to motivate the populace, 
Maximilian set out to find support for his cause in Germany and recruit the English and Spanish 
monarchies for a four-pronged attack on France.150 In the mean time, Albert of Saxony, a cousin of 
his and a veteran of the Hungarian wars, was charged with the task of subduing the rebels in the 
Netherlands.151 Albert was a very capable man indeed, but he had several advantages on his side as 
well.  Compared  to  his  South  German  mercenary  army  with  state  artillery,  the  Flemish  and 
Brabanters were at a disadvantage despite comparable numbers.152 French support was absolutely 
vital for the continued resistance — and it was that support that began to wane as the lily monarchy 
looked to its West. In September of 1488, the last independent duke of Brittany, Francis II, passed 
away. France had long sought to integrate the duchy and saw its chance now. Philip of Cleves rode 
to Charles VIII's court in the hope of gaining support, but with few results.153 Brederode and his 
followers  had to flee  Rotterdam in June.154 On the 22nd of  July,  1489, Charles and Maximilian 
signed the peace of Frankfurt, in which the Flemish and Brabantine question was also meant to be 
resolved; the revolters were to accept the king of the Romans as regent to Philip the Handsome. 
Both parties would proclaim the 1482 peace of Arras; nobody mentioned that of May 16th 1488.155 
The remaining Brabantine cities, hungry and ridden with pestilence, signed their separate peaces 
less than a month later on the 14th of August.156 Albert of Saxony sent Philip of Cleves a short, clear 
letter saying that “quant les rebelles subgetz de monseigneur le roy des Romains et de nostre cousin 
l'Archiduc, son filz, en Flandres et Brabant se remettront en l'obéissance qu'ilz leur doivent, nous 
cesserons et ferons cesser de toute guerre[.]”157
Frankfurt  was  a  broad  peace;  it  outlined  the  international  politics  for  Charles  VIII, 
Maximilian, Henry VII, Ferdinand the Catholic and also Anne of Brittany. The Flemish peace was 
outlined at  Montilz-lez-Tours on 30th of October.158 In both,  it  was stated that Philip of Cleves 
would be reinstated in his honours and pensions, as Charles, no doubt, preferred to see his ally 
150Gachard, Lettres inédites, II, 30-31; Wiesflecker, Maximilian  I., I, 322.
151Wim Blockmans, 'Albrecht de Stoutmoedige, hertog van Saksen, stadhouder-generaal der Nederlanden (1443-
1500)', Handelingen van de koninklijke kring voor oudheidkunde, letteren en kunst van Mechelen, 95, 1 (1991) 189-
200.
152Bart Willems, 'Militaire organisatie en staatsvorming aan de vooravond van de Nieuwe Tijd. Een analyse van het 
conflict tussen Brabant en Maximiliaan van Oostenrijk', 1488-1489, Jaarboek voor middeleeuwse geschiedenis, 1 
(1998) 261-285.
153Dits die excellente cronike van Vlaenderen (Antwerpen 1531) f.261r; De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 199-200, 202-
203; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 83-84.
154Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 385.
155Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, III/2, 236-238; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 156-162. Philip was very 
displeased when he heard of a peace being signed, but Charles sent him a reassuring letter that he had not abandoned 
him, nor the Flemish, Brabantines or Liègois: Pélicier, Lettres de Charles VIII, II, 386-387.
156 De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 222-223; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 162-164.
157Gachard, Lettres inédites, II, 46.
158Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, 242-244; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 164-172; John of Montfort was still 
allied to Philip of Cleves and the Flemish, but was not considered in either treaty.
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remain one of the mightiest men in the Netherlands, rather than be a martyr for a dead cause. But 
debate — which will be analysed in a later chapter — over who was to blame for the conflict in the 
first  place brought Philip into conflict  with Albert  of Saxony and the court  in Malines,  and he 
turned the city of Sluis into a den of piracy. He had been the leader of the Flemish cause up to this 
point, but from 1490 on, the revolt was Philip's game, and Sluis became a more dangerous locus of 
defiance than Bruges or even Ghent.159 The governor of Flanders, Engelbert  of Nassau, entered 
Bruges in January 1490 and renewed the law, albeit not without issues.160 In the following months, 
Philip's garrison at Sluis and that of Albert of Saxony at Damme ensured that, whichever side the 
city was on, its connection to the international waterways was hampered. The expenses of living 
caused a lot  of discontent,  and,  according to Philip Wielant,  “Philippe de Clèves practiqua une 
commotion” in the city and sent John of Rans and George Picavet, along with 300 armed men, to 
take over the government in August.161 The citizens had tried to mediate,  “but my lord of Nassau 
did  not  want  to  hear  anything  about  Philip  of  Ravenstein,  except  that  they  would  distance 
themselves from him, and then they would speak of peace.”162 Montfort,  in the mean time, was 
defeated at the end of the summer of 1490. After many attempts by the estates of Holland, which 
had been under the leadership of the lieutenant Egmont and the royal stable master,163 to finally 
bring Albert of Saxony to the North, he lay siege before the castellan's home town on the 1st of 
June.164 The siege had been going on for 16 weeks when eventually a farmer managed to redirect 
the flow of water and drain the moats. Montfort surrendered soon after.165 The Brugians did not 
have  the  resources  to  wage war  against  Albert  and  Engelbert  and  had  to  surrender  already in 
November.166  Ghent had remained largely neutral. It did not wage open warfare, but neither did it 
accept the terms of the treaty of Frankfurt or Montilz-lez-Tours. The many messengers that Philip 
of Cleves sent to the city probably tried to convince it to come to the aid of Bruges and rekindle the 
revolt.167
159John Armstrong, 'The Burgundian Netherlands, 1477-1521' in: G.R. Potter (ed.), The new Cambridge modern 
history, volume 1: the Renaissance, 1493-1520 (Cambridge 1957) 224-258, there 239.
160't Boeck, 323; Despars, 455-457; Excellente cronike, f. 264r.
161't Boeck, 347-348; Excellente cronike, f.265v; Wielant, Antiquités, 335; 
162Excellente cronike, f.267v.
163Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 380, identifies the stable master with Adolf of Nassau,a cousin of Engelbert. To the 
best of my knowledge, however, Adolf served as royal Hofmeister instead (Wiesflecker, Maximilian I., V, 280; 
Noflatscher, Heinz, Räte und Herrscher. Politische Eliten and der Habsburgerhöfen der österreichischen Länder,  
1480-1530 (Mainz 1999) 56, 63, 68). The Geschichten und Taten identifies the stable master as a 'Deschitz', who 
might also be called 'Zoller' (85, 90). A count of 'Tsorne' died during the siege of Montfort (Naaldwijk, Eerste  
kroniek, 557), but I have not been able to identify him, if it is the same person, with any Zollern.
164Kokken and Vrolijk, Dagvaarten Holland, IV, 942-943; RAD OA. 639 12, f.2r-3r, edited in Van den Brandeler, 
Bijdrage, 126-127 and Kokken and Vrolijk, Dagvaarten Holland, IV, 945-946.
165Geschichten und Taten, 102-103; Regional Archives Leiden (RAL) Stadsarchief I, nr. 1230.
166Molinet, Chroniques, II, 211-213; Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, III/2, 262-263.
167De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 244.
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Ghent stirred up again, but only in March 1491.168 France had supported Philip and the 
Flemish over the years, with financial, natural and moral support, and Philip was once again given 
the title of lieutenant general in October 1491,169 but its interest gradually waned as Charles VIII 
turned his eye towards the conquest of Brittany instead.170 Longtime prisoner Charles of Egmont, 
son of the once duke of Guelders, Adolf, was released in February 1492. He rallied the estates of 
the duchy behind him and threatened to  overthrow Habsburg rule  there.  As a result,  Albert  of 
Saxony and the court decided that the Flemish war had to be brought to an end before another front 
would open in the North, and made the decision to finally lay siege to Ghent and Sluis.171 Philip of 
Cleves' one time companion Philip of Beveren, long since reconciled and now in possession of the 
office  of  admiral,  which  Cleves  still  claimed  for  himself,  sealed  him  in  from the  sea.172 The 
blockade of Ghent agitated its citizens. On the 16th of June, the Coppenhole twins, who had been the 
leaders of the resistance against Maximilian, were executed, and peace was signed on the 29th of 
June.173 The siege of Sluis took its toll on both the attackers and defenders as disease ravaged both 
parties; but only when Philip of Cleves' father died and he had to look after his inheritance, did he 
finally give up his struggle.174 So ended over fifteen years of unrest in Flanders. A year later, the 
peace of Senlis was signed with France, which ended a quarter of a century of conflicts.175
168De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 248.
169Wim Blockmans, 'La position de la Flandre dans le royaume à la fin du XVe siècle' in:  Bernard Chevalier and 
Philippe Contamine (eds.), La France de la fin du XVe siècle. Renouveau et apogée (Paris 1985) 71-90, there 83; 
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170Wiesflecker, Maximilian I., I, 324-333.
171Gachard, 'Analectes historiques. Dixième série', Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire, 3rd series, 4 (1863) 323-
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2. Clashes at court
The chapters above have shown that a group of high nobles led and organised some very serious 
revolts indeed. To properly assess the reasoning behind the punishments doled out at the end, it is 
necessary that we look at the considerations that had to be taken into account by Maximilian and his 
lieutenants. With the process of judgment as unregulated as this one, it depended largely on the 
assessment of the nobles. What were good reasons to take harsh measures, and what were reasons to 
placate such people instead? In which ways was Maximilian dependent on the nobles? We take a 
look at two factors: the first is the broader context, what were these revolts, and what led to a 
culture where so many would choose to throw their lot with the Flemish against Maximilian of 
Austria? Secondly, we look at the narrower context, the petty rivalries and struggles at court that 
informed the decisions of these people to actually form an alternative government.
2.1 Permanent discontent
For the Flemish cities, it is the opposition to the process of state formation that is traditionally cited 
as the main driving force.176 Wim Blockmans especially has worked this out for the Low Countries. 
In his view, the counts and dukes had worked together with the cities to bring down the powerful 
nobility of the high middle ages, until, by the 15th century, the nobles were brought down and the 
monarchs  centralised  and  bureaucratised  society  and  placed  it  in  a  'national'  framework.  This 
conflicted with the interests of the urban centres, which had vested interests in self government and 
international trade. The Great Privilege of 1477 was a continuity in urban demands, but that it was 
actually  granted  was  a  major  break  in  centuries  of  centralising  policy.177 The  revolts  against 
Maximilian of Austria follow this “spirit of 1477”; the entire period up to 1492 is characterised as 
one of great “medieval” urban autonomy finally crushed by the “modern” state.178 While this model 
works very well for the great cities, and is supported by the texts of the demands that were made 
from both sides in various treaties,  it  is rather problematic for our research into the role of the 
nobility. How to place the nobles of the regency council in this?
176cf. Tilly, From mobilization to revolution (Reading 1978) 184-185.
177Blockmans,  Metropolen aan de Noordzee. De geschiedenis van Nederland, 1100-1560 (Amsterdam 2010) 44-73; 
idem, Voracious states and obstructing cities: an aspect of state formation in preindustrial Europe', Theory and 
society, 18 (1989) 733-755, there especially 751. idem, 'Breuk of continuïteit? De Vlaamse privilegiën van 1477 in 
het licht van het staatsvormingsproces', in: idem (ed.), 1477. Het algemene en de gewestelijke privilegiën van Maria 
van Bourgondië voor de Nederlanden (Kortrijk 1985) 997-125; idem and Raymond van Uytven, 'Constitutions and 
their application in the Netherlands during the middle ages', Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, 47 (1969) 399-
424, there 403-405;
178Blockmans, Autocratie, especially 307-312.
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Raymond van Uytven sketched largely the same process as Blockmans did for the urban 
communities, but he also pointed out that the nobility after having been 'defeated' as independent 
players, by no means left the playing field. The reign of Philip the Good was characterised by a 
revival of the nobility by its entering into princely service — a process that later historians have 
dubbed  “state  feudalism”.179 By  means  of  systematic  endowments  with  territories,  offices  and 
associated exorbitant salaries, the dukes of Burgundy created a “super nobility” or  aristocracy.180 
They were, moreover, gifted with lands across different provinces of the Netherlands and could thus 
for the first time be considered Burgundian (in the greater sense of the word) or Dutch.181 According 
to  van Uytven,  the revolts  do not  form a consistent  tradition  of  urban resistance  towards state 
centralisation,  as they do with Blockmans,  but a gradual shift  over the course of the centuries. 
While the earlier revolts were urban in nature, they grew increasingly more 'noble'; Van Uytven 
even goes so far as to say that the nobles “dragged the cities along” in 1488 and that they would do 
so again in the Dutch Revolt.182 This reading of the Flemish Revolts places much more emphasis on 
the aristocracy, and it explains why the nobles had the means to form alternative sources of power, 
but it still doesn't quite answer what the motivations of these nobles were to take up the sword in the 
first place.
Both wrote their accounts of the Flemish Revolts a long time ago, in the seventies and 
eighties.  Luckily,  historiography  has  picked  up  on  the  regency  of  Maximilian  in  the  new 
millennium, and the increased attention to prosopography has provided us with new approaches and 
insights. Hans Cools' thesis on the Burgundo-Habsburg aristocracy includes chapters that deal with 
the loyalties of noblemen from the reign of Charles the Bold to the Flemish Revolts.183 What is 
important in his work is that he sees the actions of nobles as individual choices based on personal 
factors. While state formation is the driving force behind the genesis of the aristocracy,  it is not 
necessarily that for the conflicts; Cools says that the noblemen who defected to France “did not 
confront “the state”, but a quickly shifting arrangement of forces instead.”184 The most influential 
scholar on the period at this time is Jelle Haemers, who has written some articles specifically on the 
motivations behind the revolting nobles. But whereas Cools looks at the nobles in an international 
perspective of choice — throwing one's lot with the Burgundians or with the French — Haemers 
179Cools, Mannen met macht, 15.
180Van Uytven, Crisis als cesuur, 433; The term aristocracy has become fairly mainstream since Hans Cools defined 
the elites that formed the subject of his study as such: Cools, Mannen met macht, 15.
181Van Uytven, Vorst, adel en steden, 110-112.Cf. Rosenfeld, The provincial governors, 13-16. The view goes back to 
Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique, t. III.
182Van Uytven, Crisis als cesuur, 434; Van Uytven, Vorst, adel en steden, 118-119.
183Cools, Mannen met macht, 149-194.
184Hans Cools, 'Noblemen on the borderline. The nobility of Picardy, Artois and Walloon Flanders and the Habsburg-
Valois conflict, 1477-1529', in: Wim Blockmans, Marc Boone and Thérèse de Hemptinne (eds.), Secretum 
scriptorum. Liber alumnorum Walter Prevenier (Louvain 1999) 371-382, there 376.
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takes  into  account  the  accretion  of  new  forms  of  government  agents,  parvenus  and  Germans 
following Maximilian. He posits that the high nobility was threatened in its influence by a wave of 
lower ranked contenders and sought to retain its position by supporting a less centralised form of 
government, the regency councils. In essence, by dividing the court up into multiple social groups, 
Haemers is largely able to take Blockmans' urban theoretical structure and apply it to a section of 
the nobility. He is, nevertheless, adamant on maintaining that the Flemish Revolts are urban revolts 
in which the nobility has little, if any, driving force.185 There is an apparent difference of insight: in 
the models of Blockmans and Haemers, a faction needs to be losing power in order for it to spark a 
revolt, whereas Van Uytven and Cools imply that only strong factions can challenge the power of 
the prince.
Certainly Maximilian of Austria was not the only ruler who had to deal with malcontent 
nobles.  Charles  the  Bold  may  have  seen  no  open rebellion  against  himself,  but  his  reign  was 
plagued by dubious loyalties and defections to the king of France as well. Across the borders, the 
English and French had their own noble rebellions;186 we may even draw connections between these 
and later conflicts, such as the Dutch Revolt and the French Wars of Religion. Jonathan Dewald 
speaks of “a spectacular series of aristocratic rebellions, stretching from the fifteenth to the mid-
seventeenth centuries.”187 The issue was not necessarily one of an actual decrease of influence in the 
face of growing state formation — Philip of Cleves, after all, was at the height of his power in 1488 
— but  rather  a  sense that  things  were  not  going to  go the  right  way,  or  that  one was treated 
unfairly.188 Much of this came down to a structural change in the position of the nobility. In former 
centuries, a nobleman derived his worth from his birth and several leading nobles could expect to be 
allowed into court by virtue of the goods they held.189 This changed generally in the 15th century, 
but  particularly  quickly  in  the  Burgundian  Netherlands,  where  only  a  handful  of  men  could 
penetrate into the new centralised court of the dukes.190 Favouritism was structural in this period; 
status could no longer be entirely taken for granted based on someone's lineage and possessions, but 
185Jelle Haemers, 'Adellijke onvrede. Adolf van Kleef en Lodewijk van Gruuthuze als beschermheren en uitdagers van 
het Bourgondisch-Habsburgse hof (1477-1492)', Jaarboek voor Middeleeuwse Geschiedenis, 10 (2007) 178-215; 
idem, For the common good; idem, 'Le meurtre de Jean de Dadizeele. L'ordonnance de cour d eMaximilien 
d'Autriche et les tensions pollitiques en Flandre (1481)', Publications du Centre européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes, 
48 (2008) 227-248; idem, Philippe et la Flandre.
186Bellamy, Treason in England; Cuttler, Treason in France.
187Dewald, The European nobility, 134-139, 137 (quote).
188Dewald, The European nobility, 137, 149.
189Mario Damen, 'Heren met banieren. De baanrotsen van Brabant in de vijftiende eeuw', in: idem and Louis Sicking 
(eds.), Bourgondië voorbij: de Nederlanden 1250-1650. Liber alumnorum Wim Blockmans (Hilversum 2010) 139-
158, there 140-148.
190Cools, Mannen met macht, 95-128; Werner Paravicini, 'Soziale Schichtung und soziale Mobilität am Hof der 
Herzöge von Burgund', in: idem, Menschen am Hof der Herzöge von Burgund (Stuttgart 2002) 371-426; Robert 
Stein, De hertog en zijn Staten. De eenwording van de Bourgondische Nederlanden, ca.1380-1480 (Hilversum 
2014) 126-127.
35
was formed in a relationship between prince and favourite. The prince's most trusted men might 
expect material rewards in the forms of pensions or donations of confiscated property, and he could 
influence the prince's policy and control access to him.191 With it came a new discourse in which the 
ascription of  renommee by contemporaries formed the core of a nobleman's honour. The primary 
way to assess a man was by his deeds. One of the primary qualities that a ruler should have, was to 
recognise virtue.192 This shift in mentality and the change in the economy,  where landed goods, 
while still profitable, lost ground to the ability of princes to pay wages and pensions, formed the 
new aristocracy, which,as we have seen, Van Uytven and Cools have written about.  The nobility, 
while  not  necessarily  becoming  less  powerful,  became  a  social  group  that  was  increasingly 
dependent on the prince for its wealth and status. As the supply of services at court increased, its 
providing nobles couldn't be met with the same rewards they were used to getting. Quite simply, it 
is a constant problem with favouritism that there is not enough favour to go around — and so we're 
seeing a structural discontent and strife between nobles themselves.193 Favouritist relationships were 
also more fragile than those based on status, and could be ended at any moment.194
In Norbert  Elias'  theories,  the prince attracted the nobility with his lavish court  and 
exploited the competition amongst them to strengthen the state.195 While it's tempting to think that 
such  a  situation  might  be  taking  place  here,  it  does  not  award  the  nobles  enough  power  of 
themselves  and  perpetuates  the  myth  of  an  absolutist  state.196 At  times,  the  conflicts  between 
noblemen at court could be seriously harmful to the position of the prince, and not just when it 
erupted into rebellion. A telling example is given when Philip of Cleves himself, in a treatise he 
wrote on naval warfare, advises Charles V not to make known who would become the leader of a 
military expedition, “pour ce que tousjours vostre conseil ne sera point qu'il n'y a quelque parsialité 
ou envye”; if Charles would announce his lieutenant, the enemies of that man would only give bad 
advice in the hope that the campaign failed.197 Such was the enmity in the Habsburg court in Philip's 
eyes.
The  Burgundian  state  has  traditionally  been  described  as  less  centralised  than  the 
191Jan Hirschbiegel, 'Zur theoretischen Konstruktion der Figur des Günstlings', in: idem and Werner Paravicini (eds.), 
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contexts of revolts, see Perez Zagorin, Rebels and rulers, 1500-1660, pt. I, Society, states & early modern 
revolution (Cambridge 1982) 96-97.
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French, because the cities — the Flemish in particular — could exert power and the duke had to 
depend largely on the aides consented by the Estates-General, whereas the king could employ direct 
taxes. The position of the Burgundians towards their vassals on the other hand may be characterised 
quite differently. Whereas France and England had their peers, and the Empire its host of smaller 
lordships, the Burgundian vassals, although some were titular princes and counts, were never rulers 
in their  own right.198 Louis XI could be under assault  from the League of the Public Weal,  an 
alliance of vassals using the military might of their own domains. Philip the Good's spectacular rise 
during the early years of his reign meant that he had quickly outpaced the expansion of the fiefs in 
the Netherlands, and guaranteed that from a territorial perspective, he did not have any rivals.199 
Instead, noblemen built up social networks and personal legitimacy in the cities.200 People with the 
power of Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Gruuthuse could appoint men of their own preference for the 
influential posts of bailiff in Ghent and Bruges.201 The great nobles were also not limited to a single 
area of origin, and interregionality was most prominent among the high nobility. By the last quarter 
of the fifteenth century, a quarter of the lower and middling nobility in Flanders was 'foreign'; for 
the high nobility that number was thrice as high.202 Adolf of Cleves, though a Brabantine by title, 
also  held  considerable  fiefs  in  Flanders  and  Zeeland;203 Gruuthuse,  though  from  a  traditional 
Flemish family, had worked himself up to being one of the greatest landholders in Holland during 
his stay as lieutenant-general.204 Borsele's patrimony was not just located in Zeeland, but also in the 
North of Flanders.205 The great aristocracy of the Netherlands then did not consist of men with 
peripheral autonomy, but of nobles who had worked their way into the centres of power, where they 
could  challenge  the  dukes  not  with  their  land  or  wealth,  but  with  their  popularity  among  the 
burghers.
Some nobles could claim an even higher status than the regular aristocracy. The concept 
of the nobles of the blood originated in France in the 14th century, but only gained importance in the 
198Paravicini, Soziale Schichtung, 382-383; Janssens, De evolutie, 129-130.
199Richard Vaughan, Philip the Good. The apogee of Burgundy (New edition Woodbridge 2002 (first print London and 
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203Jelle Haemers, 'Kleef (Cleve), Adolf van', Nieuw nationaal biografisch woordenboek, 18 (2007) 540-547, there 540.
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second half of the 15th. Over the next century, the blood relatives would clash with the peerage over 
matters  of precedence,  in which the former would eventually be victorious and they eventually 
became “a separate body and an order of supreme dignity”.206 Burgundy lacked a peerage in the 
French style, and as a result, the status of the 'seigneurs du sang' as the most elevated one developed 
sooner than in France. They were even regarded as the most prestigious part of the Order of the 
Golden Fleece. The 1473 chapter made note that Adolf of Cleves, being descended from John the 
Fearless, was to have the first place among the knights in any procession or train, along with any 
nephews and other close relatives of the duke, while Anthony, the Great Bastard, first chamberlain 
of Charles the Bold, held second place. Being an illegitimate son of Philip the Good ranked him 
lower than the legitimate family members, even if they were less closely connected, but it elevated 
him above all other members of the order.207 Adolf, “comme étant le plus noble,” was moreover the 
one to personally knight Maximilian in 1478 and the young Philip the Handsome in 1481.208 His 
salary in 1477 was a 9600 lb.; he and his family accounted for more than half of the total costs of 
pensions.209 Although, as noblemen, they belonged to the second estate, a treaty such as the one 
signed on the 16th of May 1488 was signed first by Adolf of Cleves and Philip of Beveren, then by 
the clergy, and following the nobles and deputies of the cities;210 they were placed on the same level 
as territorial lords.
The nobles of the blood thus formed an alternative locus of legitimacy, next to Philip 
the Handsome's father Maximilian. The Flemish demanded not only that the regency in Flanders 
was held by the nobles of the blood and the council, but they also wanted the boy's relatives to 
assist  Maximilian  in governing in the other principalities.211 When Maximilian was captured in 
1488, the Three Members demanded to speak to the nobles of the blood, and refused to take action 
until  these  would  come to  Ghent.212 They were  also  the  ones  who had to  set  up the  different 
proposals for the release of the king of the Romans.213
In  conclusion,  we  might  argue  that  unruly  noblemen  were  the  rule  rather  than  the 
exception in this period. Any monarch who did not gain territory as quickly as Philip the Good or 
Charles V did, was inevitably going to find himself with a shortage of favours to deal out in the face 
206Richard Jackson, 'Peers of France and princes of the blood', French historical studies, 7 (1971) 27-46  27-46, quote 
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of a nobility that had been conscripted and empowered as representatives of rule. They operated not 
in the peripheries,  as the dangerous rebels  of France did,  but exactly at  the heart  of power. In 
addition, a group of nobles of the blood came into power; they were, at the same time, the ones who 
had most to lose from the rule of a Habsburg, and also the ones most necessary to legitimise that 
rule  as  a  continuation  of  a  Burgundian  tradition.  That  exactly  these  people  revolted  is  neither 
surprising nor irrelevant.
2.2 A court of contenders
We have seen that, in addition to any disagreement with the duke, a great source of medieval and 
early  modern  revolts  was  tensions  and  factionalism  at  court,  which  almost  inevitably  led  to 
discontent  among  nobles  who  might  group  together  as  a  result.  Factions  did  not  necessarily 
correspond to a social partition.214 Although any clear cut distinction into factions is artificial, it can 
be  very  useful  if  used  with  consideration.  We  might  be  able  to  shed  light  on  the  common 
characteristics of the men who formed the regency council, and position them next to three groups 
at court that threatened their position.
The high nobility being a fairly small club, its members did not have a lot of choice if 
they wanted to marry people of their own status.215 Consequently, we can see that, of the noblemen 
of the regency councils, only Rassegem does not neatly fit within a family tree that also included 
the Burgundian dukes (see the appendix).
The death of Charles the Bold in 1477 shook up the Burgundian nobility.  Louis XI 
exploited the situation by taking over the late duke's position as patron for a good deal of powerful 
military men, and introducing them to the French court. Among them were such men as the grand 
bâtard Anthony and the governor of Picardy and Arras Philippe de Crèvecoeur, lord of Esquerdes.216 
Together, they formed a Flemish faction at court, which insisted on intervening in Flanders over 
Brittany and which could serve as a link with the rebellious cities.217 Maximilian's court ordinance 
was no doubt meant to counteract this exodus. While the absolute size of the court shrank, the 
number of noble chamberlains for the archduke alone came up to 116, almost thrice that of the 
previous dukes.218 The battle over the nobility continued over the years by means of promises and 
214Dumolyn and Buylaert, L'importance, 279-289.
215Cools, Mannen met macht, 97-98.
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favours.  Philip  of  Beveren  was  given  the  prospect  of  a  tempting  inheritance  in  France,  but 
Maximilian won him over  by giving him the governorships of Namur,  Picardy and Artois,  the 
Golden  Fleece  collar  and  a  stipend  that  was  double  the  salary  of  a  councillor-chamberlain.219 
Maximilian made sure to win Charles of Croÿ for himself by elevating his county of Chimay to an 
imperial principality.220 Olivier de la Marche and Philip of Croÿ were rumoured to be interested in 
French service in 1478, but they, too, stayed in Habsburg service.221 Maximilian had made attempts 
to woo Beveren's father, the grand bâtard Anthony of Burgundy, back to the Low Countries, but to 
no avail.222 As long as the king of France was intent on bleeding the Burgundo-Habsburg court dry 
of nobles, Maximilian was forced to employ a careful and expensive policy of favours.
The arrival of Maximilian and a stronger grip on the machinery of state and nobility was 
not appreciated by everyone. Most of the members of the regency council belonged to the people 
who had filled up the power vacuum at duke Charles' death in 1477. Jelle Haemers has regarded 
Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Gruuthuse as the 'guardian angels' of the Burgundian dynasty in this 
period. The former was promoted to lieutenant-general of the Netherlands, with Philip of Cleves as 
his backup, and the latter was made chevalier d'honneur, the equivalent of a first chamberlain, and 
thus the closest person to the duchess.223 Since the Great Privilege in Holland forbade any foreigners 
to take office,  Gruuthuse,  as lieutenant-general,  was replaced by his family member Wolfert  of 
Borsele.224 They all  ran into conflicts  with Maximilian at  some point.  Borsele was already in a 
troubled position because of the tight connections between his late father and the French king, his 
marriage to Charlotte of Bourbon, and rumours circulated that he, too, was not exclusively loyal to 
the  Burgundian  dynasty.  When  his  lieutenancy  failed  and  he  threw  his  lot  with  the  Hooks, 
Maximilian supported the Cods and relieved Borsele of his position.225 The archduke's policy in 
Holland brought him in conflict  with Wolfert  of Borsele during the Flemish Revolt,  but it  also 
pitted him against John of Montfort in the Utrecht war. Louis of Gruuthuse was dealt a blow when a 
conflict between his favourite for the position of Bruges bailiff and the former bailiff, who believed 
he still held the position, was brought before the Great Council. Maximilian and Mary personally 
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periode (1425-1482) (Leiden 2000) 194-195; Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 207-209; Louis Sicking, Zeemacht en 
onmacht. Maritieme politiek in de Nederlanden 1488-1558 (Amsterdam 1998) 38.
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intervened and sided against Gruuthuse.226 That his son John joined the French court,  married a 
granddaughter  of  Charles  VII,  and  became  brother-in-law to  Esquerdes  probably  did  not  help 
either.227 Adolf of Cleves found the former castellan of his fief Wijnendale and bailiff of Ghent John 
of Dadizeele murdered in 1481. The killer was sheltered by Maximilian, and the archduke refused 
to start an official investigation. Not only was this a provocative towards Adolf, but Rassegem, as 
the first alderman of Ghent, led the protest that the city organised.228 At the chapter of the Golden 
Fleece in 's-Hertogenbosch in 1481, neither Gruuthuse nor Borsele showed up. The latter was not 
just punished with the fine for nonattendance, but was also accused of having used violence during 
his lieutenancy, and of having had provided crucial information to the king of France.229
Maximilian's  foreign policy was far  more  firmly anti-French than  that  of Philip  the 
Good and perhaps  even more  so than that  of Charles  the Bold had been.  Confronted with the 
statement  that  “les  Franchois  [sont]  anciens  annemis  de  la  maison  de  Bourgogne,”  Louis  of 
Gruuthuse could only respond with amazement that he was one of the oldest members of court, and 
had never heard such things said during the reign of duke Philip.230 We have already seen some 
relationships  of regency council  members  with France  come by — Borsele's  wife  Charlotte  of 
Bourbon, Beveren's father Anthony and Gruuthuse's son John, who were active members of the 
Flemish faction at the French court. Furthermore, Jacob of Savoy was the uncle of Charles VIII, and 
his wife, Mary, was the heiress of the convicted count of Saint Pol; they had a lot of confiscated 
goods to gain if they remained in the good graces of the French.231 Philip of Cleves married Mary's 
sister  Françoise some time in 1487, and he could expect  to gain from it  as  well  if  he did not 
antagonise  Charles.  By  that  time,  Jacob  was  dead  and  Mary  was  remarried  to  the  count  of 
Vendôme, Francis of Bourbon.232 We thus have an elite of people who worked themselves up to be 
the most important people after the crisis of 1477, but who ran into conflict with Maximilian of 
Austria, both over matters of influence and jurisdiction within the Netherlands, as well as in his 
policy towards France. To counteract them, the Austrian supported a host of other clients,  who 
might be expected to be more agreeable.
We can divide their rivals into two important groups. Firstly, we have men who climbed 
226Haemers, For the common good, 113-116; idem, Adellijke onvrede, 191-198.
227Haemers, For the common good, 117; Maximiliaan Martens,  Lodewijk van Gruuthuse, maecenas en Europees  
diplomaat (Bruges 1992) 117; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 460.
228Haemers, For the common good, 126; idem, Le meurtre; Victor Fris, 'Rasseghem (Adrien Vilain II, dit le sire de)', 
Biographie nationale, 18 (1905) 748-755, there 748-749.
229Reiffenberg, Histoire, 110-111.
230Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 624-625. See also Gachard, Lettres inédites, 112, 115-116.
231Cools, Noblemen on the borderline, 380; Cools, Mannen met macht, 122. David Potter, 'The Luxembourg 
inheritance: the house of Bourbon and its lands in Northern France during the sixteenth century', French History, 6 
(1992) 24-62, there 27-29.
232Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 42-43.
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the ranks by their legal, financial or diplomatic skills: the parvenus at court. The urban centres of 
the Netherlands and Burgundy brought forth many officers who had a better grasp of finances and 
law  than  the  traditional  noble  families  could  provide.  Such  men  were  adopted  into  the  state 
administration  and given much greater  rewards than they could find in  any city.  This,  in  turn, 
allowed them to live like nobles and even marry into noble families, climbing the social ladder at 
speeds that were very alarming for any old elite.233 Pieter Lanchals, the servant of Maximilian who 
was beheaded on Bruges' market square in 1488, is the most prominent example; he was born the 
son of a carpenter, but worked himself up to the post of receiver general some time before 1477.  It 
is after Maximilian entered the Netherlands, that Lanchals' career became truly spectacular, being 
knighted, made maître d'hotel, and put in charge of financial policy in Flanders.234 His appointment 
to bailiff in Bruges furthermore set him up as a clear contender for Gruuthuse, who had invested 
much in being the local power holder in the city235 — and if we are to believe Gruuthuse's defense 
in 1491, Lanchals had also started a propaganda campaign against him, writing various “libelles 
diffamatoires.”236 Officers like William Hugonet and Guy de Humbercourt, who were tried by the 
Ghent mob in 1477, were of similar caliber.237 Rumours circulated that Adolf of Cleves had been 
suspiciously reluctant to intervene, and even that Hugonet and Humbercourt had been murdered “a 
l'instigation d'aulcuns de la court.”238
A second group consists of the noblemen who had hitherto been part of the traditional 
high nobility of the Burgundian and even pre-Burgundian Netherlands, but who were only in this 
period being elevated to supranational importance — and who would take over from the old elite 
after  their  downfall.  The most  important  among these are  (Limping)  John III  and (Cross-eyed) 
Frederick of Egmont, Engelbrecht II of Nassau, Henry of Witthem and the brothers of Glymes-
Bergen.239 Especially the Brabanters seem to have been doing very well.240 While Louis of Bruges 
233Haemers, For the common good, 126-129; Dumolyn and Buylaert, L'importance, 282-284; for a similar situation in 
England, see Steven Gunn, 'New Men' and 'New Monarchy' in England, 1485-1524', in: Robert Stein (ed.) 
Powerbrokers in the Late Middle Ages: Les Courtiers Du Pouvoir Au Bas Moyen-Age (Turnhout 2001) 153-163.
234Boone, La Hollande; idem, 'Un grand commis de l'Etat burgundo-habsbourgeois face à la mort: le testament et la 
sépulture de Pierre Lanchals (Bruges, 1488)', in: Frank Daelemans and Ann Kelders (eds.) Miscellanea in  
memoriam Pierre Cockshaw (1938-2008). Aspects de la vie culturelle dans les Pays-Bas bourguignons (Brussels 
2009) 63-88.
235Haemers, For the common good, 128-129.
236Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 622.
237Boone, La justice en spectacle, 43-64.
238Boone, La justice en spectacle, 53-58; Philippe de Commynes, Mémoires de Philippe de Commynes, pt. I, Dupont 
(ed.) (Paris 1843) 392-393; Despars, Cronycke, IV, 124; Haemers, For the Common Good, 112-113; Wielant, 
Antiquités, 327. On the other hand, Adolf served as guardian for Humbourt's children for some time: Gachard, Les 
archives, 307.
239Walther, Zentralbehörden, 17-20; Cools, Mannen met macht, 93-94.
240Raymond van Uytven, 'Het hart van de Bourgondische en Habsburgse Nederlanden (1430-1531)' in: idem a.o. 
(eds.), Geschiedenis van Brabant: van het hertogdom tot heden (Zwolle and Louvain 2004) 213-232, there 223-227; 
Paul de Win, 'Filips de Schone en de Brabantse adel, of de Brabantse adel en Filips de Schone?', in: Raymond Fagel, 
Jac Geurts en Michael Limberger (eds.), Filips de Schone, een vergeten vorst (1478-1506) (Maastricht 2008) 37-62.
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had been chevalier d'honneur — the equivalent of a first chamberlain — to Mary of Burgundy,241 
Maximilian  took  Engelbrecht  of  Nassau  as  his  first  chamberlain  in  1482.242 The  honour  was, 
perhaps, not only given by virtue of the talents that the lord of Breda had displayed up to that point, 
but also by his marriage to Maximilian's niece Cimburga of Baden.243 He was furthermore put in 
charge  of  the  regency  government  when  the  archduke  was  elected  and  crowned  king  of  the 
Romans.244 It must have stung somewhat that Philip of Cleves, who was handed the reins of the 
southern domains during the Utrecht war, was not elected for this position, even when he apparently 
put in enough effort during the absence that Molinet actually named him first as regent. Regardless, 
there is no evidence that Philip actively disliked Engelbrecht and they might even have liked each 
other.245
The  same  does  not  go  for  the  first  chamberlain  of  Philip  the  Handsome,  John  of 
Bergen,246 lord  of  Walhain  (the  later  John  III  of  Bergen  op  Zoom)  and  his  brothers.247 The 
ascendancy of the family under Maximilian of Austria is quite remarkable.  John II was a loyal 
noble and chamberlain, but never achieved a position of real influence; a noble like so many others. 
His sons John III and Cornelis were elected into the Order of the Golden Fleece in 1481 and 1500, 
and  son Henry,  the  bishop of  Cambrai,  would become the  Order's  chancellor  in  1493.248 Most 
important was the choice of John for Philip the Handsome's first chamberlain in 1485, a position 
which would turn into the most important one at court once the archduke would come of age.249 Up 
241Butkens, Trophées supplement, I, 44.
242H. Jansen, 'De Bredase Nassaus', in: idem (ed.) Nassau en Oranje in de Nederlandse geschiedenis (Alphen aan de 
Rijn 1979) 11-44 34; Paul de Win, 'Engelbert (Engelbrecht) II Graaf van Nassau-Dillenburg en Vianden, Heer van 
Breda', Handelingen van de koninklijke kring voor oudheidkunde, letteren en kunst van Mechelen, 95, 1 (1991) 85-
115, there 91.
243John of Egmont, too, was related to Maximilian, although much more distantly: M.A. Beelaerts van Blokland, 'De 
nationale positie van het huis van Egmond in de XVe en XVIe eeuw', Jaarboek van het centraal bureau voor 
genealogie, 14 (1960) 33-39, there 35-36.
244Royal House Archives (RHA), Oude Dillenburgse linie 1331-1605 (ODL), nr.  456.
245Molinet, Chroniques, I, 471. Philip did, after all, own a portrait of Engelbert: De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 335-336.
246The family name Glymes that is sometimes used by modern historians (also in the combination Glymes-Bergen), 
was dropped by the family itself after John I inherited the city of Bergen op Zoom in 1419: Willem van Ham,  Het  
doorluchtig huis van Bergen op Zoom: een overzicht van de geschiedenis van de heren en markiezen van Bergen op 
Zoom, hun verwanten en hun bezittingen (1287-1795) (Zaltbommel 1977) 41. In keeping with contemporary 
sources, I will use the name Bergen for the family.
247The editor of De Doppere, Fragments inédits, 83 n. 2., believes that the enmity between Philip of Cleves and John 
of Bergen went back to the murder by Philip of Lancelot of Berlaymont in 1484. That the houses of Bergen and 
Berlaymont were “sans doute alliée” at this time because the baron of Berlaymont married a granddaughter of the 
lord of Bergen op Zoom in 1578, is, in my opinion, a weak argument.
248 Hans Cools,  'Les frères Henri, Jean, Antoine et Corneille de Glymes-Bergen: les quatre fils Aymon des Pays-Bas 
bourguignons', Publications du Centre européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes 41 (2001) 123-133, there 125-127; 
Cornelis Slootmans, Jan Metten Lippen, zijn familie en zijn stad. Een geschiedenis der Bergen-op-Zoomsche heeren  
van Glymes (Rotterdam and Antwerp 1945) 1-111.
249For the office of first chamberlain, see Werner Paravicini, 'The court of the dukes of Burgundy. A model for 
Europe?' in: idem (ed.), Menschen am Hof der Herzöge von Burgund. Gesammelte Aufsätze (Stuttgart 2002)507-
534, there 509-512; Fritz Walser, Die spanischen Zentralbehörden und der Staatsrat Karls V. (Göttingen 1959) 17-
19; Walther, Zentralbehörden, 140-152; cf. Damen, Rivalité, 373-378.
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to that point, the care of the young archduke had been in the hands of Adolf of Cleves, his closest 
Burgundian relative and godfather while the previous first chamberlain, Josse de Lalaing, died in 
1483.250 Adolf's son Philip of Cleves might have expected that, as a noble of the blood and loyal 
follower of Maximilian, he would be next in line, rather than Bergen.251 John was also appointed 
governor of Namur in 1485, a position that Philip of Cleves had tried to buy from the prince of 
Orange,  who held  it  before  Bergen did.252 It  resulted  in  a  grudge.  When the  Namurois  ousted 
Bergen's  troops in spring 1488, they immediately notified Philip of Cleves,  who, hailed by the 
townsfolk, installed his own garrison mere days later.253 Not just did Philip take the castle to protect 
it from “foreign or disloyal hands,” but “to tell the truth, to come to justice, which we have always 
had and followed, regarding the office of governor of Namur, which my aforementioned lord the 
king has always promised to us.”254 It  had to be reconquered in August of that  year.255 Finally, 
according  to  Adolf  of  Cleves,  it  was  common  knowledge  that  John had  wanted  to  obtain  the 
admiralty of the Netherlands, which was in the hands of Philip of Cleves since 1485.256
Philip also held the Bergen family responsible for the 1488 conflict. In a letter to the 
city of Malines written when Maximilian was still captive, Philip thought it necessary to justify 
himself and his father against his detractors. He names Frederick of Egmont, lord of IJsselstein and 
Cornelis of Bergen, the later lord of Zevenbergen, as two nobles who have accused the nobles of the 
blood of wanting to make peace with the Flemish too easily when the imperial army was already 
gathering in Cologne.257 In addition to slandering Philip and his father in this and other ways, they 
250Haemers, De strijd, 44, 74; Molinet, Chroniques, I, 276; Hanno Wijsman, 'Politique et bibliophilie pendant la 
révolte des villes flamandes des années 1482-1492: relations entre les bibliothèques de Philippe de Clèves et de 
Louis de Bruges et la Librairie des ducs de Bourgogne' in: Jelle Haemers, Céline van Hoorebeeck and Hanno 
Wijsman (eds.), Entre la ville, la noblesse et l'état: Philippe de Clèves (1456-1528). Homme politique et bibliophile 
(Turnhout 2007) 245-278, there 246-248; Apparently, Adolf still guarded over Philip in 1486 during Maximilian's 
journey to Germany: Molinet, Chroniques, I, 470-471. For Lalaing, Walther, Zentralbehörden, 145 n.1.
251The Bergen family was related to the Burgundian dukes: they descended from a bastard son of John II of Brabant († 
1312): Butkens, Trophées Supplement, I, 146. John's great-granddaughter Margaret married the Burgundian duke 
Philip the Bold in 1369. However, the ties were so distant that the members of the Bergen family were not 
considered nobles of the blood or addressed as cousins for it
252De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 96; Edmond Poullet, 'Les gouverneurs de province dans les anciens Pays-Bas 
catholiques', Bulletins de l'adadémie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, 2e serie, 35 
(1875) 362-437, 810-921, there 904.
253 De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 127-130; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 63-64.
254Van Doren, Inventaire Malines, IV, Lettres missives, 25: “[...] soe verre 't selfve slot ghevallen ware in vremde oft 
ongetrauwe handen, als oick, om die waerheyt te zeggen, om te commen tooten goeden rechte dat wy altyt gehadt 
ende gevolget hebben, aengaende der officien van gouverneur van Namen, van denwelcken myn vorscreve heere de 
conynck ons altyts toegeseecht heift te doen gebruycken[.]”
255De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 177; Throwing out the governor John of Bergen was considered to be lese-majesty, but 
the city was forgiven if it would rally itself behind Maximilian's cause; probably a wise decision in September 1488: 
Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 63.
256Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 647.
257For Cornelis of Bergen, see Cools, Les frères, 127-128; Slootmans, Jan metten Lippen, 61-66. IJsselstein, too, very 
much enjoyed Maximilian's favour, as his fied of Buren was elevated to a county in 1492; the only other person to 
have gained an elevation to count was Frederick's older brother John of Egmont.
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had encouraged the Germans  to  punish and plunder  Louvain  and Brussels,  two cities  that  had 
disagreed with Maximilian in the past; “By which one may take notice of the good opinion, love 
and  friendship  they  have  towards  aforementioned  matter  and  the  lands  from which  they  were 
born.”258 A letter sent to the king of Portugal on the 27th of June after having joined the Flemish is 
even clearer. Philip mentioned that a group at court, with John of Bergen and his brothers as the 
leaders, had fuelled the war so that they could vindicate themselves against him. The entire war had 
little to do with the emperor or Maximilian; it  was the Bergen clan at court which stirs up war 
against Philip and the Flemish out of spite and envy.259 The claim was brought forward in 1492 as 
well, when he stated that the war, the infraction of the peace and all evils had been procured by 
John of Bergen and his  ilk  out  of hate  for Philip  of Cleves.  “[P]our satisfaire  à  sa dampnable 
ambition, lui sambloit qu'il ne seroit point sceur en son estat, se mondit seigneur Philippe n'estoit 
bany publicquement et dechassé du pays.”260
Philip  of  Cleves  likely  was  not  the  only  man  who harboured  a  grudge against  the 
Bergen clan.  During  the war  with Utrecht,  a  sizable  amount  of  land confiscated  from John of 
Montfort was given to Michael, the sixth of the Bergen brothers. He died soon after, and the fief 
was  inherited  by  none  other  than  his  elder  brother  John,  who  appointed  Cornelis  governor.261 
Although  Montfort's  struggle  mostly  seems  to  have  concerned  John  of  Egmont's  lordship  of 
Purmerend, his demands did include being reinstated as lord of these goods as well.262
Two things are noteworthy about these contending groups. Firstly, although they were 
not always newcomers and had built careers under the Burgundian dukes, their fortunes rose greatly 
under Maximilian of Austria. It seems that they were made specifically to be contenders, and that 
Maximilian had tried, by these means, to curb the power of the aristocracy that had grabbed the 
reins of state in 1477.263 Secondly, they could not always enjoy the affection of the (Flemish) cities. 
We have  seen  how Lanchals  and  other  state  officials  were  tried  at  the  Bruges  market  square 
Whether the new elite was as disliked is not clear. John of Bergen's governorship certainly was not 
liked by the local populace, and Engelbrecht of Nassau had wanted to commit a blood bath in Ghent 
when its citizens had started rioting after Maximilian's entry in 1485.264 It is also worth mentioning 
258Van Doren, Inventaire Malines, IV, Lettres missives, 22-26. “By denwelcken men wel mach mercken die goede 
meeninge, minne ende vriendscap, die zy hebben totten vorscreven materien ende den landen daer zy uuyt geboren 
zyn;”
259De Doppere, Fragments inédits, 82-84.
260Molinet, Chroniques, II, 282.
261Municipal Archives Bergen op Zoom, Register van procuraties en certificaties nr. 5269 f.104r; Van der Linden, 
Burggraven, 164-165; Slootmans, Jan metten Lippen, 60-61. The chronology is uncertain here; Van der Linden sees 
Michael granted the goods on November 4th, 1482, but Slootmans has him die on the 30th of August that same year.
262RAD OA 639 5, f.1r; Van den Brandeler, Bijdrage, 120.
263Buylaert, Eeuwen van ambitie, 186-248; Buylaert and Dumolyn, L'importance, 282-284.
264De la Marche, Mémoires, III, 283.
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that while the Cleves family, Gruuthuse and Borsele had hôtels in Bruges, nobles such as Bergen 
and Nassau only focused on Brussels and Malines.
In  the  end,  we find  that  the  noblemen  who revolted  against  Maximilian  of  Austria 
certainly had their own reasons and goals, that only sometimes overlapped with those of the urban 
centres.  To  speak  of  the  revolts  as  either  urban  or  noble  would  be  dangerously  reductive. 
Furthermore, the status of these people, their legitimacy and their political networks put them in a 
different  position than the popular  politicians.  We must  accept  that,  like the Dutch Revolt,  the 
Flemish Revolts were not an easily defined struggle between two parties, “but a highly complex 
process in which different groups strove for different goals.”265 As for Maximilian of Austria, he 
was faced with certain groups within the nobility that he at once needed to keep loyal to his cause 
by means of pensions and offices, and at the same time weaken their position and replace them with 
a political elite that more loyal to and dependent on himself. The two were essentially clashing: if 
he won in political power, he would risk losing legitimacy, and if he would use noblemen to enforce 
his legitimacy, he was forced to give up political power in exchange. The revolts broke the uneasy 
status quo. Could the punishments doled out solve his dilemma?
265Henk van Nierop, 'Alva's Throne — making sense of the revolt of the Netherlands', in: Graham Darby (ed.), The 
origins and development of the Dutch Revolt (London and New York 2001) 29-47, quote pp.32-33.
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3. Traditions of crime and punishment
Law and justice  were  well  rooted  in  Medieval  society,  but  rebellions  more  or  less 
escaped the subtle grasp of the doctors of law. There were many kinds of justice, remarks Philippe 
Contamine, but what was lacking (then as now) was any form of specific 'political justice.'  The 
punishment of rebels consisted mostly of ad-hoc solutions and traditions, rather than of any clearly 
defined code.266 This often led to conflicts and uncertainties over procedure and jurisdiction. The 
Burgundian,  thanks  to  the  ever  unsatisfied  Flemish  guildsmen,  had  built  up  a  great  deal  of 
experience  in  punishing  and repressing urban communities  after  revolts,  and developed certain 
common repertoires. The situation during the regency of Maximilian of Austria was unprecedented, 
however, in the sense that it combined noble feuds with urban revolts. Thus enmities that might 
normally have been solved (one way or another) in the closed confines of court entered the stage of 
interregional  and  even international  politics,  and  much  of  the  future  of  Philip  the  Handsome's 
subjects  depended  on  such  outcomes.  In  this  chapter,  we  will  examine  several  traditions  of 
punishment, from the basis of criminal law, to experience with urban repression and elite conflicts, 
and I will argue that certain strategies and customs existed, that could be applied and adapted to the 
situation of the 1480s and '90s.
3.1 Treason and grace in criminal law
Even just within criminal law, the concept of treason could be quite muddy. It consisted 
of two elements: on the one hand the Germanic idea of breach of trust (usually termed  seditio), 
which was based on the idea that a man had sworn fealty to his lord. By acting against his liege in 
one way or another, he broke that bond and was culpable of one of the highest crimes. This was 
essentially a feudal conception of treason. By the fifteenth century, the word sedition had lost this 
particular meaning in favour of its modern one.267 The other element was the Roman concept of 
laesa maiestatis, or lese majesty. By the time of imperial Rome, it came to mean any form of insult 
against  the dignity of the emperor,  which included infringing on his rights, such as by making 
counterfeit money.268 Lese majesty had fallen into disuse after the fall of the Roman Empire, but 
266Philippe Contamine, 'Inobédience, rébellion, trahison, lèse-majesté: observations sur les procès politiques à la fin du 
Moyen Âge', in: Yves-Marie Bercé (ed.) Les procès politiques (XIVe-XVIIe siècle) (Rome 2007) 63-82, there 64.
267Philip Wielant, Filips Wielant. Verzameld werk I. Corte instructie in materie criminele, Jos Monballyu (ed.) 
(Brussels 1995) 188: “Seditious, those who organise unjustified [ongheoorlooftde] meetings and stir up the 
people[.]”
268Bellamy, Treason in England, 1-14; Cuttler, Treason in France, 4-9; Jan Dumolyn, 'The legal repression of revolts 
in Late Medieval Flanders', Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis 68 (2000) 479-521, there 483-486.
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was picked up again by theoreticians from the 12th century onwards.
The  concept  was  intimately  interwoven  with  the  idea  of  the  sovereignty.269 In  the 
Netherlands, the importance of the concept probably reached its zenith under Charles the Bold, who 
placed much emphasis on justice as the foundation of his rule and eventually went so far as to 
accuse the Estates of Flanders of lese majesty for not consenting to the aides that he proposed. He 
also like to style himself a sovereign lord despite holding French and Imperial fiefs.270 Regardless, 
the Netherlands were quite late to develop the concept and it was very rarely explicitly used.271
Philip Wielant, in his practical treatise on criminal law includes many crimes that are 
considered crime against temporal majesty: not only conspiracy against the prince, his officers or 
the commonwealth, but also to continue serving an office from which one has been relieved or to 
appoint oneself. Most of these were punishable by death, and all included the confiscation of the 
perpetrator's  goods.  Wielant  also  mentions  that  traitors  had  historically  had  their  houses 
destroyed.272 To do so was a symbolic act that washed away the memory of the perpetrator of the 
crime,  but  the  practice  had  gotten  very  rare  indeed  by  the  15th century.273 Lese  majesty  by 
conspiracy against the prince was one of the cas royaux or cas reservées (which the Burgundians 
had appropriated themselves) that could only be judged by the prince or his council — at least 
theoretically.274
While the Burgundian duke could employ harsh punishment as a strategy to enforce his 
position and make clear his power over his subjects, he could also do so by choosing “grace et 
misericorde” over “rigueur de justice.”275 That is, to extend grace to a convicted man or woman and, 
with some attached conditions, set him or her free from the consequences of the sentence. As a tool, 
it was gradually tightened; the lower echelons of power (such as the sovereign bailiff of Flanders) 
269Cuttler, Treason in France, 9-15.
270Blockmans, '«Crisme de leze magesté». Les idées politiques de Charles le Téméraire', in: J.-M. Duvosquel, J. Nazet 
and A. Vanrie, Les Pays-Bas bourguignons, histoire et institutions. Mélanges André Uyttebrouck (Brussels 1996) 
71-81; Werner Paravicini, 'Mon souverain seigneur', in: Peter Hoppenbrouwers, Antheun Janse and Robert Stein 
(eds.), Power and persuasion. Essays in the art of state building in honour of W.P. Blockmans (Turnhout 2010) 27-
48; Stein, De hertog en zijn Staten, 183-191.
271Dumolyn, The legal repression, 489-494.
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lost  the power of remission,  but the Burgundian duke appropriated it  in all  its  forms despite it 
having nominally been a royal prerogative.276 By the second half of the 15th century, the matières de 
grâce were reserved exclusively to the duke and his closest councilmen; not even the Great Council 
could extend pardon.277
The 'misericorde' of the king or duke had clear connotations with the grace of God and 
reinforced the idea of a clear link between the earthly ruler and his heavenly judge.278 From the 
perspective of princely authority, the act made clear for everyone to see the power of the duke over 
the court that had sentenced the convict. Not only could he display his capacity to overrule the local 
lawmen, but it also required the convicted to specifically appeal to the duke and recognise him as 
the highest  representative of the law.279 Of course,  the dukes did not just  go around pardoning 
people left and right in order to show their superiority over the urban aldermen. Walter Prevenier 
has suggested that  there  were two principal  reasons for a pardon: 90%, he estimates,  were the 
'idealistic' pardons described at length by Marjan Vrolijk in her dissertation. They were attempts to 
circumvent the narrow and inconsiderate practices of Medieval law and instead to work towards a 
form of  reconciliation  between  the  perpetrator  and  the  victim.  It  usually  required  all  involved 
parties to agree with the solution.280 In addition to those, however, Prevenier identifies a 10% which 
he calls 'politically motivated'. It was at any time entirely possible that a person who was in some 
way involved in the Burgundian clientèle network was guilty of having committed a grave crime. In 
order to maintain (or gain) the ability to make use of such a person, he was granted a pardon. One 
example given is that of one Adrian Vilain (the eponymous cousin of the regency council member) 
who, after having abducted the widow Humbercourt, fled and worked himself up in the ranks of 
Jacob of Savoy's military detachment. As a commander there, he was too useful to be convicted of 
abduction  or  rape.281 What  is  interesting  is  that  while  the  'idealistic'  pardons  take  the  specific 
circumstances  and  context  into  account  more  than  the  law  could  allow  for,  but  a  'politically 
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motivated' does not do so at all. The question of the veracity of the story becomes irrelevant. “The 
prince and his notaries,” writes Prevenier,  “only care about the opportunity and the usefulness of a 
pardon, and the construction of a more or less credible discourse.”282 The 16th century French jurist 
Jean Papon even went so far as to claim that a “homme rare & excellent en sa vacation, & dont la 
mort seroit dommageable à la republique” could be remitted for a crime as grave as homicide.283 
Theoretically, at least, even lese majesty could not be pardoned, but this happened only very rarely.
Nonetheless, although being extended pardon sounds like a good deal, it was in some 
ways quite painful for anyone to ask for it. To ask for grace was to admit to having committed the 
crime. Pardon requests was usually full of all manners of excuses and conditions that made the 
crime understandable, but they were always a confession, which was at best shameful and at worst 
one's worst enemy if the request for pardon was denied.284
3.2 Repression of urban communities
Even  though  the  elements  of  justice  described  above  may  have  been  employed 
opportunistically and cynically at times, they were more or less able to function well. Criminal law 
as  an instrument  was,  however,  quickly rendered  obsolete  once tens  of  thousands of  Flemings 
decided to  revolt  against  the duke of Burgundy.  To try every one of them would have been a 
ludicrously laborious process. What happened instead was that not the individual but the city was 
used as the standard unit of measurement.285 The treaties and rituals surrounding the surrender of a 
rebellious  city  occupy  a  difficult  space  between  diplomacy  and  justice  where  the  two  can't 
meaningfully be separated. Since the complete massacre of the population obviously was not an 
option,  the rebellious subjects  were, with a handful of exceptions,  extended the duke's grace.286 
However, that grace was combined with some harsh repressive measures.
While the conflicts of the Burgundian dukes with the Flemish urban communities have 
always  received  much attention.  Historians  such as  Henri  Pirenne,  Richard Vaughan and Wim 
Blockmans, however, had only looked at such peace treaties themselves, focusing on the way in 
282Prevenier, Two faces, 191.
283Jean Papon, Trias ivdiciel dv second notaire de Iean Papon, conseiller dv roy, et lieutenant general au baillage de 
Forestz. (2nd edition Lyon 1580) 471. The example given is that of a soldier who had murdered 17 people, but was 
so good at his job that even the notoriously harsh Francis I saw reason to remit his crimes.
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Sheridan Smith (New York 1977) 37-39, 53.
285Antony Black, 'The individual and society' in: J.H. Burns (ed.), The Cambridge history of Medieval political  
thought c. 350-c. 1450 (Cambridge 1988) 588-606, there 602-604; J.P. Canning, 'Law, sovereignty and corporation 
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which the Burgundian dukes broke the city state ideal.287 The study of the rituals involved in revolts 
and in the submission of a city, which is a more recent trend in historiography, owes much to the 
work of Peter Arnade. He incorporated such rituals into the larger scheme of the Burgundian theatre 
state. Arnade describes Philip the Good's actions after having defeated Ghent in 1453 as following: 
“[H]is answer to Ghent's rebellion was to impose a crushing punishment, the purpose of which, I 
argue, was a full public recuperation of princely authority. As part of his terms for peace, the duke 
demanded that Gentenars undergo a dazzling ceremony of humiliation which, with a host of other 
ritual  punishments,  was meant  to belittle  the defeated  townsmen through a drama of collective 
punishment.”288 This does not mean that we should neglect the actual, 'political' terms of the peace 
treaty; but it does mean we should see these in the light of a broader repressive act of the dukes, the 
point of which was not only to diminish the stature of the cities, but also to make that painfully 
clear to the inhabitants. The rituals described for Ghent by Arnade correspond well with those of 
other conflicts. We can identify a certain repertoire of options available to the dukes.
Firstly, there is often a ritual destruction. In the case of a rebellion, the entire city was 
culpable of lese majesty. Theorists agreed that a prince had the authority to destroy any such city. It 
had come up several times in the past: councillors suggested the destruction of Bruges, Ghent and 
Malines after their revolts in 1438, 1453 and 1467, and would later advise it to Charles V and Philip 
II. Although doing so certainly would have sent a clear message, it would also have meant a serious 
blow to the power of the duke; if they behaved, these cities were centres of major importance, and 
so they were spared. Dinant and Liege, located in the eponymous principality, were less fortunate in 
1466 and 1468, and they were systematically rased. Instead of destroying the entire city Philip the 
Good  closed  one  of  Bruges'  gates  and  made  it  serve  as  a  chapel,  and  closed  two  of  Ghent's 
entrances.289 During the Flemish Revolts, Engelbert of Nassau advised to destroy Ghent when the 
citizens  caused  a  riot  in  1485  after  Maximilian  had  entered:  “[P]ar  ce  moyen  estoit  le  prince 
perpetuellement seigneur et maistre de Gand et de toute Flandres.” Philip of Cleves disagreed and 
argued that “quant Gand seroit destruite, il perdroit la fleur et la perle de tous ses pays.”290 In the 
end the Habsburger did not alter the civic topography of the submissive cities after any of the peace 
treaties, even if he had hoped to be able to demolish the house where he had been held captive in 
287Pirenne, Histoire, II, 338; III, 53. Blockmans, Autocratie, 305-307; idem, 'La répression de révoltes urbaines  
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1488 and replace it with a chapel for John of Dadizeele and Pieter Lanchals.291 A plan to fortify the 
ducal  residence and integrated  the gate  to Bruges  into it,  as  well  as to  build  a  tower near  the 
waterway to Antwerp was never realised.292
Secondly, the cities were obliged to pay a fine to the duke. This has been termed the 
amende  proffitable,  as  a  companion  to  the  ritual  amende  honorable.293 It  is  surprising  that 
Maximilian, who asked so much money of the Flemish, was relatively mild in his fining. The peace 
of Bruges after the first revolt included no fine, not even after the riot in Ghent after the archduke 
had entered,  save for a hefty payment  for the negotiators  and some reparations  to Margaret  of 
York.294 The  second  revolt  was  more  financially  destructive.  The  Brabantine  cities  were 
individually fined so as to wring as much money as possible out of them, but the fine imposed on 
the county of Flanders through the treaty of Montilz-lez-Tours was relatively modest.295 Even 's-
Hertogenbosch, which had not taken sides in the conflict, but had refused the emperor passage on 
his  way back to Germany,  could only buy off  its  punishment.296 In the separate  peace treaties, 
Bruges and Ghent were fined as well.297 In addition, Maximilian's monetary ordinance, enacted in 
1489 just after the treaties were signed, tripled the amount of silver in the coinage, thus making 
these fines suddenly worth a lot more.298 Several cities had to file for bankruptcy in the following 
years, Bruges among them.299 In spite of such consequences, the fines were relatively mild. Ghent, 
for example, ended up paying only a sixth after Cadzand in 1492 than it had paid at Gavere in 
1454.300 A very significant portion of this sum was to be paid to several of Maximilian's men: about 
one seventh, 1,667 lb.gr. Went to Albert of Saxony and one twelft, 1000 lb. of the 12,000 lb. to 
Engelbert  of  Nassau.301 By this  means,  Maximilian  and his  predecessors  hoped to  be  effective 
patrons for their clientèles.302 These were impressive amounts of money, and the count of Nassau 
291BNF, ms. fr. 17909, f. 49r; Boone, La justice en spectacle, 62. It was common in reconciliations that the murderer 
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was said to have built his palace in Brussels with the spoils of Flanders, but we need to keep in 
mind that they received pensions of 2500 and 1500 lb. respectively per year.303
A third aspect, one of the most important, was the political repression employed, in the 
form of confiscation of civic privileges. Doing so often included changing the way in which the 
college of aldermen was formed, and the dukes used this as a means of gaining more influence in 
the political landscape of a city. In our case, however, we may skip a detailed description of such 
events, since none of these means could be applied or adapted to the case of noblemen. It is worth 
noting that in the end, although Maximilian was often quite willing to maintain a particularistic 
status quo after the first peace treaties, the submissions after the cities revolted again were quite 
repressive.304
Once all conditions were agreed upon, the city could perform the  amende honorable, 
the ritual in which the repentant populace asked for forgiveness. It had been an old tradition, but the 
Burgundians refined it and made it a staple of the submission of revolts, and included the exact 
terms of it  in their  peace treaties.  It involved the city magistracy and all  other prominent  male 
citizens kneeling bareheaded and barefoot (the captains even in their  undergarments) before the 
duke, handing over the keys of the city and pleading for mercy. Kneeling and begging in this way 
was a ritual that was most commonly seen in the reconciliations that took place after a murder. The 
murderer and his friends and family — sometimes hundreds of people — were dressed down to 
their shirts and asked for forgiveness.305 Presenting the keys,  on the other hand, was a common 
ritual in princely entries; it signified the complete submission of the city and handed over the day-
to-day authority to the prince while he stayed. It also meant he couldn't be locked in or out.306 When 
Philip the Good entered Ghent in 1453, he furthermore introduced the custom of confiscating the 
guild  banners  and  publicly  parading  and  displaying  them  as  spoils.  Next  to  the  prominently 
displayed ducal banners and emblems,  these banners drew attention to the ideological stripping 
down of the literally undressed supplicants.307 Both these procedures and the following procession 
through the streets, filled with tableaux vivants, were coated with a layer of sacredness that made 
numerous comparisons between the victor and God, portraying him as a messianic figure.308 The 
303GSAB Raad van State en Audiëntie (RSA) 22bis, f. 1v-2r; Wauters, Histoire des environs, 192.
304Dumolyn, The legal repression, 514-516. Jacoba van Leeuwen, De Vlaamse wetsvernieuwing. Een onderzoek naar 
dejaarlijkse keuze en aanstelling van het stadsbestuur in Gent, Brugge en Ieper in de Middeleeuwen (Brussels 2004) 
passim, but for the regency of Maximilian in specific, 95-118, 170-191, 231-246.
305Glaudemans, Om die wrake wille, 227-229.
306Hans Smit, Vorst en onderdaan. Studies over Holland en Zeeland in de late middeleeuwen (Louvain 1995) 287-289; 
Dumolyn, De Brugse opstand, 295 n.896.
307Arnade, Realms of ritual, 122-123; Loïc Colella-Denis, 'Les réconciliations entre Philippe le Bon et ses sujets 
révoltés dans les Mémoires de Jacque du Clercq', Publications du Centre européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes 53 
(2013) 111-123, there 122.
308Peter Arnade, Beggars, iconoclasts, and civic patriots. The political culture of the Dutch Revolt (Ithaca and London 
2008) 34-38; idem, Realms of ritual, 119-126;  Boone, 'Diplomatie et violence d'Etat. La sentence rendue par les 
53
very accusatory nature of such a ritual was offensive to citizens; when the French mediated between 
Philip the Good and Ghent, the Ghenters objected to the use of the word 'sentence' and rejected the 
humiliating proposal outright.309 Moreover, the peace was proclaimed in the language of the victors, 
French, to a Dutch speaking audience.310 Charles the Bold would follow the same pattern.
In such cases, Maximilian was aware of the specifics of a Burgundian tradition. He sent 
the  maître d'hôtel Olivier de la Marche, who was often tasked with keeping traditions alive and 
proper, to Adolf of Cleves and Philip of Beveren in preparation for his entry in 1485, “pour dresser 
les besongnes et leur dire ce qu'ilz avoyent à faire.” Letters were sent to the Ghenters to tell them 
how to meet the archduke; as usual, bareheaded and on their knees.311 Their banners, however, were 
not confiscated.312 Information on this event is very scarce, and the fact that Molinet describes the 
humiliation of the citizens after the tumult later that week in much more detail, should tell us that it 
did not entail  a terribly spectacular  event. That second time,  the chancellor  of Brabant told the 
Ghenters that “le duc les avoit recheu à mercy et fait paix, plus à leur honneur et avantage que au 
sien, dont ses princes ou barons s'estoyent esbahis.”313 In the case of Bruges, which was pacified 
earlier  that  month,  I have not been able to find evidence of a ritual  of  amende honorable.  The 
archduke entered the city by ship and the chroniclers present this occasion more as a renewal of his 
oath than as a punishment of the city.314 It was not necessarily Maximilian who had to be present. In 
1490, the  amende was consented to by Bruges to Engelbert of Nassau, although I have found no 
reference  to  it  having  taken  place.315 The  Ghenters  kneeled  before  Albert  of  Saxony in  1492, 
presenting him their apologies and the city keys, “mit mer gar vil schönern worten.”316 In all cases, 
ambassadeurs et conseillers du roi de France, Charles VII, concernant le conflit entre Philippe le Bon, duc de 
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however, the description, if there is one, is very short compared to the accounts of the subsequent 
festivities and rejoicing and no banners were confiscated this time around.
Not everyone could be part of the amende honorable and walk away with the shame and 
a future of heavy taxes. Some people were deemed too guilty or too dangerous, and they were 
excluded from the peace, to be judged in trial. Such trials almost invariably ended in banishment or 
beheading, with a great degree of publicity.317 Over the course of the two Flemish revolts, 38 of 
Maximilian's opponents were confronted with a death penalty, 9 of them in Ghent and 29 in Bruges. 
By  comparison,  the  cities  themselves  during  their  revolutionary  reigns  executed  43  men  who 
favoured the archduke, although here it is Ghent that holds the higher number, with 31 to 12.318
317Boone, La justice politique, 205-218; Dumolyn, The legal repression, 502-507, 517-519.
318Boone, La justice politique, 206. It is worth noting that opponents of Maximilian were not just executed by him or 
his lieutenants, but were also tried by counterrevolutionary regimes before they signed peace, as William Rijm and 
the Coppenhole twins were.
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3.3 Conflicts with noblemen
While the Burgundian dukes saw many urban revolts from even before they actually inherited the 
county of Flanders, they were not confronted with my nobles revolts.319 For a reservoir of practices 
319An exception is the plot of William of Rochefort and John de la Trémoille, both knights of the Order of the Golden 
Fleece, to deliver Dijon into the hands of Charles VII in 1432: Gaston de Fresne de Beaucourt, Histoire de Charles  
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Image 2: Maximilian enters Ghent in 1485. One of several submission scenes in the Weisskunig.
Image 2: Maximilian enters Ghent in 1485, as depicted in the Weißkunig.
and customs, Maximilian might have looked elsewhere. To France, for example, which had a logn 
legacy of treason trials. Louis XI conducted more trials than any contemporary. The king, just like 
duke Charles the Bold, did much to expand his authority by employing the idea of lese majesty.320 
There was an interesting shift in the tactics of confiscation. The very accusation of lese majesty was 
enough to warrant a confiscation of the accused's goods.321 During the Hundred Years War, the king 
usually opted to integrate such lands into the royal domain. It allowed for easier reconciliation and 
incentivised a return to the French party for those who had chosen the English or Burgundians. But 
as the troubles became more internal and the integrity of the realm became the goal, confiscated 
property was instead largely handed out to the king's favourites.322 
One of the most important trials, in itself and in the ramifications it had for the relations 
between France, Burgundy and the borderline noblemen, was that of the connétable Saint Pol. The 
fabulously wealthy Louis of Luxembourg, count of Saint Pol was one of those noblemen who had 
an independent position in the Franco-Burgundian borderlands, and king Louis and duke Charles 
sought  to  get  rid  of  him.323 In  1475,  the  connétable was  charged  with  treason  by  the  French 
monarch, and was given the choice either to admit  to a conspiracy and to plead with the king for 
mercy, or to subject to criminal law. He did not bow down and was finally beheaded after a swift 
trial.324 The king, seizing the opportunity for propaganda, gave copies of the trial  documents to 
important noblemen in the realm.325 Saint Pol was a very high nobleman by Burgundian standards, 
but a little less so by French. The peers of France could legally only be tried by the king and the 
other peers, although in practice this mostly meant in the presence of the others rather than by them, 
and even then the right was not consistently employed. They suffered some hard punishments for 
rebellions, but none of them were condemned to death. Instead, the duke of Nemours forfeited his 
peerage when he revolted in 1470, and when he was tried again in 1477, he was not granted the 
privilege of defending himself in front of his peers, and was eventually relieved of his body. The 
VII, pt. II, Le roi de Bourges, 1422-1435 (Paris 1882) 459-461. Some cases that did not involve such overt betrayal 
or rebellion, but were classified as treason include the infidelity of the count of Tonnerre under John the Fearless 
and the 'Borsele affair' under Philip the Good: Pierre Gresser, 'Inconduite et trahison d'un prince sous Jean sans 
Peur: le cas de Louis de Chalon, comte de tonnerre', Publications du Centre européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes 48 
(2008) 57-72; Robert Stein, 'De affaire Van Borselen en de consolidatie van de Bourgondische macht in de 
Nederlanden (1425-1435)', Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 124 (2009) 3-
29.
320Cuttler, Treason in France, 213-233.
321Maurice Keen, The laws of war in the late middle ages (London and Toronto 1965) 91-92.
322Cuttler, Treason in France, 120-141.
323Cools, Noblemen on the borderline, 374-375.
324Yves Lallemand, 'Le procès pour trahison du connétable de Saint-Pol', in: Yves-Marie Bercé (ed.) Les procès  
politiques (XIVe-XVIIe siècle) (Rome 2007) 145-155, there 152-154.
325Werner Paravicini, 'Peur, pratiques, intelligences. Formes de l'opposition aristocratique à Louis XI d'après les 
interrogatoires du connétable de Saint-Pol' in: Bernard Chevalier and Philippe Contamine (eds.), La France de la fin 
du XVe siècle. Renouveau et apogée (Paris 1985) 183-196, there 184.
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duke  of  Alençon  seemed  to  be  heading  the  same  way  if  he  would  not  perform  an  amende 
honorable, but he escaped the verdict when Louis XI died.326 René of Anjou was summoned to 
court for lese majesty, but was at the same time approached by an embassy which convinced him to 
sign an accord with the king and so escape trial; the cession of Provence to the crown was probably 
arranged then and there.327 The different treatment of the count of Saint Pol and the peers shows that 
a  man's  status  was  vital  in  his  chances  for  survival.  The  kingdom's  greats  could  escape  with 
concessions or honourable amends. 
Charles VIII and his regents were undoubtedly milder people than Louis XI had been, 
and the Mad War of 1485-1488 did not result in any spectacular executions, just like the Flemish 
Revolts did not. Francis II of Brittany and Louis of Orléans were called before the parliament of 
Paris, but the trial was indefinitely postponed when neither appeared.328 Francis eventually signed a 
peace treaty with the king, which opened up the way for the incorporation of the duchy into the 
kingdom; the duke of Orléans spent three years in prison, but was eventually released by Charles 
VIII in the hope that he could secure the marriage between himself and Anne, the new duchess of 
Brittany.329 The policy of Charles and his regents seems to have been to use mildness in order to 
gain  a  territorial  advantage.  For  all  France's  experience  with trials,  its  monarchs  seem to  have 
employed the ad hoc political grace that Prevenier identified for criminal law.
The Burgundian state did not have anything like the French system of peerage as a level 
of distinction. But the dukes had their own select group with special privileges in the form of the 
Order of the Golden Fleece. The most important conflict between the Burgundian dukes and their 
vassals was unquestionably that of Charles the Bold and the Croÿ clan. Anthony 'the Great' Croÿ, 
his brother John (II) and their nephew John (III) of Lannoy were the stars of the Burgundian court 
during the reign of Philip the Good, with clientèles all over the Burgundian domains. But they did 
not limit  their  services to duke Philip and also had good connections with Louis XI of France, 
which  gained  them many  prestigious  and  profitable  offices  on  the  other  side  of  the  border.330 
Charles the Bold contested their influence at his father's court and launched a propaganda campaign 
against the Croÿs, accusing them of attempts at bewitching and kidnapping him.331 When Charles 
took over many of his  ill  father's  duties in 1465, he expelled the Croÿs and Lannoys from the 
326Cuttler, Treason in France, 94-115.
327Cuttler, Treason in France, 229-230.
328Molinet, Chroniques, I, 577-581. Even Philip the Handsome was called upon to attend as one of the realm's major 
vassals.
329Baumgartner, Louis XII, 34-36; Cuttler, Treason in France, 235-236.
330Damen, Rivalité, 12-17; Violet Soen, 'La causa Croÿ et les limites du mythe bourguignon: la fronière, le lignage et 
la mémoire (1465-1475)' Publications du Centre européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes, 52 (2012) 81-97, there 84-87.
331Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 474-487.
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Burgundian domains, confiscated their possessions and publicly accused them.332 Anthony, the two 
Johns and their children found refuge with the French king and could still enjoy considerable power 
from their possessions South of the border.333 All three being Fleece Knights, they asked to defend 
themselves before their peers. Charles, who had become duke of Burgundy and sovereign of the 
Order in 1467, was not inclined to use the corrections. This was a case of lese majesty, he argued, 
and was not one to give up judicial powers easily.  He gave the three the choice between either 
undergoing a trial by criminal law for the crime of lese majesty, or submitting to him and begging 
for his forgiveness. Neither were acceptable to the Croÿs and Lannoy, who considered themselves 
innocent and claimed that they would prefer “mourir que de demander pardon.” As knights, they 
demanded to be tried by their peers. In May 1468, Charles and the loyal knights settled the matter of 
the Order's authority; “ledit ordre est institué pour l'exaulcement et gloire de sa maison, non pas 
pour diminuer sa seignourie et sa haulteur,” and thus a statement was made that the Order could 
only judge “matière touchant l'onneur” and not act as an alternative to criminal justice.334
In the end, the Order of the Golden Fleece had failed a mediative institution and the 
Croÿs were forced to ask for Charles' mercy.  John of Lannoy appeared before the duke in June 
1468,335 and John of Croÿ and his son Philip begged for the ruler's grace two months later. They 
were quickly reconciled. In an attempt to drive a wedge between the two branches of the family, the 
two Croÿs were given many prestigious offices and even some lands of their family members still 
in  exile.  Anthony was only reconciled  with Charles  in  1473. As he would not submit,  he was 
reconciled not by grace, but by a correction and thus did not need the ritual humiliation. The duke 
only  entrusted  him again  with  his  lands  after  he  moved  back  to  the  Burgundian  Netherlands. 
Anthony's son Philip was only brought together with Charles again in December 1475, after the 
Grand Croÿ had died. Louis of Luxembourg, the connétable of Saint Pol had bequeathed some of 
his domains to Philip in his testament. With so much in the balance, Philip needed Charles in order 
to secure his inheritance, and the duke of Burgundy needed the powerful Croÿ on his side rather 
than that of the king of France. All the former had to do was to take a new oath of loyalty.336
A big difference between France and Burgundy was that the French Order of Saint 
Michael,  founded to  compete  with  the Golden Fleece,  was  not  nearly  as  influential  as  was  its 
332Damen, Rivalité, 17-20; Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 488-493;
333Soen, Causa Croÿ, 89-90.
334Soen, Cause Croÿ, 90; Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 504-520. Thus the statutes of the Order of the Golden Fleece at 
least justified the condemnations of Egmont and Hornes on the charge of lese majesty in 1567, despite claims that, 
as knights, they could only be tried by peers: Nierop, The nobles and the revolt, 62.
335Raphaël de Smedt, 'Jan heer van Lannoy, stadhouder en diplomaat' Handelingen van de koninklijke kring voor 
oudheidkunde, letteren en kunst van Mechelen, 95, 1 (1991) 55-84, there 71.
336Soen, Causa Croÿ, 90-96.
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Burgundian counterpart; his membership never helped Saint Pol in the slightest.337 The battle that 
Charles the Bold had waged to elevate his justice above the peer judgment of the Order, was less of 
a problem in France; even the peerage was brushed aside fairly easily. Even when Charles did gain 
the concession of being the sole judge, he still opted to have the amendes take place at the chapters 
of  the  Golden  Fleece,  and  the  fellow  member  were  still  the  authority  on  issues  of  honour. 
Comparatively,  Burgundian justice was much weaker. At best it could spend years trying to opt 
noblemen to ask for mercy while they were sheltered in France, but the duke sometimes had to 
settle for a less than spectacular and affirmative reconciliation. By contrast, the king of France was 
able to capture, try and execute noblemen who were suspected of having taken part in a conspiracy. 
Nevertheless,  both consistently  used the flexibility  of  political  grace  and reconcile  whenever  it 
suited strategic aims.
337Although it was symbolically taken from him just before the execution: Cuttler, Treason in France, 227.
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II. Punishments and reconciliations
As mentioned  in  the  introduction,  this  section  will  be  divided  between punishments  for  urban 
rebellions, the judgment in the Order of the Golden Fleece, and the punishments for fueds with the 
government. The following table aims to illustrate the place of the nobles within these categories.
4. Punishment for the participation in urban revolts
Maximilian of Austria had a different conception of a regency than did the council that disputed his 
guardianship over Philip the Handsome. While the regency council posed the young Philip as an 
independent ruler with a body politic that was, as Kantorowicz has said “utterly void of infancy”, 
Maximilian often used a combined style of Maximilian-and-Philip, with the two as an indivisible 
political persona.338 In his mind, the affairs of him and his son could not be separated, and until his 
coronation in 1486, they used each other's titles.339 With the exception of John of Montfort in 1483, 
all  the nobles were judged by the authority of the united persona because they “avez usurpé et 
usurpez  journelement  les  haulter,  auctorité  et  seignourie  de nous  et  de nostre  dit  filz.”340 That 
338The seal that Maximilian had made for Philip, for example, named and depicted the both of them: Jelle Haemers, 
'Zegels, eden, taal en liturgie. Ideologie, propaganda en het symbolische gebruik van publieke ruimte in Gent 
(1483)', Handelingen van de maatschappij voor geschiedenis en oudheidkunde te Gent, 61 (2007) 183-212., 194-
197; Ernst Kantorowicz, The king's two bodies: a study in medieval political theology (Princeton 1957) 7-9.
339From his crowning in 1486 onward, Maximilian opted no longer to use a plural archdukes, dukes, etc., but usually 
styled himself king of the Romans (and later, king of Hungary, Dalmatia and Croatia), and left the Burgundian titles 
solely to Philip (an exception is found in Gachard, Lettres inédites, II, 57, where the old style was used, but with 
Maximilian's name replaced by his title as king). When Maximilian appointed Engelbert of Nassau as lieutenant-
general of Flanders from Nuremberg, the charter was officially styled as being written by Maximilian and Philip 
both, so he too was no strange to creative Kantorowiczing. It is signed with Maximilian's own seal as king of the 
Romans: KHA ODL 462. Albert of Saxony also styled himself lieutenant-general of both princes. cf, Van Doren, 
Inventaire, II, Lettres missives, 6-7: “[G]hy weet hoe [...] eenige particuliere personen [...] in cleenen getale, hebben 
by huerer grooter giericheyt ende ambitien gepresumeert te onthouden den persoon van onsen harde lieven ende zere 
geminden zone Phelips [...] ende voorts te usurperen 't regiment an den voorscreven lande van Vlaendren [...] in 't 
welke doende zy grootelicx mesbruuckt ende mesgrepen hebben jegen ons die, gemerct de jonchede van jaeren van 
onsen voorscreven zone, behoeren, na allen rechten godlick ende weerlick, te hebben de geheele ende vulle 
administracie ende 't regiment, alsowel van den persoen van onsen voorscreven zone, als van allen zynen landen[.]”
340Keryvn de Lettenhove, Histoire de Flandre, V, 534.
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Golden Fleece
1482-1485 X X
1482-1485, 1488-1489 X X
1482-1485, 1488-1490 X
1482-1485 X
1482-1485 X
1482-1485, 1487-1490
1488-1489 1490-1492 X
John of Montfort 1483 1488-1490
Urban revolt Fued Noble of the blood
Adolf of Cleves, lord of Ravestein
Philip of Burgundy, lord of Beveren
Louis of Bruges, lord of Gruuthuse
Wolfert of Borsele, lord of Veere
Jacob of Savoy, lord of Romont
Adrian Vilain, lord of Rassegem
Philip of Cleves
castellan of Montfort, along with the city of Utrecht, was punished  by the archduke in 1483, when 
Philip the Handsome was held in Ghent, in his role of count of Holland.341 In short, he regarded the 
guardianship to entail more or less the same rights, titles and authority as the jure uxoris had before 
Mary's death. Maximilian's position as king of the Romans, being suzerain in Brabant, Holland, 
Utrecht and Imperial Flanders, was rarely ever invoked, even though his father charged him with 
the conduct of war against Philip of Cleves and the Flemish and “to punish and correct  and to 
institute such a repression and obtain amends.”342 The imperial ban, which forfeited Philip's goods, 
was pronounced at that meeting of the Estates-general in Antwerp, but the king of the Romans 
could not lift it; only the emperor could.343 All of this meant that one of Maximilian's primary goals 
during both the conflict and the resulting treaties was to establish his position as regent of Philip the 
Handsome; it was the only claim that was to any degree useful.
While peace treaties in the middle ages and after were generally signed between rulers 
who acted by their authority rather than as representing a political body,344 the urban communities 
had long traditions of popular representation and signed as cities or confederations. In these cases, 
the peaces of Utrecht in 1483 and Bruges in 1485, were signed with, respectively, 'those of Utrecht' 
and 'those of Flanders'.345 None of the noblemen involved concluded their own peace. They were 
either included in the negotiations and mentioned in the final document, or, when they were knights 
of the Golden Fleece and were entitled to be tried by their peers, they were clearly mentioned as not 
being part of the general pardon that was extended in such peace treaties. Being grouped together 
with the citizens, they underwent a sort of literary amende honorable in the preamble of the text. 
The preamble to a peace would try to pin the guilt on the losing party and sometimes to justify the 
war. This was a common feature of a treaty between a ruler and a rebellious vassal,  but it  did 
demand a certain amount of power. It denied the losing party the autorias belli, the right to have 
waged the war in the first place, and was quite humiliating in every sense.346 The Utrecht treaty 
341Antonius Matthaeus and Theodorus Verhoeven (eds.), Rerum Amorforiarum scriptores duo inediti (Leiden 1693) 
329-330; cf. 336-339 for the Amersfoort treaty made some days later.
342GSAB RK 104, f.97r-97v: “te straffene ende corrigeren ende sulcken bedwanck af te stellene ende beternisse te 
vercrigen”. The only time I know of that Maximilian invoked his sovereignty is found in Gachard, Lettres inédites, 
I, 116: “nous [...] comme roy des Rommains, sommes vostre souverain, et, comme père et mambou de nostredit filz, 
vostre prince et seigneur.”
343Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 91; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 64; Surquet, Mémoire en forme de chronique, 550; 
On the ban, Friedrich Battenberg, Reichsacht und Anleite im Spätmittelalter. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der  
höchsten königlichen Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, besonders im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert (Cologne 1986). 249-
449.
344Lesaffer, From Lodi, 13-22.
345Verzameling van XXIV charters, 16/1; Molinet, Chroniques,, I, 423.
346Randall Lesaffer, 'The concepts of war and peace in the 15th century treaties of Arras', in: Denis Clauzel, Charles 
Giry-Deloison and Christophe Leduc (eds.), Arras et la diplomatie européenne, XVe-XVIe siècles (Arras 1999) 165-
182, there 168-171. An example that Lesaffer gives is that of the 1414 and 1435 treaties of Arras between the duke 
of Burgundy and the king of France. In the first, John the Fearless was blamed for having waged a rebellion against 
his suzerain, whereas in the second, Philip the Good is not reprimanded and the autoritas belli of both parties is 
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mentions that Maximilian accords the Utrechters mercy after they had asked for it. That in Flanders 
was quite long. It recalled at length how the Flemings by means of several malevolent persons had 
kept Maximilian's son from him and denied him regency. But, inspired by God and appalled by the 
shedding of Christian blood, the archduke is willing to make peace:
“We, as the one who has always been more inclined towards peace than to war, have 
received  the  subjects  and  inhabitants  of  the  aforementioned  lordship  and  county  of 
Flanders  spiritually  and truly,  from our  true  knowledge and princely power and do 
receive them hereby in grace”.347
By signing a treaty like this, everyone subscribed to the views expanded upon in it, and admitted 
that this version of events was the one that had transpired, much like the ritual of amende honorable 
was  designed  to  publicly  humiliate  and  impose  a  truth.  But  outside  of  this  general,  all-
encompassing message included in the pacification charters, there was a lot of room for noblemen 
to be treated, from very leniently to very harshly. Not everyone got away as easily as the bastard of 
Fenin, an obscure and relatively harmless man whom Maximilian forgave with the reasoning that 
“puis qu'il hait les Francois, je lui pardonne.”348 In the following, we will look at the individual 
verdicts. Although condemnation or grace were essentially individual affairs that had little to do 
with any kind of standardised legal procedure, we can discern some common themes.
4.2 Family members into the fold: Philip of Burgundy, lord of Beveren and Adolf of 
Cleves, lord of Ravenstein
The ideal situation, from Maximilian's perspective at least, was that the nobles would 
abandon the Flemish cause and join his instead. He made special attempts to woo the nobles of the 
blood into his camp, just as he had before accorded great sums of money to keep them from moving 
into French service. In February 1485, the archduke made arrangements for the continuation of 
Adolf's payment of a 12.280 lb. pension, as well as that of 1600 lb. for his wife — much more than 
the 6000 lb. that the nobleman was receiving from the Three Members.349 We have already seen the 
arguments with which Maximilian tried to win over Philip of Cleves in the spring of 1488; in the 
autumn of that year, he sent a letter in which he proposed to Philip to forgive him for his rebellion 
and maintain him and his father in their pensions and offices if he would only switch sides. The 
implied.
347Verzameling van XXIV charters, 16/1-16/2.
348Molinet, Chroniques, I, 463.
349Gachard, Les archives, 307-308.
63
letter was dismissed as one that “contained much honey, but mixed with much poison.”350
Philip was the first to distance himself from the regency council, but his relation to it in 
later phases is not entirely clear. He is less visible as an active participant in the revolt after the 
1484 meeting of the knights of the Golden Fleece, but we still find him in France to request aid in 
March the next year.351 He reconciled with Maximilian in April of the next year, and he was part of 
an embassy headed by Engelbert of Nassau that entered Bruges on the 1st of June 1485 to negotiate 
peace.352 The  Divisiekroniek  claims  that  it  was  his  father  who brokered  the  eventual  treaty.353 
Despite entertaining Maximilian's agenda, Beveren never lost the trust and esteem of the Flemish 
cities. After the treaty was made up and signed ten days later, the people of the city asked him to 
become the city's  new captain;  Philip's former regency council  colleague and former captain of 
Bruges, Louis of Gruuthuse, had been arrested earlier that day. Philip, however, refused to accept 
the honor until Maximilian was informed.354
Adolf of Cleves stayed in the regency council, but when in June 1485, the opponents of 
the regime of the revolt, under the leadership of Matthew Peyaert, grabbed power in Ghent and took 
some of the most important nobles and officials captive,  they were apparently aided by Adolf's 
men.355 That, coupled with the conquests of Maximilian, left only him alone with the representatives 
of the city, in the regency council. Adolf and the new leaders seem to have come to an agreement: 
he remained in position as, at least nominally, the most important man, while he supported their 
renewal of the law and their attempts to seek peace with Maximilian of Austria. Philip of Beveren 
returned to the city soon after and the both of them, together with the representatives of the Council 
of  Flanders  still  present,  publicly  condoned  the  actions  of  the  new  regime.356 Beveren  also 
represented the city in a delegation that discussed the final content of the peace treaty; unlike Adolf, 
he signed it as one of Maximilian's company.357 It was Adolf who brought Philip the Handsome 
before his father outside of Ghent on the 7th of July. By the time Maximilian's company entered the 
city, he too had become part of the archduke's entourage.358 The overdue pension was paid less than 
350“[...] mits dat dieselve brieven innhouden vele hoenichs, hoewel datter veele venyns inne gemyngelt is, soe ghy wel 
mitter selven antworden vertaen sult.” Gachard, Lettres inédites, I, 166-168.
351Haemers, De strijd, 74.
352Haemers, De strijd, 114; Despars, Cronycke, IV, 252.
353Aurelius, Divisiekroniek, f.397r.
354Despars, Cronycke, IV, 257.
355De la Marche, Mémoires, 279.
356Blockmans, Handelingen, 353; Haemers, De strijd, 110-113; Van Leeuwen, Vlaamse wetsvernieuwing, 101.
357Despars, Cronycke, IV, 259, 262. When the Divisiekroniek, f. 397r, claims that “at this time reconciled and united 
with the duke [Maximilian] [...] lord Philip of Beveren,” the writer is either unaware that Philip had already joined 
Maximilian's service (which is quite possible), or is aware of a ceremony that we are not (which seems less likely, 
considering the important tasks which had been entrusted to him in the previous month).
358De la Marche, Mémoires, 280-281. He walked alongside Nassau, his own son Philip, Charles of Guelders and 
Charles of Chalon.
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a month after the peace was signed, as well as 400 lb. for 'rendered services'.359
Nobody spoke of either Philip's or Adolf's actions as part of the regency council. One of 
the men who was tried and convicted for crimes against Maximilian, confessed that, besides having 
tried  to  send Philip  the  Handsome  to  France,  he  also  attempted  to  cast  suspicion  on  Adolf.360 
Conveniently, any negativity about the nobleman could be explained away as the evil rumour of a 
convicted  rebel.  When  he  was  appointed  the  guardianship  and  tutelage  of  duke  Philip  during 
Maximilian's journey to gain the king's crown in Germany, court chronicler Molinet stressed that he 
had “tousjours, en paix et en guerre, s'en estoit honorablement acquité.”361 The dubious position that 
he had played during these years was only brought up again when the second revolt erupted, but it 
seems,  by that  time,  to have been a means of putting pressure on his  son,  rather  than a direct 
response to his involvement in the first revolt. Unlike Adolf, Beveren did join the second regency 
council, but he abandoned that before its formal dissolution as well, some time in the summer of 
1489.362 Once again, no mention was made of it.  Like the French peers, the family members of 
Philip the Handsome had, by their status, been judged much milder. Unlike the former, however, 
Adolf and Beveren never needed to publicly make amends or make concessions. For all of Philip of 
Cleves'  mistrust  of  Maximilian's  forgiveness,  it  seems to  have  been  quite  possible  to  escape  a 
rebellion unscathed, if only one was a family member and helped dismantle the urban revolts.
4.3 Goods and offices: Wolfert of Borsele, lord of Veere, and Jacob of Savoy, count of 
Romont
Wolfert of Borsele and Jacob of Savoy were in considerably worse positions than the 
nobles of the blood; their position was based on accumulated wealth and offices, and was less vital 
than the legitimacy provided by the family members. In the end, their saving graces were that their 
reconciliation legitimised the transaction of (parts of) their landed goods. Borsele and Maximilian 
did  not  particularly  get  along after  the  disastrous  lieutenancy of  the  nobleman  in  Zeeland  and 
Holland, and he was met with scrutiny at the chapters of the Golden Fleece. The count of Romont 
served as captain-general of Flanders and became the principal military leader of the revolt.363 They 
were faced with the confiscation of their properties. Romont's lordship of Enghien (Hainaut) was 
359Haemers, De strijd, 120; Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 29.
360Despars, Cronycke, IV, 266.
361Molinet, Chroniques, I, 471.
362It is in June of 1489 that Maximilian, after being begged by Philip, forgives the inhabitants of Philip's possessions in 
Zeeland: Jacobus Ermerins, Eenige Zeeuwsche oudheden, uit echte stukken opgehelderd en in het licht gebragt;  
Behelzende de heeren van Vere uit den huize van Bourgondien; Benevens een beschryving van het kasteel en 
kappittel van Zandenburg (Middelburg 1786) 12.
363Louis Colot, 'Jacques de Savoie, comte de Romont, homme ligne de la maison de Bourgogne', Publications du 
Centre européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes 20 (1980) 89-102, there 101.
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taken by Maximilian in 1484 and was given to Philip of Cleves in May of the next year.364 Other 
parts of his possessions were given to Engelbert of Nassau and John of Bergen.365 In March 1485, 
John of Kruiningen conquered Veere, confiscated Borsele's possessions and renewed the law. The 
lordship was returned to the crown, and Maximilian swore the oath as lord of Veere on the 9 th of 
June.366 Although he did have land outside of Zeeland,367 the isle of Veere and its surroundings had 
been the base of power for the Borseles; for all intents and purposes, Wolfert's power was broken. 
Romont,  at  least,  had received the county of Saint Pol from the French king, once held by his 
father-in-law, Peter II of Luxemburg.368
But Borsele and Romont did not just lose lands, but also their offices: the two of them 
served as admirals of the Burgundian Netherlands, with Borsele fulfilling the function in Holland, 
Zeeland, Artois and Boulonnais, and Romont doing so in Flanders. In January 1485, Maximilian 
created one office for the entire admiralty of the Netherlands, and Philip of Cleves was the man for 
the  job.  The  instruction   specifically  mentioned  that  it  was  conceived  of  “en  deportant  et 
deschargeant  dudit  office  tous  autres  detenteurs  et  occupeurs  quelzconques.”369 The  offices  of 
Borsele and Romont had been cleverly superseded without the need for a legitimisation of taking 
them away.
What  to  do?  As  Ghent  experienced  its  internal  revolution,  Romont  was  accused  of 
conspiring against the city with the French. He defended his honour from Bruges, but the turning 
tide meant that he had to flee the city. His wife could not get away in time and was captured.370 
Jacob was  left  out  of  the  peace  treaty  and summoned  to  appear  before  the  Order,  but  he  had 
retreated to Saint Pol and enjoyed a pension from the French king.371 Fleeing the scene altogether 
seemed the preferable option to him. Borsele stayed in Ghent, but things certainly did not look very 
good for him when the whole of Flanders was surrendering to Maximilian.
364Victor Fris, 'Romont (Jacques de Savoie, comte de)', Biographie nationale, 19 (1907) 928-937, there 934; Gachard, 
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Herwijnen (eds.), Borsele, Bourgondië, Oranje. Heren en markiezen van Veere en Vlissingen (Hilversum 2009) 61-
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Edelen in Zeeland, 284.
367Van Steensel, Edelen in Zeeland, 282 n. 148.
368M. Bonnabelle, 'Étude sur les seigneurs de Ligny de la maison de Luxembourg, la ville et le comté de Ligny', 
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While the both of them could not count on a lot of sympathy at court and did not have 
much value to the archduke, they eventually saved themselves by means of the familial contacts 
they created. Wolfert of Borsele decided to play his ultimate trump card: to marry his daughter 
Anna to someone who could serve as his advocate with Maximilian and the Order of the Golden 
Fleece. Anna had in the past been engaged to Philip of Cleves, likely in an attempt to create a power 
bloc to withstand the policies of the archduke. But the wedding never came to pass, as Wolfert of 
Borsele, Adolf of Cleves and co-signer Louis of Bruges formed the regency council while Philip 
remained on Maximilian's side.372  So when the war ended, on the 4th of July,  six days after the 
conclusion  of  the  peace  and  three  days  before  Maximilian  entered  Ghent,  where  Borsele  still 
resided, the former lord of Veere and Anthony, the Great Bastard, wrote up a marriage contract 
between their children Anna and Philip, the lord of Beveren. A day later, Philip himself entered the 
city and agreed to it.373 They probably had great expectations of the marriage; Wolfert could be 
protected by a member of the Burgundian dynasty, who enjoyed Maximilian's favour and was nigh 
untouchable. Philip of Burgundy had always been a man with the status to be one of the prime 
noblemen in the Netherlands, but the lordship of Beveren was not quite enough to match. With the 
Borsele patrimony, he could expect to be a geopolitical player as well. Maximilian agreed to the 
marriage.  Two other Borsele daughters were later  married to Martin and Wolfgang of Polheim, 
intimate friends of Maximilian, and the first also a Fleece knight.374
Jacob  of  Savoy,  too,  attempted  to  find  himself  a  way  out  of  the  conflict  with 
Maximilian;  his  wife's  sister,  Françoise,  had  been  captured  as  well,  and  as  guardian  of  the 
Luxembourg patrimony by virtue of his marriage, Romont was to provide a possible dowry. Philip 
of Cleves  was to  eventually marry Françoise and become his  brother-in-law. Before that  could 
happen, Romont was reconciled with Maximilian in February 1486, on the condition that Philip 
would get to keep the lordship of Enghien and that he would inherit Saint Pol in case Jacob of 
Savoy were to die without an heir. The marriage took place in the autumn of 1487.375 The count of 
Romont had died before that time, in February of 1487.376 Philip of Cleves did not, in the end, 
receive the prized Saint Pol. Romont's widow gave birth to a posthumous daughter and eventually 
372Haemers, Adellijke onvrede, 203-205; idem, Philippe et la Flandre, 31-33. The document is edited ibidem, 84-87.
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married François of Bourbon, the count of Vendôme. They were instituted by Charles VIII with the 
county instead.377 In the end, both Wolfert and Jacob knew they could not expect to be reconciled 
based on their own qualities, and instead opted to make themselves invaluable to Maximilian by 
being the means by which the ducal family, in the form of the two Philips, could inherit valuable 
territories.
4.4 Urban authority: Adrian Vilain, lord of Rassegem, and Louis of Bruges, lord of 
Gruuthuse
To a large degree, having power in the Netherlands meant having contacts in the powerful cities, 
and noblemen were instrumental in this. To effectively take over administration, Maximilian either 
had to win the favour of an influential aristocrat, or provide a new regime. In Holland, he could 
easily replace the Hooks with Cods under the leadership of some of his chamberlains, such as the 
lord of Egmont. In other places, he was unable to create his own base of power, and was forced to 
reconcile with noblemen who might then serve as a link between the court and the city. Few people 
could command a respect that transcended the party and class struggles. Those who could were both 
invaluable and highly dangerous to anyone wishing to employ them. Louis of Gruuthuse, was a man 
without equal in his home town Bruges. Perhaps to balance his Brugian influence in the regency 
council, Adrian Vilain, the lord of Rassegem, a prominent Ghenter, was added to the council later.
Louis of Gruuthuse, was faced with a problem as the war was nearing its end: while 
Utrecht and Ghent were impenetrable for Maximilian, he had a few men up his sleeve in Louis' 
bastion of Bruges, in the person of Pieter Lanchals, whom we have discussed as a lowborn rival of 
the old aristocracy in the second chapter, and his cohorts. As a result,  the repression there was 
harder, and more people were executed than in the much more troublesome Ghent.378 Gruuthuse had 
meant to leave the city at the very last moment, but the approaching army closed off the gates and 
he had nowhere to go. The first thing Engelbert of Nassau did upon entering Bruges, was find him 
in the city hall and take him into custody. The count of Nassau asked Gruuthuse whether he wanted 
to be tried by his peers of the Order of the Golden Fleece, or by the law of Bruges; he responded 
that he preferred his native city.379 Even so, the request was not granted; he was thrown into the 
'prison commune' of Bruges, and the responsible law was never informed of the events, nor of his 
case.380 Olivier de la Marche retrieved him from prison and brought him along to Gent, and onward 
to Malines, where he could prepare his defense for the next chapter of the Order of the Golden 
377Bonnabelle, Étude, 67-68; Haemers, De strijd, 123; Potter, The Luxembourg inheritance, 27-28.
378Haemers, De strijd, 119-133.
379De la Marche, Mémoires, 276; Despars, Cronycke, IV, 257; Fris, Dagboek, II, 260; Wielant, Antiquités, 329.
380Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 629.
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Fleece.381
Rassegem faced the opposite situation: he was captured by his townsmen and initially 
reconciled with Maximilian. On the 7th of 8th of June 1485,382 the faction in Ghent more inclined 
towards peace with Maximilian grabbed power and locked up some of the city's leading political 
figures of the revolt, such as Daniel Onredene, William Rijm, the Coppenhole twins and Rassegem, 
in the local castle. The first two were tried, condemned and put to death on the 14th.383 Rassegem 
was  charged  with  having  been  “the  first  original  origin  and head  of  all  the  past  commotions, 
mutinies  and  seditions.”384 But  he  wisely  spent  his  time  in  prison  “gaigner  amis  par  dons  et 
autrement,” and did not share the same fate as Onredene and Rijm. He was released from the Steen 
a day later by his allies among the aldermen.385 He was immediately made captain of the city again, 
much to the dislike of the great dean Matthew Peyaert, who had lead the revolt. While doing so, 
they imprisoned one of the city's new sergeants. When Peyaert demanded the man be restored to 
liberty, Rassegem's allies demanded that the other political prisoners would be released as well.386 
On the  26th,  Rassegem was  part  of  the  peace  negotiations;  his  agreement  to  the  proposal  was 
deemed necessary for the city  to  accept  it.387 He,  too,  feared the popular  unrest,  however,  and 
decided it best to flee to Tournai.388 Maximilian forgave him all of his actions of the recent war just 
days  after.389 It  is  likely that  Maximilian tried to win Rassegem's  favour back by remitting  his 
misdeeds, and by that means gain an ally within the notoriously hard to penetrate politics of Ghent.
But  Rassegem did  not  return  to  Ghent  and  did  not  turn  over  to  Maximilian's  side. 
Instead he moved on to Lille, where a band of Engelbert of Nassau's archers captured him despite 
the reconciliation on the 26th of January 1486, and led him to the prison of Vilvoorde in Brabant.390 
Around that same time, his mother was banished from Ghent, being suspected of partaking in a plot 
to assassinate the city aldermen.391 What was to become of Rassegem is entirely unclear; unlike the 
Fleece knights, he was not summoned to a trial to defend himself. Instead, his captivity ended more 
spectacularly.  In early August of 1487, his eponymous relative, the lord of Liedekerke, daringly 
rescued him from prison.392 Both of them moved to Tournai, to enter their native Ghent again in 
381't Boeck, 83-84; De la Marche, Mémoires, 279-280; Despars, Cronycke, IV, 268; Aurelius, Divisiekroniek, f. 397r.
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September. Rassegem wrote letters to Maximilian, pleading his innocence and the injustice of his 
imprisonment, and also asked Philip of Cleves to support his cause. The Vilain cousins were asked 
by several important Flemish figures to justify their actions at a meeting in Dendermonde, where 
Philip of Cleves and Anthony and Philip of Burgundy could hear their case and act as arbiters. 
These nobles of the blood agreed, and so did Maximilian; but despite the necessary hostages having 
arrived in Ghent shortly after, the aldermen of Ghent forbade Rassegem and Liedekerke to leave the 
city.393
The rest is history — parties radicalised, and early in the next year the Brugians joined 
the Ghenters in revolt as they captured Maximilian. Few series of events encapsulate the difficulty 
that surrounded unreliable noblemen as well as the circumstances of the lord of Gruuthuse during 
the second Flemish Revolt do. He was locked up in Malines, Gorcum and Vilvoorde from 1485 to 
1488.394 When Maximilian  was  captured  by the  Brugians,  the  council  of  Philip  the  Handsome 
decided that Gruuthuse be released so as to help with the negotiations — he was released on the 
fifteenth of February,  mere two weeks after the event, and we find him attending a meeting of 
Philip's council at the end of the month.395 The Three Members of Flanders were very eager to have 
him be part of the negotiations; a delegation to organise the meeting of the Estates-General in Ghent 
specifically demanded “monseigneur de la Grutuse, qui leur estoit fort agreable.”396 The archduke 
agreed,  and gave him a safe conduct,  sending him on his way on the 12th,  and after the Ghent 
chapter,  he  alone  visited  Maximilian  in  Bruges.  There,  Gruuthuse  reported  later,  the  king  of 
Romans said that he would give up his regency over Philip the Handsome and gave him letters 
declaring so.397 On that occasion in Bruges, he did not just visit Maximilian, but also went to the 
nine members of the city to personally thank them for six jugs of wine that every one of them had 
given to him.398 Even if Maximilian's concession was by no means forced onto him, the lord of 
Gruuthuse was certainly what we would today call 'corrupt' when suggesting it to  him.399 Not long 
after, Maximilian regretted having said what he had, and asked for his letters  back; he felt that 
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Louis of Bruges had pressed him into making concessions by means of scare tactics.400 Despite the 
mediating role that Gruuthuse ostensibly played, the king did not feel he could trust him at all, and 
wrote to his son that he feared the nobleman would deliver him into the hands of his enemies or 
otherwise harm him. As a result, Gruuthuse was captured by the magistracy of Malines in spite of 
Philip's earlier assurances as to his safety. The Ghenters were particularly suspicious of this course 
of action. Deputies of the Estates-General sent the city of Malines a letter begging the magistrates to 
release the old nobleman, because he had great influence on the spirit of the inhabitants of Bruges 
and  because  his  presence  could  contribute  a  lot  to  the  deliverance  of  Maximilian.401 Several 
members of Philip's court, including Henry and John of Bergen and Henry of Witthem — rivals 
who could only benefit from his fall from grace — visited him and assured him that no harm would 
come to him and that “l'arrest de la personne n'estoit que pour bien et a bonne fin.” This quickly 
turned out not to be the case. He was brought to Dendermonde with an armed and alert escort, 
ready,  as he later  claimed, to murder him in case anyone tried to rescue him.402 Just before his 
release, the king of the Romans promised to the Three Members that upon his delivery, he would 
set Gruuthuse free from his arrest.403 It is unclear whether Maximilian did do so, or whether he 
escaped; he did not make an objection to the claim that he did.404 In any case, he was considered a 
wanted  man  again  soon after,  and was captured  by German  troops  and led  to  Rupelmonde  in 
June.405 There, he was used as a trump card. When the war flared up, the Ghenters were eager to 
violently dispose of the German hostages who no longer served any use; the imperial troops made 
clear that if such were to happen, Gruuthuse would be killed. His son John and Philip of Cleves, 
therefore,  pleaded  with  the  populace  to  keep  their  calm.406 Friends  helped  him  escape  from 
Rupelmonde already in early July.407 In his defense, Gruuthuse explained that the was justified in 
having fled by divine and natural law. After all, he was treated “vilainement et durement” and was 
threatened with death or deportation to Germany on a daily basis. He realised that he could not go 
to Malines for fear of his safety, and he could not flee to France for the sake of his honour; Ghent 
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was  the  only  safe  place  to  go.408 And  so,  Louis  of  Bruges  joined  another  revolt  against 
Maximilian.409
Gruuthuse eventually served as member of the regency council, captain of the city of 
Bruges and, during the Brabantine campaign of Philip of Cleves, he conducted affairs in Flanders as 
his replacement.410 Rassegem was one of the fiercest antagonists of the king of the Romans. When 
several of the king's closest advisors were captured in Bruges, it was Rassegem who asked for a 
portion  of  them to  be  handed  over  to  Ghent,  where  some  of  them eventually  died  gruesome 
deaths.411 During the war, Rassegem served as commissioner of the law besides conducting the 
Ghent war effort.412
Regardless, the both of them knew when their cause was a lost one. Louis of Gruuthuse 
and Adrian of Rassegem supported the movement for peace in 1489 and represented the county of 
Flanders  in  negotiating  the  peace  of  Montilz-lez-Tours.413 Although Gruuthuse  left  Bruges  just 
before Engelbert of Nassau entered it as victor on the 16th of January 1490, he was found outside of 
the city a short while later.414 His caution was unfounded; he does not seem to have been punished 
for his role in the revolt, and we still find him in position of captain of the city in spring.415 The 
reason was quite simple: once again, the authorities needed the lord of Gruuthuse to negotiate for 
them; in this case, it was Philip of Cleves in Sluis who needed to be argued with, and so Gruuthuse 
was sent as the head of an embassy of prominent Brugians to relay the government point of view.416 
Ghent never really submitted after signing the peace of Montilz-lez-Tours, but the lord of Rassegem 
strived  towards  abandoning  Philips  of  Cleves  and  reconciliating  with  Maximilian.  Philip  later 
complained that the Ghenter had hindered his every action and at one point even tried to have him 
assassinated.417 Molinet tells us that when Ghent was still  independent and reluctant to give up, 
Rassegem, “tenant parti contre la querelle du roy des Romains,” forsook the oaths to and alliance 
408Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 634.
409Van Praet, Recherches, 26.
410Nieuw nationaal biografisch woordenboek, 18 (2007)388-396, there 394.The first mention of him as captain is on 
the 26th of January 1489: 't Boeck, 259. He seems to have spent most time in Ghent up until that point, since he is 
said to have entered Bruges on the 19th of November 1488 after 35 weeks of absence; ibidem 254. Van Praet, 
Recherches, 42, mentions earlier visits to the city.
411De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 110.
412Diegerick, Correspondence, 203, 236; Jelle Haemers and Botho Verbist, 'Het Gentse gemeenteleger in het laatste 
kwart van de vijftiende eeuw. Een politieke, financiële en militaire analyse van de stadsmilitie', Handelingen van de 
maatschappij voor geschiedenis en oudheidkunde te Gent, 62 (2008) 291-325, there 321-322.
413De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 194; Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 66; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 165
414't Boeck, 323; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 172.
415't Boeck, 336; Van Praet, Recherches, 26-27 notes that Gruuthuse was named before all other officers of the city in 
this period in any list.
416BNF ms. fr. 18997, f.85r-f.85v; 't Boeck, 330;  De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 232, says that the city accounts of Sluis 
proved that the same delegation was also present on the 30th of January, but this is mentioned by neither of the two 
meticulous sources that recall this embassy, nor by any other source.
417BNF ms. fr. 18997, f. 115r-115v, edited in De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 376-377.
72
with Philip of Cleves for the promise of money.418 Philip, in turn, proclaimed a feud against him and 
had him assassinated on the 12th of June, 1490.419 A sad ending for the man who was just getting 
reconciled with the authorities after being one of the nastiest thorns in the court's side since 1477.
It  was  also  in  June  1490  that  Bruges  sprang  back  into  revolt,  partially  over  the 
numismatic ordinance from which the lord of Gruuthuse had a lot to lose;420 The whole of the city's 
magistracy stayed in place, presumably including Gruuthuse, but he did not stay for long.421 The 
next month, he headed a delegation of the city to discuss its problems on a meeting of the Estates-
General in Malines. That meeting was never held, but he stayed behind in Malines, and Jan van 
Rans and Joris Picavet replaced him as captain of Bruges eventually.422 He was accused before the 
Order of the Golden Fleece on the 20th of May, 1491.423 After the inconclusive trial, it is hard to 
trace  Gruuthuse.  His role  in the sphere of Bruges politics  had definitively ended after  the city 
surrendered for a second time on the 29th of November 1490. Finally, in November 1492 — a mere 
month after Flanders had been pacified entirely — the old an sick Louis of Bruges rode into his 
native town for the last time, where he passed away on the 24th.424 
The relationship between nobles with an urban base was a fickle one, on both sides. 
They could be the most dangerous and the most necessary men to the central government. As a 
result, they were treated harshly when they were punished, but at the same time imprisoned so that 
they could be used to bargain with or release at a later date. It is probably no coincidence that the 
very  last  book  the  oft-time  prisoner  Louis  of  Gruuthuse  bought  was  a  copy  of  Boethius'  De 
consolatione philosophiae.425
4.1 The test case: John of Montfort, castellan of Montfort
Of all the noblemen discussed here, John of Montfort was the first to be defeated in 1483. But since 
he is  the one who did not  figure in  the Flemish Revolt,  we can use his  experience  to test  the 
uniqueness of the Flemish cases. Did Maximilian use a radically different treatment for a man who 
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had not lived at court and who was to a large degree a foreigner, or do we see the same strategies 
applied?
After the defeat of the Hooks in the cities of Holland, attention turned to those who had 
fled and the people who had supported them, mainly from the neighbouring bishopric of Utrecht. 
On the 14th of April 1481, Maximilian had come before Montfort and demanded that the banished 
Hollanders be handed over to be tried. He had also asked bishop David and the city of Utrecht to 
break bonds with the lord of Montfort and act against him.426 Montfort himself received letters to 
appear before the Great Council to justify his actions, but never admitted to these demands. After he 
was called upon three times and three times did not appear before the Council, Maximilian and 
Mary proclaimed on the 17th of July the punishment that he was to receive if he did not defend 
himself: they “banished and banish the aforementioned lord of Montfort to eternal days from all of 
our lands and lordships and declare all the goods of that same lord of Montfort, whichever they are, 
to be to our profit forfeited, forwarded and confiscated.”427 In the end, he was not even punished for 
his  actions  during  the  occupation  of  Leiden  and  the  harbouring  of  the  Hooks,  but  for  his 
unwillingness to explain these actions. Within ten days, the often contended Purmerend was given 
to Maximilian's close friend Veit of Wolkenstein.428 Even so, Montfort's position in Utrecht only 
was only strengthening; on the 7th of August, Montfort and his supporters took control of the city 
and forced the bishop to flee.429 The latter turned to Maximilian, who was intent on bringing bishop 
David back to the city by force of arms.
The conflict began in October of that same year 1481. In spite of the hitherto more than 
troublesome relation between Maximilian and John of Montfort, the archduke was still hoping that 
he would not have to take any more serious measures. While he instructed his lieutenant-general 
Josse de Lalaing not to concede in any way to Engelbert of Cleves, who was shoved forward as the 
new bishop, his policy on Montfort was far milder: “et en tant que qu'il peut toucher monseigneur 
de Montfort, veult aussi que ce soit mis en arbitraige et sceu se icelui seigneur de Montfort peut 
demourer sans prejudice dudit traictie es villes d'Utrecht et d'Amersfort, et autrement est content 
qu'il  demeure  en sa  ville  de Montfort.”430 For  the time  being,  however,  Montfort  was  still  the 
fiercest opponent of the Habsburgs.
The castellan was captured by the opposing faction in Utrecht on the 21st of April 1483. 
426Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 316-317; Van der Linden, Burggraven, 160-161.
427L. Galesloot, 'Trois arrêts historiques du Grand Conseil de Malines', Bijdragen en mededelingen van het historisch 
genootschap gevestigd in Utrecht, 6 (1883) 422-463, there 435-437, quote p.437.
428Van der Linden, Burggraven, 162. For Wolkenstein, see Cools, Mannen met macht, 306-307.
429Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 327.
430Michel van Gent, 'Een middeleeuwse crisismanager: Joost van Lalaing, stadhouder van Holland en Zeeland, 1480-
1483', in Jacques Paviot (ed.) Liber amicorum Raphaël de Smedt, pt. III, Historia (Louvain and Paris 2001) 165-
182, there 177. The instruction is not dated, but has to be written after the battle of Westbroek (26 December 1481).
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The city of Montfort was to be put under the control of bishop David's delegates. The Hollanders 
demanded that the fortifications of the city and castle would be demolished, so that John would at 
all times be vulnerable. They were, however, ready to respect the goods of all in the Sticht. Rumour 
had  it  that  the  Hollanders  wanted  to  execute  him,  but  were  divided over  who would have  the 
ownership of his head afterwards. It was, of course, also problematic that Montfort was subject both 
to Maximilian as well as David. Commotion in Utrecht changed the political situation again early in 
the next month, and John of Montfort was free again.431 Only when Maximilian settled things with 
Louis XI and the regency council in Flanders, could the most drastic of measures be taken — the 
siege  of  Utrecht.  On the  31st of  August,  a  peace  was  mediated  by  emissaries  of  the  emperor 
Frederick.432 On the third day of the next month, the final peace was proclaimed, in which Montfort 
was also taken into account; he was to contribute to the 20.000 lb. that Utrecht had to pay in fine, 
but in return he we be reinstated in the goods of his that were confiscated during the war. On the 6th, 
the archduke triumphantly entered Utrecht and received John of Montfort in grace.433 Undoubtedly, 
this was considered an anticlimactic end by the Hollanders; even if the rumour that they had wanted 
Montfort's head was not true, they had demanded that he was made harmless by the destruction of 
the fortifications of his home town. Maximilian acted quite mildly by not touching the city and 
castle, and was much harder on the ideological enemy Engelbert of Cleves than he was on John of 
Montfort, whom he had hoped could be used as an ally in the future. His Hollandish possession, 
which had by then come into the hands of Veit  of Wolkenstein and John of Bergen,  were not 
returned. This eventually became the cause of Montfort's second struggle in 1488-1491.
Compared  to  the  noblemen  of  the  Flemish  revolt,  we  can  only  conclude  that  the 
strategies employed against John of Montfort were largely the same. Like Wolfert of Borsele and 
Jacob of Savoy, his goods were confiscated before the peace was signed, although for Montfort, it 
was at least legitimised by a case — or rather an aborted case — before the Great Council. His 
goods, too, were given to partisans of Maximilian. He could easily be driven from his possessions 
in Holland. Like in Bruges, where Pieter Lanchals could take over from Louis of Gruuthuse, the 
Hooks were  easily  replaced  with  Cods;  they had  essentially  no  bargaining  position.  Not  so in 
Utrecht, where the bishop's party was not particularly strong and Montfort and his Hooks had to be 
appeased, just as Rassegem had to be in Ghent. Like them, he would also be driven into a new 
revolt  out of dissatisfaction over the unclear and perhaps overly opportunistic way affairs  were 
handled.
431Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 361-362; Van der Linden, Burggraven, 167-168.
432Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 364; edited in Molinet, Chroniques, I, 423-424.
433Aurelius, Divisiekroniek, f.395r; Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 364-365; Van der Linden, Burggraven, 169.
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4.8 Trends and patterns
Molinet tells us that Maximilian was accompanied by an impressive train of Flemish captives when 
he was received in Bruges, and his nobles proudly displayed their  newly won goods. Philip of 
Cleves held by his  side the wife of the count of Romont,  her sister  (who was to later  become 
Philip's own wife) and their goods. Philip of Beveren carried along his new father-in-law, Wolfert 
of Borsele. Engelbert of Nassau had gotten the goods of Louis of Gruuthuse. The public display, 
according to the court chronicler, did much to convince the Three Members to uphold the newly 
made peace.434 It was made clear to everyone that the three knights of the Golden Fleece could not 
form an alternative legitimate government.
The various confiscations ended up benefiting a small number of favourables at court. 
Philip  of  Cleves  and  Engelbert  of  Nassau  greatly  expanded  their  domains  by  means  of  the 
Gruuthuse and Romont confiscations, and John of Bergen received a considerable amount as well. 
In Holland,  the goods of John of Montfort  were given to Veit  of Wolkenstein and Michael  of 
Bergen,  but  soon  ended  up  with  John  of  Egmont  and  Michael's  brother  John.  For  himself, 
Maximilian kept Veere, at least for the time being, but that, and the other Borsele lands, ended up in 
the hands of Philip of Beveren a year after. Katia Hancké has argued that for cities in this period, 
the confiscation of goods of political opponents of the regime was mostly a way to finance the 
expensive revolts. Furthermore, for a wide ranging program of confiscation to take place, the civic 
authority had to be powerful and well established.435 On the level of the government actor, we do 
not find the actions serving to aid finance; the fines paid by the cities were supposed to take care of 
that.  Instead,  we may see a double function to confiscation of noble goods. Firstly,  since these 
mostly concern domains (as opposed to the  immeubles of many urban convicted),  depriving the 
rebellious nobles of them meant depriving them of an economic power base. It was hard to keep up 
being a  grand seigneur without  any land to match.  Secondly,  it  allowed for a  redistribution  of 
wealth and served as a reward for other nobles. The relationship between authority and confiscation 
is present here as in urban cases, but the relationship seems to be reversed. Veere and Enghien were 
declared  to  have  fallen  to  the  crown  before  Borsele  and  Romont  were  taken  into  custody; 
Purmerend and Polsbroek after Montfort had refused to defend himself before the Great Council. It 
was more the case that archducal power was displayed and made public by means of confiscation of 
lands. One of the grant letters, that to Philip of Cleves for Enghien, mentions two reasons: “tant 
pour proximité de lignaige que pour les grands et loyaux services.”436 These can be used for other 
434Molinet, Chroniques, I, 459-460.
435Katia Hancké, 'Confiscaties als politiek wapen in intern stedelijke conflicten, casus: Gent: 1477-1492', in 
Handelingen van de maatschappij voor geschiedenis en oudheidkunde te Gent, 49 (1995) 197-220.
436Gachard, Les archives, 44.
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cases as well. The proximity of line meant the cases of Philip of Cleves and Philip of Beveren, who, 
as nobles of the blood, were vital in the legitimising function they served by acknowledging the 
regency of Maximilian; the loyal services, of course, referring to tasks performed in the army or 
council of the archduke. The 'solution' to a rebellious nobility was thus to bribe the loyal nobility 
even further.
Proximity of line and services rendered were, in a way, also the qualities that the two 
members who escaped 'unscathed', Adolf of Cleves and Philip of Beveren, displayed. Both, as we 
have seen, were members of the ducal family. Maximilian of Austria had tried to portray himself as 
a protector of the Burgundian dynasty, the man who had come in 1477 to rescue the duchess Mary 
and her beleaguered lands from the threat of French invasion.437 Taking relatives of his son captive 
would have been entirely contradictory to the image of himself that Maximilian tried to get across. 
But it is hard to tell if such a propagandistic move was the ulterior motive in this case. Adolf and 
Philip also proved themselves to be the most 'reasonable' of the members of the regency council in 
the  end.  Philip  retreated  from military  activity  after  the  Dendermonde  meeting  and  eventually 
switched camp altogether, which granted him forgiveness for all deeds misdone in the past. In the 
next months, he was crucial in establishing peace. Adolf did not leave the regency council, but he 
was the one to disband it in the end. His social position meant that he was almost as untouchable as 
the young duke Philip himself, and he weathered the tumult in Ghent without problems. He was the 
one who eventually disestablished the council and returned Maximilian to power. As such, both 
members were useful both in a legitimising way as well as in services rendered during the war. That 
Maximilian  had  always  intended  for  them to  more  or  less  get  away  with  it,  is  shown by the 
negotiations he had with Adolf over his pensions, and the fact that neither Beveren nor Ravenstein 
were, at any point, confiscated.
As for the personal treatment of the nobles, it is difficult to entirely condone the actions 
of Maximilian and his closest servants; we do find a good deal of promises not being held, such as 
that to Louis of Gruuthuse to choose his own court of justice and the grace awarded to Adrian of 
Rassegem. The confusion over Montfort's Hollandish possession may have been intentional as well. 
In the first case, that may have been the result of an overly generous promise of the lieutenant-
general  Engelbert  of  Nassau  that  did  not  conform to  the  plan  Maximilian  of  Austria  had  for 
Gruuthuse. The situation in Bruges allowed for a more radical repression than that in Ghent, since 
there was an archducal party present in the former which could take over the reins in the city under 
437Sonja Dünnebeil, 'Der Orden vom Goldenen Vlies als Zeichen der burgundischen Einheit. Ideal oder Wirklichkeit 
unter Maximilian I.?', Publications du Centre européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes 52 (2012) 111-127, there 116 
n.12; Graeme Small, 'Of Burgundian dukes, counts, saints and kings, 14 C.E. - 1500' in: D'Arcy Jonathan Dacre 
Boulton and Jan Veenstra (eds.), The ideology of Burgundy. The promotion of national consciousness, 1364-1565 
(Leiden 2006) 151-192, there 178-185. cf. Gachard, Lettres inédites, II, 91.
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the leadership of Peter Lanchals. Aside from Gruuthuse, ten citizens of Bruges were excluded from 
the peace treaty, as opposed to only six for the much more troublesome Ghent.438 It is likely that 
Maximilian tried to win Rassegem's favour back by remitting his misdeeds, and by that means gain 
an ally within the notoriously hard to penetrate politics of Ghent. It is no surprise then that when 
Rassegem did not, in fact, return to his native city and cooperate with the new civic government, he 
was seen as a man with ulterior motives and was caught and placed in prison in spite of earlier 
promises.
If we have to come to a general conclusion here, it must be that the punishment doled 
out  to  these high  noblemen  depended almost  entirely  on the  use  that  they could  have and the 
services that they could provide to the rule of Maximilian of Austria. Adolf of Cleves and Philip of 
Burgundy had been useful in deconstructing the regency council in the end and brokering the peace 
between the archduke and the Three Members; and their continued good relations with him ensured 
the legitimacy of his rule. As such, they received no punishment at all. Adrian of Rassegem and 
John of Montfort had been a fierce opponents of Maximilian's, but the government thought that they 
could  be  reasoned with  and that  they could  prove  useful  in  upholding  authority  in  Ghent  and 
Utrecht  in  the  future.  Montfort  was  punished only  in  a  monetary  fine  and  Rassegem was  not 
punished at all, at least until it seemed that he was not willing to actively cooperate in any plans of 
the archduke. Wolfert of Borsele, Jacob of Savoy and Louis of Gruuthuse were not quite as useful 
as the other members of the regency council. Borsele's personal conflicts had wrought havoc on 
Hollandish politics and contradicted archducal policy. His patrimony, moreover, had for a large part 
already been confiscated during the war, and as such, he had no base of power that Maximilian 
could not penetrate himself. Instead, his clients in Holland had been replaced by Cods under the 
leadership of John of Egmont, and his position in Zeeland was usurped by the archduke himself, 
and later given to Philip of Beveren. Jacob of Savoy's value never seems to have been one of urban 
clientèle, as it had been for others. He was a military man first and foremost, and even setting aside 
the fact  that  Maximilian had enough capable  army leaders of his own — Philip  of Cleves and 
Engelbert of Nassau most prominently — entrusting a man who had previously revolted and who 
had a host of connections at the French court with key locations on the border seemed like a disaster 
waiting to happen. So the patrimony of the count of Romont was dismembered and given to his 
successor,  Philip  of  Cleves.  Louis  of  Gruuthuse's  main  strength  had  been  the  incomparable 
popularity he enjoyed among the citizens of Bruges. Maximilian, however, sought to establish an 
entirely new regime, and counted instead on Peter Lanchals to take over the position of the city's 
first man.
438Haemers, De strijd, 119-133.
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The final episode, from 1487 onwards, shows just what the strength of some of these 
people in the Flemish cities was. Rassegem, after his escape from prison, could rile up the entire 
city and pretty much caused it to go to war with Maximilian. As the Brugians revolted against the 
(by then) king, the council in Malines quickly realised that Lanchals' alternative government was 
not as effective as hope would have had it be; and when Lanchals himself ended up on the scaffold, 
the only way to reason with the Brugians was to recruit Gruuthuse from prison. Both the grace 
awarded Rassegem in 1485 and the release of Gruuthuse in 1488 show that Maximilian and his 
council  preferred  an  untrustworthy  interlocutor  to  complete  urban  anarchy,  and  that  they were 
willing to bend the rules of trial to achieve stability in the Flemish cities. From there on, however, 
the government and the nobles ended up in a vicious circle of distrust and disrespect that had to lead 
to a breakdown at some point. Little wonder that the both of them ended up in a second Flemish 
revolt.
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5. Punishment in the Order of the Golden Fleece
We have established that the actual punishment of the rebellious noblemen during the 
reign of Maximilian depended mainly on the usefulness of these people for further political and 
symbolic purposes. These sentences were barely at all influenced by the nature of the actual 'crime', 
but rather driven by an extreme pragmatism. What then, of the Order of the Golden Fleece, that 
bastion of ceremony and otherworldliness, how did these chapters deal with the trespasses of their 
members? The Golden Fleece has unjustly often been neglected as a political instrument in favour 
of the value of the ducal court.439 But the chivalric order often provided means for the dukes to 
portray a common identity and serve to build an interregional consciousness in a conglomerate of 
states that did not form a unity in any other way.440 As such, it formed a tool of great importance in 
the legitimation of the rulers of the Burgundian state, and the domain of the order was more than 
any other arena — certainly more than the court — an area in which impeccability was of the 
utmost  importance.  “[T]he  Toison  d'Or  was  one  means,”  argues  Malcolm  Vale,  “whereby  an 
aggressive and competitive nobility might not only be united, but disciplined.”441
 The Order went through some of its roughest years during the regency of Maximilian of 
Austria, with the Dendermonde meeting in 1484 and its divisions being perhaps its all-time low 
point. The Order had been founded as a means to integrate the nobility of the Burgundian lands, but 
things went rapidly downhill after 1477; many of its members left for French service, and Louis XI, 
having confiscated the duchy of Burgundy, claimed the sovereignty of the Order. Maximilian of 
Austria was accepted as the true sovereign without much problems in 1478, but out of 18 living 
knights,  only  5  even  attended  the  ceremony.  Several  new  members  had  been  chosen  then  to 
augment the total number of knights to 25, but no more than 6 were present at the chapter in 1482. 
When five of the Order's members joined the Flemish regency council in 1483 and ended up at war 
with the sovereign, the institute as a binding mechanism appeared to have very little function left at 
all. As such, it was vital that Maximilian reshape the Golden Fleece, bring as many members as 
possible back into the fold, correct and punish those who had deserted it, and restore it to a symbol 
of legitimacy.442
439 D'Arcy Jonathan Dacre Boulton, The knights of the crown. The monarchical orders of knighthood in later medieval  
Europe, 1325-1520 (Woodbridge 1987)xiv-xv; Malcolm Vale, War and chivalry. Warfare and aristocratic culture 
in England, France and Burgundy at the end of the Middle Ages (London 1981) 34-35.
440Boulton, The knights of the crown, 356-396; idem, 'The Order of the Golden Fleece and the creation of Burgundian 
national identity', in: idem and Jan Veenstra (eds.), The ideology of Burgundy. The promotion of national 
consciousness, 1364-1565 (Leiden 2006) 99-115; Armstrong, A policy for the nobility,, 231-232.
441Vale, War and chivalry, 42.
442Dünnebeil, Der Orden als Zeichen, passim; idem, 'Der Orden vom Goldenen Vlies zwischen Burgund und dem 
80
The year 1483 saw a lot of attempts to bring the Order back together meet failure by the 
divisions between its members. Maximilian asked for the members of the regency council to justify 
themselves at the next chapter; they refused to cooperate, arguing that Maximilian was sovereign of 
the Order only by virtue of his marriage to Mary of Burgundy; Philip the Handsome would now be 
the  new  sovereign,  and  the  next  chapter  would  have  to  wait  until  his  coming  of  age.443 The 
Dendermonde meeting of June 1484 solved that issue remarkably quickly, even if it did not solve 
anything else; the knights all agreed that Maximilian indeed had no right to be the sovereign of the 
Order anymore, but they had to concede that it was impossible to withhold chapters for another 
decade and acceded that the archduke of Austria was the most qualified to be the chief and conduct 
meetings until Philip would come of age — as long as he would style himself père et chef and his 
son souverain de l'Ordre.444
The final peace treaty with Flanders excluded, besides 19 citizens of Flanders, three 
members of the Order of the Golden Fleece: Jacob of Savoy, Louis of Gruuthuse and Wolfert of 
Borsele. They were to be tried by their peers, and as such, had to await the next chapter. Setting it 
up took a while. Although the statutes held that it ought to be organised every three years and was 
thus  long  overdue  after  the  war,  Maximilian's  election  to  king  the  following  year  held  up 
preparations. Only a handful of members met at preparatory meetings without the chief in 1486. 
Some of the things  they debated  on was whether  Romont,  Gruuthuse and Borsele  ought to  be 
summoned by means of closed letters or by public placard, and what form the accusation would 
take.445
In the end, absence, war and rebellion would keep the knights from assembling until 
1491.446 By then, Jacob of Savoy and Wolfert of Borsele had already passed away. But in working 
towards the submission of the Flemish cities  and of Philip of Cleves,  a trial  could be an ideal 
political  weapon.  Not  just  was  the  lord  of  Gruuthuse  finally  brought  to  trial,  the  previously 
uncharged Adolf of Cleves was also accused; no doubt a tool in the arsenal to force his son into 
compromise.447 Besides allowing the king to confiscate all of the possessions of someone accused of 
lese majesty, there were also precedents for punishing the children of the convicted.448 In spite of 
the charges against Borsele ostensibly having been dropped after his death, and the reconciliation of 
Maximilian with Romont, they,  too, were included in the accusation.449 Posthumous prosecution 
Hause Österreich', Publications du Centre européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes 46 (2006) 13-30, there 25-26.
443Reiffenberg, Histoire, 128-136.
444Reiffenberg, Histoire, 139.
445Reiffenberg, Histoire, 157, 159.
446De Smedt, Le 15e chapitre, 3-38.
447Haemers, Opstand adelt, 8.
448Bellamy, Treason in England, 13.
449Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 530.
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was not foreign to Roman law,450 and it shouldn't surprise us that the rules of the Order attached 
much value to it as well. Aside from the those on trial, only six knights attended; the father and 
chief was still in Austria as well.
Besides  the  members  of  the  regency  council,  other  members  under  trial  were  two 
knights  who  had  opted  for  serving  the  French  crown,  Philip  Pot  and  Philip  d'Esquerdes,  the 
marshall who had conducted the armies of Louis XI and Charles VIII against Maximilian. They 
were accused of perjury and convicted.451 The final list of the issues charged against the members of 
the regency council was written up by the king himself in Austria.452 Among other things, it accused 
the knights of having usurped the regency over Philip the Handsome and his lands; of having allied 
with the French,  the ancient  enemies  of the Burgundian dynasty;  of having waged war against 
Maximilian; finally, of not just having joined the revolt, but having been the instigators of it. The 
final charge: lese majesty.453 The charges cannot be called personal, since Philip of Cleves faced 
almost  exactly  the  same  accusations  in  Maximilian's  letters.  Adolf  of  Cleves  and  Louis  of 
Gruuthuse were given copies of the text, so that they might prepare their defenses for a later date; it 
was scheduled  for the next  meeting,  which ought  to  have taken place  three years  alter.  In  the 
obligatory  corrections,  Philip  of  Beveren  was  briefly  reprimanded  for  his  indifference  during 
Maximilian's captivity, but there is no mention of his involvement in the second regency council.454 
The points in which the assembled thought the king himself was lacking are very interesting: he 
was accused of being too indifferent to harmful events, and of confusing, in the distribution of his 
graces,  the loyal  and disloyal  subjects. Specifically,  they were referring to the ease with which 
Philip of Cleves had gotten away with the murder of Lancelot of Berlaymont in 1484 — and was 
able to accumulate many offices and honours in the years following.455
Several days later, the gathered knights discussed the fates of the late Jacob of Savoy 
and Wolfert of Borsele. The count of Romont was found guilty of having acted “contre les status 
d'icelle Ordre par lui juréz, il s'est armé et de son auctorité porté capitaine contre le roy et mondit 
seigneur, leur a fait guerre et commis pluseurs aultres cas reprochables et non dignes de chevalier 
d'honneur, en deleissant la vengeance à Dieu.”456 A little placard containing said verdict was added 
to his coat of arms in the St. Rombout in Malines, where this feast was held, and to that in the St. 
John of 's-Hertogenbosch, the site of the previous chapter.457 On Wolfert of Borsele no conclusion 
450Cuttler, Treason in France, 93-94.
451Molinet, Chroniques, II, 225-226.
452Reiffenberg, Histoire, 188.
453Reiffenberg, Histoire, 181-185.
454Reiffenberg, Histoire, 194-196.
455Reiffenberg, Histoire, 199-200; For this episode, see De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 66-77.
456Molinet, Chroniques, II, 225-226.
457B. Bauchau, 'Jacques de Savoie (1450-1486). Histoire d'un portrait et protrait historique', Handelingen van de 
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was reached, and his coat of arms was not adorned with an accusatory text. The knights wished to 
await the verdict on Cleves and Gruuthuse, figuring that the cases would be similar. His stall plate 
would be painted over with the charges only in 1501.458
Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Gruuthuse consequently both wrote or had written for 
them long justifications.  Unfortunately,  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  tell  what  degree  of 
authorship the two nobles had over these texts. The similarities between the two of them and the 
fact that several passages are completely identical,  make it clear that they were written in some 
form  of  cooperation,  perhaps  that  of  having  one  and  the  same  jurist  assist  in  writing.459 The 
justifications have been analysed quite recently by Bernhard Sterchi and by Jelle Haemers. Sterchi, 
in  a  book  about  normative  literature  at  the  Burgundian  court,  has  focused  on  the  rhetoric  of 
defense.460 Haemers, more interested in the political situation, has looked at the texts, along with 
Philip  of  Cleves'  justification,  to  reconstruct  the  political  ideology  of  revolting  noblemen.461 I 
disagree with Haemers that the texts were used as “justification of the political resistance of the 
nobility in the Flemish Revolt”. They were instead complete  denials of political resistance. The 
arguments  raised  were  means  by  which  the  two  men  had  hoped  to  be  able  to  reconcile  the 
undeniable political actions that they took with the ideology of the loyalist Fleece knights.
What  becomes  clear  from the  texts  is  that  both  parties  made the most  far-reaching 
claims that they possibly could, often venturing into the unbelievable. For example, the accusation 
will call out Adolf and Louis as the instigators of all troubles against Maximilian, even going so far 
as to blame Louis for having organised the Brugian revolt of 1488 at a time when he was still under 
house arrest in Malines. The both of them would, in turn, respond that they had never actually been 
in political opposition to the Habsburger and that when they retained Philip the Handsome in Ghent, 
they did so by commandment of Maximilian and under threat of the Flemish.462 Several others have 
to take the fall for Adolf and Louis. In addition to generally expressing a very low regard for the 
Flemish citizens, William Rijm (whom, we have seen, was ones of Maximilian's fiercest opponents) 
was blamed for almost everything.463 The count of Romont was blamed for all military action taken 
koninklijke kring voor oudheidkunde, letteren en kunst van Mechelen, 95, 1 (1991)  117-146, there 145-146; Sterchi, 
Über den Umgang, 534, 763.
458Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 534-535.
459In the case of Gruuthuse, it is not even entirely evident that it was written during his life time, although that would 
seem entirely likely. The text of Adolf of Cleves, at least, bears a signature. Even so, when Adolf's father is 
mistakenly named Jehan instead of Adolph, we can assume that this was a sloppiness that was not his own; Sterchi, 
Über den Umgang, 538-539, 547-648. Jelle Haemers has suggested Roeland of Moerkerke, who also co-wrote 
Philip of Cleves' proposition as a possible author, and although this is entirely plausible, there is no evidence for it; 
Haemers, Opstand Adelt, 10.
460Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 547-558.
461Haemers, Opstand adelt, 1-23.
462Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 549-550, 661; Haemers, Opstand adelt, 10-13.
463Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 613-614, 616, 620, 654-656, 658, 660.
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against Maximilian in '84 and '85; Adolf and Louis had nothing to do with that and had never lead 
any troops.464 So  too  was  the  alliance  between  Flanders  and France  the  work  of  Romont  and 
Rassegem, and the noblemen at trial had known nothing of it until it had been concluded;465 for so 
far as they had had contact with Charles VIII, it was to discuss the return of the duchy of Burgundy 
(perhaps  not  entirely  coincidentally,  the  recovery  of  Burgundy  was  one  of  Maximilian's  pet 
projects).466 By that time, of course, Rijm, Romont and Rassegem had passed away; they were easy 
targets to saddle with the blame.467 Adolf even positioned himself on Maximilian's side when he 
pointed out that in the past he had thrice punished the Ghenters for rebelling. “Et se le peuple a aimé 
ou ayme ledit  seigneur de Ravestein,” so goes Adolf's defense, “ce n'a pas esté pour leur avoir 
permis ne tolleré leurs rebellions et desobéissances.”468
What  is  perhaps  the  most  interesting  underlying  notion  is  the  idea  of  permanence. 
Maximilian accused Adolf and Louis of always having conspired against him. They, in turn, do not 
admit that there was such a thing as an open conflict between them and the king; they had always 
been loyal. In order to support such claims, they also legitimised their persons by resorting to noble 
lineage — in Adolf's case, blood ties to the Burgundians — and the important and virtues roles that 
they had played in the ducal  court  since the time of Philip the Good.469 Sterchi  summarises  as 
follows:  “Das  situationsunabhängige  Ansehen der  Beteiligten  liefert  die  Legitimation  für  deren 
Handlungen — auf die Legitimität der (womöglich interessegeleiteten) situativen Ansprüche jeder 
einzelnen  Handlung  wird  nicht  eingegangen.”470 We  can  also  see  such  an  obsession  with  a 
consistent personality in the decision to remove, repaint or cover up the stall plates of guilty knights 
in all churches where they hung. For this reason, Adolf of Cleves and Louis of Bruges did not just 
demand that the charges be dropped, but they demanded that they would never be mentioned again 
and be deleted from the protocol books altogether, “affin que jamais il n'en soit aucune mémoire ne 
congnoissance.”.471
Both Adolf and Louis died in 1492 before a verdict  could be reached. A text by an 
anonymous man (perhaps Olivier de la Marche) advised the king-of-arms Toison d'Or on how to 
lead the funeral ceremony. It stressed the position of the Fleece collar in the ceremony and in the 
decorations.472 But that  did not  mean the the need for a conclusion was a done deal.  With the 
464Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 612-613, 619, 624, 656.
465Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 612, 655.
466Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 652.
467Haemers, Opstand adelt, 10-11.
468Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 551-552, 660-661 [quote].
469Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 550-551; Haemers, Opstand adelt, 13-16.
470Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 557-558.
471Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 554-555, 671 [quote]; Haemers, Opstand adelt, 20-21.
472Malcolm Vale, 'A Burgundian funeral ceremony: Olivier de la Marche and the obsequies of Adolf of Cleves, Lord 
of Ravenstein', English historical review, 111 (1996) 920-938, esp. 931, 933. Vale seems to be unaware of the 
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permanence of such verdicts in mind, it was important for both the heirs of the men and for the 
Order as an institution to determine whether they had been guilty of lese majesty or not. Philip the 
Handsome and his closest advisors decided to wait until a fair number of older members could 
attend the next chapter. They had even hoped that the king of the Romans might be present at some 
point, but Maximilian was preoccupied with the matters of empire.473 The sixteenth chapter would 
only  take  place  in  January  1501.  Jacob  of  Luxembourg,  lord  of  Fiennes,  who  had  married 
Gruuthuse's granddaughter, procured his defense, almost ten years after it was ostensibly written.474 
Initially the confrères gave the Adolf and Louis the same sentence as Wolfert of Borsele: judgment 
would be left up to God. This lack of temporal conviction was not considered a good thing; the 
reports  of  it  were  “dures  et  doloreuses  nouvelles”  to  Adolf's  widow,  who  had  hoped her  late 
husband would be rehabilitated.475 Their coats of arms had been installed, as the as those of other 
members passed away were. But unlike the others — unlike even the Great Bastard, who was also 
not entirely in the clear after having joined the French court and accepting the Order of St. Michael 
—  they  were  taken  away  and  hung  elsewhere  in  the  church.,  with  the  herald  Toison  d'Or 
proclaiming the reasons before the empty seats as if addressing the charged themselves.476
More than half a year later, in September 1501, an ambassador of the king of France 
pleaded  for  them to  be  returned,  and  Philip,  at  this  eager  to  please  Louis  XII,  did  so.477 The 
international relations had made the meetings of the Order an event with which even the French 
king got himself involved; Adolf's and Louis' sons were both in French service. But the members of 
the Order were not entirely willing to play Louis'  game.  Firstly,  they severely reprimanded the 
ambassador when he called the situation an  outrage,  when they considered it  justice. Secondly, 
Philip the Handsome attached a little note to the coats of arms declaring that he had returned them 
“sur la pryere et requeste du roy treschrestien et pour luy complaire.” The secretary wrote down in 
the protocols that six thousand people saw the note before it was removed a day later, and that “tout 
le monde” knew that the honourable position of the icons was not by virtue of the innocence of 
Adolf and Louis, but by an act of grace that the archduke bestowed upon them.478 To this day, the 
little shields still hang untouched in Malines, and in the end, judgment was up to God alone.
questionable position of Adolf at this time.
473Reiffenberg, Histoire, 217, 219.
474Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 535-536.
475Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 535, 671. Reiffenberg, Histoire, 233.
476As described in a letter from the Mantuan ambassador Niccolò Frigio, edited in William Prizer, 'Music and 
ceremonial in the Low Countries: Philipe the Fair and the order of the Golden Fleece', Early music history, 5 (1985) 
113-153, there 142, translation on p. 151.
477Molinet, Chroniques, II, 481-482.
478Molinet, Chroniques, II, 482; Sterchi, Über den Umgang, 543-544; all of this is recounted summarily in Bernhard 
Sterchi,  'The importance of reputation in the theory and practice of Burgundian chivalry. Jean de Lannoy, the 
Croÿs, and the Order of the Golden Fleece' in: D'Arcy Jonathan Dacre Boulton and Jan Veenstra (eds.), The 
ideology of Burgundy. The promotion of national consciousness, 1364-1565 (Leiden 2006) 99-115, there 110-112.
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The concern  that  the Order  of  the  Golden Fleece  had for  writing  correct  history is 
astonishing.  The knights  were very aware that  an event  can be explained  in  different  ways  by 
placing it in a different context, both the acts of the regency council members, as the acts taken in 
the Order chapters. The modes of emplotment that could be employed by a chivalric order were 
quite limited. The code of honour allowed for the story of noblemen who had always conspired 
against  the  dynasty,  and  it  allowed  for  the  story  of  noblemen  who  had  always  supported  the 
dynasty, but were duped by misunderstandings and lies. Turns, nuances and regrets were not used. 
Even when the king of France intervened to reverse a decision, it was cleverly accompanied with 
statements that emphasised that only the effects of the verdict had been changed, but not the verdict, 
and that doing so was in line with the magnanimosity of the Order. 
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6. Punishment for the feuds of John of Montfort and Philip of Cleves
Calling Philip of Cleves' or even John of Montfort's and Francis of Brederode's actions 
part of the Flemish Revolts is not without its problems. Jan Dumolyn and Jelle Haemers, in an 
article  on  the  rebellious  tradition  in  Flanders,  have  defined  a  rebellion  or  revolt  as  a  form of 
collective action in Charles Tilly's definition; it “consists of people's acting together in pursuit of 
common interests.” But Tilly makes clear that “action is collective to the extent that it produces 
inclusive, indivisible goods.”479 If we hold to these definitions, we can hardly hold that Philip of 
Cleves and the two Hook leaders were in revolt,  for their  demands did not lay in the realm of 
collective  goods,  but  in  personal  demands.  We might  sooner  say that  they employed  forms  of 
capital  extortion,  if  we  employ  'capital'  in  the  sense  that  Pierre  Bourdieu  does;480 Brederode 
demanded political capital in the form of important political positions in the county of Holland; 
Montfort demanded economic capital in the form of the restitution of the lordship of Purmerend; 
Cleves  demanded  symbolic  capital  in  the  form of  an  acknowledgement  that  he  had  done  the 
honourable  thing all  along.481 In  doing so,  they made use of another  option  in  a  'repertoire'  of 
contention.482 Rather than as rebellion, they made use of the techniques of the old noble feud. In and 
around France, a nobleman who suffered from a truce could go for a reprisal and seek compensation 
for his loss by military action without breaking that truce. It involved the general taking of goods, 
regardless of the victim. One could take the goods of one man for the crimes of another. The only 
person who was exempt from reprisals was the king, since he was not a private person, but public 
majesty.483 A more directly  antagonistic  conflict  was what  the German historians have called a 
kleinkrieg. Whenever a nobleman felt that he was treated unfairly by a fellow nobleman or by his 
liege lord, he had the right — some would say, duty — to declare a feud and wage small scale war, 
mostly by pillaging and burning, to obtain satisfaction. Several episodes of the Hook and Cod wars 
479 Jan Dumolyn and Jelle Haemers, 'Patterns of urban rebellion in medieval Flanders', Journal of medieval history, 31 
(2004) 369-393, there 372; Tilly, From mobilization, 7, 27-28, 84-90.
480Pierre Bourdieu, 'Economisch kapitaal, cultureel kapitaal, sociaal kapitaal' in: idem, Opstellen over smaak, habitus  
en het veldbegrip (Amsterdam 1989) 120-141. For their application within the study of the medieval Netherlands, 
see Jan Dumolyn, Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren in het graafschap Vlaanderen (1419-1477) (Antwerp 
2003) 5-15 and idem, 'The political and symbolic economy of state feudalism: the case of late-medieval Flanders', 
Historical materialism, 15 (2007) 105-131.
481The use of Bourdieu's terms here should be read as a handy metaphor for developing an ideal type of contention, 
rather than as a serious means of analysis — it is, if nothing else, a very anachronistic notion. To see honour as a 
form of accumulated labour implies that it is inherently temporal, whereas, as has been discussed in the previous 
chapter, one could be retroactively dishonourable.
482Michael Biggs, 'How repertoires evolve: the diffusion of suicide protest in the twentieth century', Mobilization: an 
international quarterly, 18 (2013) 407-428, there 408-411; Tilly, The contentious French (Cambridge MA 1986) 9-
10;.
483Keen, Laws of war, 218-234.
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involved such feuds, and it was not the first time the families Egmond, Brederode and Montfort had 
been part of conflicts like these.484 When the parliament of Dôle favoured William of Vienne over 
Henry of Blamont as the lord of several territories, the latter garrisoned the castle there and had to 
be ousted by John the Fearless.485 Maximilian's father Frederick was confronted with a feud in 1453 
when his erstwhile councillor Georg of Puchheim demanded overdue payment for his services in 
war. He damaged the lands in south-eastern Austria and tried to involve the local estates. Puchheim 
saw it as his duty to guard his honour in this way.486 Within such traditions, the actions of our three 
noblemen Brederode, Montfort and Cleves do not appear as strange as they do at first sight. Not 
only did they act differently from leaders of general revolts (as John of Montfort had in 1483 and 
Philip of Cleves up until 1489), they were treated differently as well. All previous treaties were 
signed with the inhabitants of political entities, such as those of Utrecht or those of Flanders. These 
treaties incorporated the noblemen that led the struggle. But these three feuds were resolved by 
treaties with the person. So important was Philip of Cleves' personal conflict with the authorities, 
that when Ghent surrendered in 1492, its crime was written down in the peace treaty as “having 
accepted and sustained the quarrel of lord Philip of Cleves”, along with all the war and damage that 
that entailed.487 With men who fought from such specific demands, it is worth looking at the way 
they were submitted with that in mind.
6.1 God's friend and all the world's enemy488
The surrender of Philip of Cleves has been treated by historians as a compromise and, in 
some  cases,  as  half  a  victory.489 By  contrast,  John  of  Montfort's  subjugation  is  seen  as  more 
repressive.490 These views, in my opinion, betray an anachronism. I will argue instead that in spite 
of many concessions to Philip of Cleves, he was denied the most important of his demands, and 
considerably more agreeable versions of a treaty were drawn up before. John of Montfort's articles 
484Brunner, Land und herrschaft, 1-110; Glaudemans, Om die wrake wille, 33-65.
485Armstrong, A policy for the nobility, 216. Armstrong also mentions Gerrit of Strijen, who held Zevenbergen castle 
against Philip the Good in 1427, but as a partisan of Jacqueline of Bavaria, his quarrel can hardly be called a feud. 
For more on this case, see Vaughan, Philip the Good, 45.
486Otto Brunner, Land und Herrschaft. Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Österreichs im 
Mittelalter (Vienna 1965 (first print Vienna 1942)) 12-14.
487Blockmans, Autocratie, 359: “[...]gheaccepteert ende ghesustineert hebben die querele van heere Phelips van 
Cleven[.]”
488“Aber da der von Rafenstain von Brück hinweg ziehen must, zoch er gein de Schleus [...] alda er sich lange weil 
gottes freunt und aller welt veint schreib.” Geschichten und Taten, 101-102.
489Hans Cools, 'Philip of Cleves at Genoa: the governor who failed', in: Jelle Haemers, Céline van Hoorebeeck and 
Hanno Wijsman (eds.), Entre la ville, la noblesse et l’État. Philippe de Clèves (1456-1528). homme politique et  
bibliophile  (Turnhout 2008) 101-115, there 101; De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 235: “Zulke een capitulatie is een 
overwinning”; Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 77: “Philippe ne doit rendre compte d'aucune de ses actions.”; De 
Win, Filips en de Brabantse adel, 55 calls it “merkwaardig”.
490Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 387-388.
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were indeed painful, but not in such a way that his political career was inhibited. Furthermore, I 
hope  to  demonstrate  that  these  treaties  of  1490 and 1492 shared  many elements  of  ritual  and 
otherwise, which should give us a view of a bigger picture.
The treaties of Frankfurt and Montilz-lez-Tours both stipulated that Philip of Cleves be 
restored in his honour and that he would get to keep his estates, offices and pensions. The Frankfurt 
treaty employs the same rhetoric of grace that was used a decade later when the French ambassador 
demanded the restoration of the coats of arms of Philip's father and Louis of Gruuthuse: “le roi des 
Romains, à la requeste dudit roi très-Chrétien son beaufils, reprendra en sa bienveillance messire 
Philippe de Cleves.”491 Thus it was a gift that Maximilian gave to the king of France, rather than 
something Philip deserved. Charles sent the latter a reassuring letter that he had not abandoned him, 
nor  the Flemish,  Brabantines  or  Liègois.492 But  even though the  terms  were quite  in  line with 
Philip's demand, the form was not and the matter had only gotten more complicated by the time of 
Montilz-lez-Tours. The treaty is surprisingly candid about the uncertainty:
“And about that my aforementioned lord Philip of Cleves has requested to be received 
to expostulate in all honour and reverence his justifications and also that he be held in 
his estates, offices and pensions which he has always had from the king of the Romans 
and the archduke, to whom he has continually been and is most humble kin, servant and 
subject; [in response to that] has been said that the mentioned lord Philip is included in 
the treaty of Frankfurt and that the most Christian king will talk of this request to the 
king, his father in law, when they will see each other.”493
As with the Golden Fleece trials,  restored in honour still  meant  damaged honour. It 
implied that Philip had committed a crime of sorts, and that only Maximilian's goodwill towards 
Charles VIII bailed him out. Instead, he wanted to be recognised as having done the right thing all 
along, “à quoy toutsvoies l'on ne la voulut respondre ne soy contenter.”494 What was the subject of 
many letters in June 1488 became the spindle of three years of conflict.
Albert  of Saxony demanded from Philip a renewal of the law in Sluis, to which he 
agreed.  The  fighting  had  stopped,  since  Philip's  oath  was  void  now  that  the  Flemings  were 
491Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, III/2, 236-238; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 156-162.
492Pélicier, Lettres de Charles VIII, II, 386-387.
493“Et sur ce que mondit seigneur Philippe de Clèves a fait requerir pour estre receu à remonstrer en tout honeur et 
reverence ses justifications et oussy qu'il soit entretenu ès estas, offices et pentions qu'il a tousjours eues d'icelui ou 
d'iceulx roy des Romains et archiduc, desquelz il s'est continuellement tenu et tient très humble parent, serviteur et 
subget, a esté dit que ledit monseigneur Philippe est comprins ou traittié de Francquefort et que le roy très cristien 
parlera de ceste requeste au roy, son beau père, quand ilz se verront.” Molinet, Chroniques, II, 169. 
494BNF ms. fr. 18997, f.83r-83v.
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reconciled with Maximilian. But the commissioners proceeded to ask for the delivery of the castles, 
and  although  they  expected  a  “bonne  responce”,  they  got  a  lengthy  speech.  Charles  VIII  had 
promised  him  that  the  issue  would  only  be  looked  at  when  he  and  Maximilien  arrived  there 
together. Perhaps this was his interpretation of the clause in the Montilz-lez-Tours treaty. Recalling 
the entire history of the last few years, Philip of Cleves argued that he had only done what he did 
because of his hostage oath, and that he should not be punished, but rewarded. If Maximilian should 
come to Sluis, Philip would gladly take a new oath of loyalty, but until then he would not give Sluis' 
castles “à personne qui vive”.495 Subsequent talks between the lieutenant-general, Bruges and Philip 
of Cleves yielded few results, except that the latter agreed to take an oath of loyalty and hand over 
the keys to Sluis ceremonially, but now also required the king of the Romans to pay him a sum of 
money that was due.496 In the mean time,  his position in Sluis  allowed him to put pressure on 
everyone. He turned the city, “ein solch bevestigung, daraus man die ganzen kristenhait bekriegen 
[kann]”, into a den of piracy and blockaded all trade to Bruges.497
A last attempt at reconciling with John of Montfort  was made in April  1490, and it 
reflects many of the same issues that plagued the conversation between Philip of Cleves and the 
local government. Maximilian and Philip wrote that:
“As the castellan of Montfort has taken with force and violence our house, castle, keep 
and city of Woerden, and from there has burnt, killed, captured, harmed and robbed our 
well-meaning subjects of our lands of Holland, and has done and perpetrated all acts of 
war that were possible from there; because of which that same castellan should certainly 
be corrected and punished as an example to others. Nevertheless, by humble petition 
and request of some of our loyal servants who has pleaded to us very seriously for the 
aforementioned castellan, and asked us to prefer and prove mercy before the rigour of 
justice.”498
495BNF ms. fr. 18997, f.84r-85r; De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 230-231.
496BNF ms. fr. 18997, f.86v-f.87r; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 258-259
497De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 228, 233; Geschichten und Taten, 101-102; Philip the Good called the city “le principal 
port et le clef de nostre pays de Flandres”: Dumolyn, Brugse Opstand, 240 n.701. See also the Verein für hansische 
Geschichte, Hanserecesse, pt. III/2 (Leipzig 1883) nrs. 471, 496, 514, 515, 518, 523, 526, 528 and 557.
498RAD OA 639 4, f.1r: “Alzoe die borchgrave van Montfoirde met crachte ende gewelde inne genomen heeft ons 
huys, casteel, slot ende stede van Woerden, daer uuyte gebrant, dootgeslaghen, gevanghen, gescadet ende beroeft 
onse goetwillege ende getruwe ondersaten onser landen van Hollant, ende alle fayten van oerloge daer uuyt gedaen 
en geperpetreert hem megelic ende doenlic zijnde; daer of die zelve borchgrave wel behoerde gecorrigeert, 
gepugnieert ende gestraft te wesen ten exemple van anderen. Nochtans ter oetmoedeger bede ende versoecke van 
eenegen onzen getruwen dienaren die ons zeere ernstelic voere den voirs. Borchgrave beden hebben ende willene 
prefererende ende bewijzen barmherichteit voere riguer van rechte[.]” In April 1490, Maximilian was, of course, in 
Germany, while Philip the Handsome still resided in Malines. The document is not an official letter, but a draft with 
corrections, which might suggest that the definitive text was written by a third party — perhaps Albert of Saxony or 
Engelbert of Nassau?
90
The proposal went on to state that, because Montfort had “confessed his evil facts and crimes” and 
had begged for grace, mercy and remission, Maximilian and Philip would allow the castellan to be 
arbitrated in the matter between himself and John of Egmont by Albert of Saxony and Engelbert of 
Nassau, provided that he vacate Woerden beforehand.  Like Philip of Cleves, he claimed that such 
an arbitration would violate the earlier promise of Maximilian, and he, too, wanted to keep onto the 
fortress until the arrival of the king himself. The commission that visited him considered these to be 
“frivolous proposals”, and so did Albert of Saxony.499 The siege finally brought him to terms half a 
year later, and he had wasted his opportunity at arbitration.
To recount all the events and negotiations between the court and Philip of Cleves here 
would take too long, and the work has already been done by others.500 We pick up Philip of Cleves' 
thread  again  in  1492.  He  had  agreed  to  take  a  vow  of  loyalty  to  Maximilian  and  Philip  the 
Handsome,  but  on  certain  conditions  that  were  not  easy  to  fulfill.  When  he  demanded  to  be 
reinstated  as  lieutenant  of  Flanders  and  of  Namur  (held  by  Engelbert  of  Nassau  and  John  of 
Bergen), he was denied these because he did not possess the first during the time the king was 
captured, and never legally possessed the second at all. As for the lieutenancy of Hainaut and the 
admiralty (held by the prince of Chimay and Philip of Beveren), those were already in the hands of 
other men, and Maximilian did not want to injure them. But on the whole, a lot of Philip's proposed 
articles were answered positively.501 What they did not agree on, where the most important points.
In March, Roeland of Moerkerke delivered a “proposition” to the gathered archduke, 
fleece knights and Estates-General in Malines on behalf of Philip of Cleves. In it, Philip recounted 
his noble ancestry,  the many good deeds he thought he had done for Maximilian and Philip the 
Handsome, and the self-sacrifice of him offering himself as a hostage in spite of his own wants. The 
two hour  text  also provided  a  summary of all  the negotiations  that  had taken place up to  that 
point.502 After the archduke and his councillors had talked over it, the estates were called back in the 
next day to discuss the proposition,
499RAD OA 639 12, f. 1r-2r, printed in Van den Brandeler, Bijdrage, 123-125 and Kokken and Vrolijk, Dagvaarten 
Holland, IV, 944-945.
500For Philip of Cleves, De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 228-265; Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 67-75; For John of 
Montfort, Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 382-383, 386. There are, however, many entires in the Dagvaarten that make 
mention of many delegations not included here.
501RAG Varia 3, nr. 244, nr. 26 for the proposals, nr. 9 and 9bis for the replies in Dutch, nr. 30 for the replies in 
French. Judging by the numerous corrections and marginal notations, the replies may be the originals. Nr. 35 is a 
version of the replies in Dutch with the notations integrated into the text. Summaries can be found in Isidore 
Diegerick, Inventaire analytique et chronologique des chartes et documents appartenant aux archives de la ville  
d'Ypres, pt.7 (Bruges 1868) 188-192 and 193-195.
502BNF ms. fr. 18997 f.74r-103r. The event is described and the text summarised by a member of the Hainaut delegate 
in Louis-Prosper Gachard, 'Analectes historiques. Dixième série', Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire, 3rd 
series, 4 (1863) 323-367, there 342-344. The piece is analysed in Haemers, Opstand Adelt, passim.
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“which, although it was of great length, came down in the end to two points: one for the 
repeal of the ban made by the emperor, and the other for the declaration that he was not 
the cause of the wars and divisions and the evil happenstances, etc. On which seemed, 
regarding the ban, that it had been made by the emperor and not by the king nor my lord 
the archduke: as such, if monseigneur Philip wants provision in this, he will have to get 
it from the emperor; but, in case the peace and appointment will be made, my lord can 
consent to him to be mediate with the emperor for the abolishment of the ban. And 
about the other conclusion, it is requested against the honour of the king.”503
The estates agreed with this decision of the court completely. Upon the departure of the embassy, 
Philip the Handsome spoke some of the first recorded words we have of him: “Dittes à monsieur 
Philippe qu'il ne me face faire chose dont je puisse avoir regret cy-après.”504
6.2 Rivals in diplomacy
Diplomacy was hot issue during the war. Maximilian and the court tried to monopolise the authority 
on the making of treaties, but they had trouble doing so. The estates of Lille, Douai and Orchies 
negotiated a pact of neutrality with France, and although they realised that the treaty would need the 
approval  of  Maximilian,  they  were  quicker  in  implementing  the  truce  than  the  king  was  in 
responding. He agreed to it eventually and reluctantly, but distanced himself from the treaty after 
the peace with France was signed,  and severely reprimanded the cities.505 If  the bribes are any 
indication of where the Walloon Flemings thought the major stumbling block in their private peace 
would be, fingers ought to be pointed at John of Bergen, who received the royal sum of 2400 lb.506 
Many of the cities in Holland wanted to conclude a treaty with Brederode and Montfort without the 
consent  of  the  central  government.  They argued that,  although they had  no  authority  over  the 
domains or the offices of the county, they could sign a peace in their own name and shuffle money 
around. Philip the Handsome and his council disagreed vehemently and sent a letter to Dordrecht: to 
do so would be “greatly contrary to the highness and lordliness” of Maximilian and Philip, and the 
city was told to block any attempts at treaty that did not have the approval of Albert of Saxony and 
503Gachard, Analectes historiques X, 344-345.
504Gachard, Analectes historiques X, 353.
505Michael Depreter, 'Le prince et les états de Flandre Wallonne: des diplomaties concurrentes? Modalités et enjeux du 
traité de Wavrin (14 décembre 1488)', Publications du Centre européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes 53 (2013) 179-
200.
506Depreter, Le prince et les états, 186, 194. This sum was given in two gifts, one in December 1488 and the other in 
January 1489, both of 1200 lb.
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the councilmen of Maximilian in Malines. They were to wait until the king returned, “which shall 
be very soon, to come to the aid and comfort of you and our other good and loyal subjects, and to 
punish and correct  the rebels  and disobedient  as an example to all  others.”507 Both in Walloon 
Flanders and in Holland, we find that the local governors were supportive of the peace treaties, and 
in Holland the lieutenant and the stable master even 'advised' it.508 Already in 1488, Malines was 
told to redirect any letters from Philip of Cleves or the Flemish cities, who had “against their nature 
become French” unopened to the king.509 The Hollanders did read such letters, but decided not to 
risk making any separate peace with Philip of Cleves and infringe on the honour of Maximilian and 
Philip.510 Before his departure, Maximilian had ordered that the Estates should all send a handful of 
plenipotentiaries to follow Albert of Saxony on his campaigns. The idea was that the lieutenant 
general could act swiftly, make clear his intentions, and gather insight from the natives, but it was 
perhaps just as much intended to keep an eye on the dignitaries of the Estates, and make sure they 
did not act on their own.511
Nevertheless,  the  revolting  nobles  knew  quite  well  that  the  estates,  in  which  the 
beleaguered  cities  played  such  an  important  role,  were  more  pliable  than  was  the  central 
government.512 Philip of Cleves had always wanted to send a delegation to a gathering of the Estates 
General. The 'proposition' that Roelant of Moerkerke delivered on his behalf before the gathered 
estates on the 8th of March 1492 was nominally addressed to Philip the Handsome, but seems to 
have had the urban representatives as its target audience. For one thing, it was written in Dutch, 
while noblemen would generally converse in French at court.513 At the end of the speech, which 
took over two hours, copies of its text, both in Dutch and in French, were handed to the members of 
the estates-general.  Although the archduke Philip  did not consider it  necessary for them to get 
involved, he did allow Moerkerke to give his writings. The archduke was thankful for the “prudence 
et léauté” of the members of the estates when they were smart enough to immediately hand over 
their copies to the chancellor, but they graciously received copies of the responses that the court had 
written up a day later.514 One of Philip's demands for a peace treaty had also been that the Estates 
would serve as arbiter in case there was any doubt over any of its point. This was not something the 
court could consent to; the interpretation of any point belonged to the king, the archduke, “and no 
507Kokken en Vrolijk, Dagvaarten Holland, IV, 728-730.
508Depreter, Le prince et les états, 186, 199; Kokken en Vrolijk, Dagvaarten Holland, IV, 885-886.
509Van Doren, Inventaire, IV, Lettres missives, 29-30.
510Kokken en Vrolijk, Dagvaarten Holland, IV, 1036-1037.
511Gachard, Lettres inédites, II, 22, 34-35; Koenigsberger, Monarchies, States generals, 71.
512In 1483, Maximilian had even dared to ask the Three Members of Flanders not to write to the cities loyal to him 
“pour les séduire et desvoier de la raison, bonne amour, léaulté, bon pourpos et voulloir qu'ilz ont envers nous et 
nostre fil.” Keryvn de Lettenhove, Histoire de Flandre, V, 537.
513Armstrong, The language question, 201-202.
514Gachard, Analectes historiques X, 336, 344-345.
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one else.”515
A lot of the negotiation  had been in the hands of two of Maximilian's top diplomats, 
Charles  of  Croÿ,  the  prince  of  Chimay,  and  Engelbert  of  Nassau.516 The  two  made  the  treaty 
between  Albert  and  Saxony  and  John  of  Montfort,517 and  they  were  both  instrumental  in  the 
negotiations  with  Philip  of  Cleves,  along  with  the  lords  of  Beveren  and  Chièvres.518 In  1491, 
Chimay had been appointed 'principal  mediateur'  in the matter  Philip  of Cleves by Maximilian 
himself during a trip of the prince to Germany, but once in Malines “aucuns esperitz brisèrent tout 
ce qui estoit conchupt.”519 Regardless, even if the power of Chimay was cast into doubt, he was still 
one of the most important negotiators. It might have been useful that the two who were sent out to 
reason with Philip of Cleves were also his successors, Nassau as lieutenant-general of Flanders and 
Chimay with the same office in Hainaut. For all their ability to negotiate, however, the men in the 
Netherlands did not have unlimited power in this case. They were allowed to punish or extend grace 
in Maximilian's  name, “sauf toutesvoyes  et referme la disposicion des offices et benefices et la 
mamance  des  deniers,  que avons retenu à  nous tant  seulement.”520 He may have had Philip  of 
Cleves in mind while dictating this. It meant that any real compromise had to be sanctioned by the 
king himself.
6.3 Peace
Brederode's demise is one of compromise and bad luck. The Hollanders quickly decided that to end 
the occupation of Rotterdam was to be their first priority, and by February 1489, two months after 
the coup, the city had been surrounded.521 When its garrison stealthily left in an attempt to receive 
supplies from John of Montfort, it was ambushed by the troops of the stable master, and, deprived 
of most  his his men, Francis of Brederode was forced give up his immediate ambitions.522 The 
treaty, signed near the end of June, allowed Brederode and anyone who wanted to follow him to 
515RAG V3, 244, nr.9, f.3v, nr. 26 f.6r, nr.30 f.4r., nr.35 f.4v; Diegerick, Inventaire, IV, 191, 195.
516For Nassau's previous experience, see De Win, Engelbert van Nassau, 88-97. Chimay had represented Maximilian 
in the brokering of a truce in 1488, but seems to have become an important diplomat only after this time: Cools, 
Mannen met macht, 198; De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 194.
517Aurelius, Divisiekroniek, f.404r; Naaldwijk, Eerste kroniek, 557; Geschichten und Taten, 103 als names John of 
Cruiningen here.
518De Fouw, Philip van Kleef, 257; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 319-320.
519Molinet, Chroniques, II, 216, 321. The 1300 florins debt that Maximilian asked the magistracy of Malines to relieve 
Chimay of in September 1491  may have formed a reward for this appointment. Because the king of the Romans had 
very few actual funds, he often resorted to actions like these to pay his vassals: Spufford, Monetary problems, 141-
146.
520RHA ODL 462.
521Van der Sluys, Verhaal, 99-102; Payments of the militias of Leiden and Haarlem can be found in Kokken and 
Vrolijk, Dagvaarten Holland, IV, 875-876.
522A.J., Kort verhaal, 34, 40-41; Aurelius, Divisiekroniek, f. 402v; Kokken and Vrolijk, Dagvaarten Holland, IV, 905; 
Van der Sluys, Verhaal, 144-148.
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leave Rotterdam unharmed, as long as they left all the weapons and artillery behind.523 The treaty 
forcing him from Rotterdam was a stopgap measure, a means for the Estates of Holland to buy time 
to organise their defenses. Whether it was actually agreed to by the central government in Malines, 
is unsure; considering the treaty took three days at the most to be written, it is unlikely.
Having left Rotterdam, he sailed towards Sluis.524 We find him entering Bruges on the 
12th of August, “with very beautiful, rich state,” where he quickly set out to assemble a new force.525 
When peace was nearing in the city early in the next year, Brederode, along with Gruuthuse, fled to 
Sluis; not two weeks later, Engelbert of Nassau entered.526 Brederode's fleet,  manned by nobles, 
Flemings, Easterlings and Danes, threatened seafare throughout Holland and Zeeland, for the next 
year, but when rumour had it that he was planning to take the town of Goedereede on Westvoorn, 
Albert of Saxony sent the lieutenant Egmont and his cousin, the lord of IJsselstein, to hunt him 
down. In the battle of the Brouwershavense Gat, the Hollanders and their allies defeated the fleet 
and captured a heavily wounded Brederode, who was brought to Dordrecht. Before he could be 
tried, he passed away; even so, his status allowed him to be buried in the local Augustine convent 
while the bodies of his men decorated the city gates.527 For our present case at least, this is all a 
highly unlucky turn of events; it would have been interesting to see where he would have ended up 
alive.
Philip  of  Cleves  surrendered  in  the  Autumn  of  1492.  Adolf  died  on  the  18th of 
September, 1492. His lands and the castle Ravenstein were ordered to be occupied three days later, 
and on the first day of October the Great Council pronounced all goods confiscated.528 Philip had 
very little choice at this point, and was forced to surrender if he ever wanted to bury his father and 
see anything of his patrimony; besides, the month long siege of Sluis was taking its toll.529 On the 9th 
of October, Chimay, Nassau, Beveren and Chièvres entered the city to speak with Philip, and they 
finally signed the peace treaty between him and Albert of Saxony on the 12th.530 The duke of Saxony 
523Van der Sluys, Verhaal, 153-157. The evacuation of Rotterdam should probably be dated on the 23rd of June; it is 
mentioned as such in one of the accounts of the Estates of Holland, (Kokken and Vrolijk, Dagvaarten Holland, IV, 
905) and is confirmed by A.J.'s Kort verhaal, 34, which says that he left in the morning of a Monday, which the 23rd 
was. Naaldwijk, Eerste kroniek, 554 names St. John's mass, the 24th.  The day of the treaty is more difficult to 
ascertain. Van der Sluys, while almost universally wrong with dates, does usually give a correct account of events 
and places two or three days between the treaty and the exodus. The Divisiekroniek, f. 402v, however, mentions that 
on the 22nd there was still negotiating going on, and that same day, messengers were sent to Haarlem and Alkmaar to 
send delegates to 'negotiate with those of Rotterdam' (Kokken and Vrolijk, Dagvaarten Holland, IV, 903).
524Aurelius, Divisiekroniek, f.404r.
525't Boeck, 297.
526't Boeck, 323.
527Aurelius, Divisiekroniek, f.404r-404v; Naaldwijk, Eerste kroniek, 558-559; 'De nederlaag van jonker Frans van 
Brederode, vermeld door Jan graaf van Egmond', Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde 2 
(1861) 269-272; Van der Sluys, Verhaal, 168-171.
528Vale, A Burgundian funeral, 926; Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 76-77.
529De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 271; Geschichten und Taten, 126; 
530De Doppere, Fragments inédits, 38; Molinet, Chroniques, II, 320.
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was  so  pleased  with  the  peace,  that  he  sent  letters  announcing  the  treaty  immediately  at  its 
conclusion, before the whole process had taken place.531
The treaty itself  is  already very telling.  Before coming to the actual  articles,  Albert 
shortly  recounts  the  sequence  of  events  that  has  led  to  writing  of  the  document.  It  is  very 
discriminatory  indeed;  Philip  of  Cleves  had  held  the  city  and castles  of  Sluis  for  some years, 
“within which and from which [he] made war and had war made against the lands and subjects of 
good will of our merciful lord and cousin [Philip the Handsome].” To “remedy” that and bring both 
Philip and the city to obedience, Albert was expressly commanded by Maximilian to lay siege. In 
the end, Philip asked to negotiate, after which Nassau, Chimay, Beveren and Chièvres mediated to 
conclude the peace between the lieutenant and him.532 Having just recounted the difficult process 
and discussions from both sides, this  version of the story seems very simplified to us. It  is  no 
attempt at recreating the sequence events, but rather, it is the formulation of an 'official version' of 
what events took place. One in which Philip of Cleves had taken actions to the detriment of his lord 
(as we have seen, the ultimate crime one could be accused of), and was disobedient to archduke and 
king.  This  version  does  not  allow for  a  different  interpretation  of  the  public  good.  There  is  a 
connection  to  the  judicial  trial  in  the  words,  such  as  when  Philip  is  given  “grace,  quittance, 
remission and abolition,” in those words,533 just as the dukes say that the condemned man is “quicté, 
remis et pardonné” or “forgiven, quitted and remitted out of especial grace.”534 Furthermore, the 
treaty is presented not as a compromise, but rather as a complete victory for the authorities, where 
Philip has no bargaining position, but can only beg for mercy. That the actual articles of the treaty 
contained a good deal of concessions towards Philip did not matter; what mattered was that by 
accepting and signing this document, he made known publicly that he subscribed to the version of 
the story in which he did wrong. The tone here is different from that of the treaty made between 
Charles VIII and Francis of Brittany four years earlier. There, too, does the king grant peace at the 
request of the loser's request, after having had to fight it for the well-being of his country, but the 
text  never  specifically  dwells  on  any  malign  on  Francis'  part,  and  speaks  instead  merely  of 
“diférends” between Charles and the duke; all of which “à grand regret,  pour l'amour qu'avions 
toujours  porté  à  nôtre  tres-cher  cousin”.535 The  treaties  between  Maximilian  and  his  subjects, 
including Philip of Cleves, are more keen to stress wrong-doings and write a narrative of events. 
The harshest blow for Philip of Cleves might have been at the end of the treaty. Albert declares to 
“have  forgiven,  quitted,  remitted,  abolished,  and forgive,  quit,  remit  and  abolish  from especial 
531Van Doren, Inventaire, IV, Lettres missives, 43.
532Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 90.
533Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 97.
534Vrolijk, Recht door gratie, 19-20.
535Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, III/2, 209.
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grace” all “crimes, excesses and abuses” that have been committed against Philip the Handsome.536 
The wording here is not standard treaty language, but taken from the law of grace, where the the 
phrase  was  standard  use.  Furthermore,  the  treaty  goes  on  to  invoke  the  chancellor,  the  Great 
Council and the minor councils in Brabant, Flanders and Holland. The impression is given of a 
legal document; though it is a peace treaty constituted from concessions, it reads like a court case, 
with all the implications of inequality that that entails. Unfortunately, if the Montfort treaty ever had 
a preamble or such a conclusion, it has been lost.537
The ritual  of  submission  that  was  organised  in  Sluis  two days  after  the  treaty  was 
ratified,  served to reinforce this idea and make the fact clear to everyone involved.  A German 
biographer  of one of Albert's  captains  describes the ceremony of Philip's  surrender.  It is worth 
quoting the piece at length:
“Duke Albert, lieutenant of his royal majesty, stood under his pavilion decorated in a 
golden piece. All of his men, counts, lords and noblemen, honourable and well dressed. 
Ravenstein,  together  with  the  citizens,  knelt  before  the  praiseworthy  prince  and 
admitted to having done injustice, begged for mercy. This speech took a whole half of 
an hour, which they did on their knees. He [Albert] answered that all the keys of the city 
and castles would be given to Schaumburg as the highest captain.  He [Schaumburg] 
took with him the English captain and others, went into the castle, raised the banner of 
the empire,  duke Philip and of the king of England from the castle,  and they let all 
trumpeters blow with joy and let all other musicians play music.”538
Molinet  also  tells  us  that  they  bared  their  heads  on  this  occasion.539 The  process  for  John  of 
Montfort two years earlier was much the same; kneeling, begging for mercy for previous crimes, 
and  finally  grace  from Albert  of  Saxony.540 What  draws  attention  is  that  despite  the  fact  that 
negotiations between nobles like Philip and John, and Albert took on a very different form from 
536Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 96-97.
537RAL SA 1230.
538“Herzog Albrecht, kuniklicher majestat stathalter, stunde under seinem gezelt in einem gulden stück köstlich 
geziert. Alle die seinen, von graven, herren und edlen ehrlich und wolgeklaidet. Der von Rafenstein sambt den 
bürgern knieten nider für den lobreichen fürsten und bekenten sich unrecht getan haben, baten umb gnad. Der von 
Rafenstein verpflichtet sich wider die küniklichen majestat oder der son, als sein recht naturlichen erbherren, 
nimmermer ze tun. Dise red wert ein ganze halbe stunt, die si auf iren knien teten. Die antworteten alle schlussl der 
stat und schlösser, wurden dem von Schaunburg als obristem haubtman eingeben. Der name zu sich den englischen 
haubtman und ander, zoch in daß schlos, sties des reichs herzogen Pfilipsen und des kunigs von Engellant banir aus 
dem schloss, ließen all trumetter mit freuden aufplasen, und ander spilleut all ir hofrecht machen.” Geschichten und 
Taten, 126-127.
539Molinet, Chroniques, II, 320.
540Geschichten und Taten, 103.
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those between the urban centres and the Habsburg victors, the ritual of submission is exactly the 
same. Philip of Cleves, his soldiers and the citizens of the town of Sluis are all grouped into one 
submissive  body,  even  though  the  treaty  was  specifically  one  between  Albert  and  Philip  as 
individuals. Sluis figured as a 'client'  of Philip's. The bending of the knee had been applied as a 
means for rebellious nobles to beg for pardon by the Carolingians, and had only later found its way 
into law and, from there on, into urban rebellions.541 But from there, it seems to have found its way 
back. When Philip of Cleves and John of Montfort kneeled, they did so with all the innovations that 
the ritual had accumulated along the way, such as the lengthy outdoors speeches and the mass of 
penitents.
Another key element of the surrender of a city or fortified place was the handing over of 
the local keys as a sign of submission. Again, we find the act carried out both by John of Montfort 
and by Philip of Cleves, but in the second case with a twist. Philip handed Albert the keys to both 
the castles of Sluis during the ceremony as a sign of submission,  but immediately after, Albert 
returned the keys to the larger castle, thereby giving the office of castle lord to Philip. In the end, 
Philip held Sluis both before and after the ceremony, but he hadn't held on to it, as he did not have 
the right; it was graciously given to him on that 14th of October.542 “Lord, so far you have signed 
calling yourself the castellan of Montfort. The city is now in our hands. We give it back to you, and 
from now on, sign lord of Montfort.”543
Nevertheless,  Albert,  having had to  lay siege  to  both places,  very well  realised  the 
dangers of having the same people occupy Sluis and Montfort. Therefore, measures were taken to 
disarm the places. In the case of Montfort, the lord John had to open up the castle to a garrison of 
soldiers from Holland, and personally gain the permission for this from the local sovereign, bishop 
David. In addition, he was not allowed to rebuild the shattered city walls and defenses for the next 
ten years, with the exception of the roof of his castle.544 Doing so was a time-honoured tradition by 
the end of the fifteenth century.545 It also served a symbolic means; the houses of criminals and 
traitors were sometimes destroyed after they were tried or had fled.546 A shaping of space like this 
one, too, would have been a potent reminder of the power of Maximilian over John of Montfort, 
and the justness of its use. In Sluis, Philip of Cleves had to hand over governance of the smaller 
541Koziol, Begging pardon, 177-178, 205.
542Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 91.
543Naaldwijk, Eerste kroniek, 558: “Heer ghij hebt u tot noch toe ghescreven burchgraeff van montfoert die stat staet 
nu in onsen handen die gheven wij u weder ende scrijft u voert an here van montfoert.”
544Van Alkemade, Rotterdamse Heldendaden, 316-317.
545Armstrong, A policy for the nobility, 217-218, especially n.1.
546Marc Boone, 'Urban space and political conflict in Late Medieval Flanders', The journal of interdisciplinary history, 
32 (2002) 621-640, there 627; Glaudemans, Om die wrake wille, 177-184.
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castle to Albert of Saxony.547 Its garrison was replaced by Albert's and a new captain was installed; 
five  hundred  men  were  stationed  there.548 This  ensured  that  any  further  rogue  actions  were 
essentially impossible; the lieutenant general had a back door into the city. But on the other hand, 
unlike the solution in Montfort, the city was, if the forces from the two castles were on the same 
side, defensible against threats from a common enemy. To repair the damage done to the larger of 
the two castles,  Philip  was allowed 30,000 lb.,  to  be paid by the estates  of Brabant,  Flanders, 
Holland and Zeeland.549 In a way, the Montfort garrison and the occupying of the smaller Sluis 
castle can be seen as a link between Charles the Bold's aborted plans to erect a military citadel in 
Ghent, and Charles V's practice of doing so, both there and in other places.550 They suggested a 
permanent mistrust.
That Philip of Cleves' treaty is not particularly mild, is seen by comparing it to a more 
advantageous concept from the court from earlier in 1492. When Philip's emissaries left Malines on 
the 15th of March after having read out the lengthy proposition, they were given a proposal by the 
archduke. In it, he was offered the governorship of both of Sluis' castles, as well as the admiralty. It 
would,  in retrospect,  have been smarter  to accept  there  and then,  but  at  the time he could not 
consent to these terms because the point regarding his honour and his safety were not conceded 
to.551 On the peace with Montfort, the 19th century historian Van den Brandeler has suggested that 
Albert of Saxony was obliged to be lenient, based on an anecdote found in the chronicle of Nicholas 
Despars: the defenders of the city of Montfort had captured the duke of Saxony himself, and only 
set him free once he promised to lay down his arms against John of Montfort.552 One the whole, 
though, it seems unlikely that if the event took place, only a chronicler working in the second half 
of the 16th century would know of it. But it shows that not long after, myths were popping up trying 
to explain why Montfort was not set back much more than he was. 
Philip of Cleves and his wife invited Albert of Saxony and the other signees to dinner, 
and they sat harmoniously together the evening after the submission ceremony.553 In Bruges, all 
thanked God “for the grace that He accorded that [Albert of Saxony] and lord Philip of Ravenstein 
came to an accord in such a friendly manner.”554 Philip finally left Sluis sporting a long beard,555 and 
547Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 92.
548Excellente cronike, f.277v; Hoccalus, Histoire des Païs-bas, 740-741.
549Haemers, Philippe et la Flandre, 94-95.
550Arnade, Beggars, 191-192; Boone, Urban space, 637-638.
551Diegerick, Inventaire, IV, 195-196 for a summary of the proposal, 197 for Philip's reply.
552Van den Brandeler, Bijdrage, 89-90; Despars, Cronycke, IV, 461.
553Molinet, Chroniques, II, 320.
554Excellente cronike, f.277v: “danckende god vander gracie die hi verleent hadde dat hi ende mijn heere Phelips van 
Ravesteyn so vriendelic veraccoordeeirt waren.”
555De Doppere, Fragments inédits, 38. This look is confirmed by a small contemporary portrait in the Musées des 
Beaux-Arts de Belgique by the Master of the Legend of St. Catharine, reproduced in Hugh Hudson, 'Paradise for 
ever. More on the patronage and iconoraphy of the 'triptych with the miracles of Christ' in the National Gallery of 
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went to Bruges, which was decorated with lanterns and candles for the occasion.556 He was received 
“amicably and happily” and the magistracy organised a banquet for him and all other nobles.557
6.4 Epilogue
“And the parties from both sides were reconciled; but how or in what way was not mentioned to the 
common man and remained a secret between the lords,” so tells us the Divisiekroniek of John of 
Montfort's encounter with Albert of Saxony.558 We, unfortunately, have no more information than 
the common man, but we can make some guesses as to what had been discussed; in all likelihood, 
they tried  to  win his  support.  John of  Montfort  was  the most  powerful  and influential  man in 
Utrecht, and bishop David did not have eternal life. We can see that Maximilian and Philip tried to 
gain his favour a few years later:  when the rise of Charles of Egmont in Gelre set up an anti-
Habsburg block in the North-East, they wanted to have their relative Frederick of Baden set up as a 
coadjutor  and  successor  to  David.  During  one  of  their  travels  to  make  arrangements  for  this, 
Engelbert  of  Nassau  and John of  Cruiningen  promised  that  Montfort  would be  restored  in  his 
Hollandish possessions within six months. That did not happen, but he received the lordship of 
Nieuwenveen in 1497, and was appointed councillor and chamberlain in 1505.559 Albert of Saxony 
had allowed Montfort to continue his struggle for Purmerend at the Great Council, and he took it up 
again in 1497. The trial  was stalled for years on end, until   the final  resolution in 1509, when 
Montfort was perhaps getting a little too close with Charles of Gelre, conceded to John of Egmont. 
Not just was Montfort not in the right, the verdict expressed displeasure over the course of action 
taken.  If  Montfort  had objected to the confiscation,  he could appeal  only to Maximilian  or his 
procurator, and only do so within four years of the event. And even then, it was argued, he should 
have known better than to ask for restitution of a lordship that had by then been given to someone 
else, which the doctors of law forbade. What's more, Montfort's continued support of Maximilian's 
enemies and his rebellion meant that he hadn't held his end of the bargain and ought rather to have 
been deprived of all  of  their  goods.  Going beyond a  mere struggle over one lordship,  the trial 
discussed the history of Hook and Cod wars since the death of Charles the Bold (and in case, 
Montfort noted that several of Egmont's ancestors had supported Jacqueline of Bavaria and were 
Victoria', Oud Holland 126 (2013) 1-16, there 4.
556Louis Gilliodts-van Severen, Inventaire des archives de la ville de Bruges, pt. VI (Bruges 1885) 364.
557Excellente Cronike, f.277v.
558Aurelius, Divisiekroniek, f. 404r “Ende de partien an beyden sijden sijn verenicht; mer hoe ofte in wat manieren is 
den ghemenen man oncondich gheweest ende is alleene onder tsecreet van den heren ghebleven” cf. Die alder  
excellenste cronyke van Brabant, van Vlaenderen, Hollant, Zeeland int generael, ende die nieuwe gesten geschiet  
zijnde bi onsen prince ende coninc Kaerl die in die ander Cronijcken niet en sijn (Antwerp 1518) chapter lxv.
559Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 397-399.
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banned for it  by Philip the Good).560 The verdict  thus not only gave a judgment in a particular 
instance, but it wrote the accepted version of the history of Holland and Utrecht.
Philip of Cleves already received his payment of 30.000 lb. in December of 1492.561 He 
served at court and received his pensions, in which he received less money only than Albert of 
Saxony,  but  did not  make it  into  the  conseil  privé and was not  given  any important  office  as 
governor or commander;562 furthermore, the pension he received was not any higher now that he 
was lord of Ravenstein than it had been when his father was still alive, and it was not nearly the 
sum his father received in his glory days. A better method of assessment than the payments of the 
pensions may be those of bribes; and while he received numerous gifts before 1488, he almost 
never received any after.563 He served, essentially, as a symbol of legitimacy, a man whose position 
was too prestigious to ignore, but his conduct too unreliable to trust. Philip and Maximilian had not 
seen each other after that fateful May 16th 1488, and only met again in 1494. Philip personally asked 
for  forgiveness  for  anything  that  might  possibly  have  displeased  Maximilian,  and  the  king 
responded “Je le vous ay pardonné, et de fait je le vous pardonne.”564 Convinced perhaps his lack of 
recognition in the Netherlands, perhaps by his close blood ties to the new French king, Louis XII, 
Philip went to France in 1498. The command of Sluis, which he had defended for three years with 
so much vigour, was sold for 10.000 lb. to Engelbert of Nassau.565 He served the monarch in his 
Italian  campaign  as  governor  of  Genoa  and  leader  of  a  naval  crusade  against  the  Turks  — 
disastrously  in  both  cases.566 By  the  time  he  returned  to  the  Netherlands  in  1508,  Philip  the 
Handsome had died in Spain, and Maximilian was fulfilling another regency, this time for Charles 
V. John of Bergen had much influence with acting regent Margaret, and only when William of 
Croÿ, the lord of Chièvres, became the most powerful politician at Charles'  coming of age, did 
560Galesloot, Trois arrets, 447-463; Van Gent, Pertijelike saken, 401-404; Although Montfort had also asked to be 
reinstated as the lord of Polsbroek during his occupation of Woerden, I have not been able to find any evidence that 
he made any more attempts at getting it back later; Purmerend seems to have been the only lordship he sued for.
561Chrétien Dehaisnes, Inventaire sommaire des archives départementales antérieures à 1790. Nord. Archives civiles  
— série B. Chambre des comptes de Lille, Nos 1842 à 2338, pt. IV (Lille 1881) 277; Vale, A Burgundian funeral, 
929.
562GSAB RSA 22bis, f.1v-2r; Jean-Marie Cauchies, 'De la «régenterie» à l'autonomie. Deux ordonnances de cour et de 
vouernement de Maximilien et Philippe le Beau (1495)', Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire, 171 (2005) 43-
88, there 56-57, 66-67; Joseph Chmel, Urkunden, Briefe und Actenstücke zur Geschichte Maximilians I. und seiner  
Zeit (Stuttgart 1845) 537, 541.
563Joachim Piens, Mechelse giften. De relatie tussen de stad en de vorstelijke entourage in de Bourgondische en 
Habsburgse periode (1467-1503) (MA thesis Louvain 2010) 98. One occasion in which he did receive a few cans of 
wine was by the city of Middelburg in Zeeland when he discussed Philip the Handsome's estate in 1493: Burgers, 
Smit and Van der Vlist, Dagvaarten Zeeland, II, 534.
564Molinet, Chroniques, II, 394-395.
565De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 283-284.
566Cools, Philip at Genoa; Jonathan Dumont, 'Entre France, Italie et Levant. Philippe de Clèves et la «croisade de 
Mytilène» (1501): portrait d'un seigneur bourguignon par l'historiographe royal Jean d'Auton', Publications du 
Centre européen d'Etudes Bourguignonnes 49 (2009) 51-68; De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 288-329.
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Philip gain a position of influence again.567 He had hoped to finally become a knight of the Order of 
the Golden Fleece in 1516, but was refused. If they accepted the man who had shown cowardice at 
the battle  of Enguinegate,  who had murdered Lancelot  de Berlayment  and Rassegem, and who 
rebelled  against  king  and  archduke,  they  would  violate  the  Order's  statutes  of  only  accepting 
“nobles hommes sans reproche.”568 True to himself, he wrote a long justification of his actions, but 
to  no  avail.569 It  was  also  rumoured  Maximilian  threatened  to  return  his  collar  if  Philip  were 
accepted.570
567De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 343-344, 346-349.
568De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 379.
569BNF ms. fr. 18997, f.109r-116r, edited in De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 369-377.
570De Fouw, Philips van Kleef, 349-350, 377-382. Philip had only been allowed to attend the 1473 chapter of the 
Order as a spectator in his youth: De Gruben, Les chapitres, 366.
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Conclusion
In  the  above  I  have  employed  methods  of  anthropology,  prosopography,  diplomatic  history, 
combined  with  narrative  historical  theory  to  answer  a  question  of  political  culture  inspired  by 
sociological considerations of symbolic violence: in what way does the punishment of rebellious 
nobles shed light on the relationship between Maximilian of Austria and the Dutch aristocracy?
Maximilian  was  in  a  precarious  position.  He  did  not,  as  historiography  has  held, 
represent an authority to a populace that demanded less authority;  he was one possible locus of 
authority. Next to him, the Estates-general held the keys to the coffers and asserted its position, the 
nobles of the blood were seen as the true representatives of the Burgundian line and the closest to 
Philip the Handsome, and the Order of the Golden Fleece could be appealed to as standing above 
the quarreling parties. Maximilian had to make clear to one and all that his rank was above any 
other  and  that  his  authority  was  not  to  be  questioned.  The  conflict  was  one  of  establishing 
recognition.
Some nobles reasserted their own position and rebelled. Their position was grounded in 
their  blood ties to Philip the Handsome,  or in their  position in the mighty urban centres of the 
Netherlands. Unlike Louis XI, who initiated many treason trials to get rid of people he did not want 
and need in the kingdom, Maximilian had the conflicts more or less forced upon him. He had to 
punish  people  whom  he  had  rather  have  on  his  side  as  well  as  those  whom  he  would  not. 
Consequently,  the  results  varied.  Some  had  their  involvement  in  rebellions  entirely  ignored, 
whereas other were humiliated and imprisoned. The use that someone could have in the future was 
the primary deciding factor in the treatment. Power was redistributed and flowed into the hands of a 
new and loyal elite. A nobility that was afraid of losing its position to newcomers only accelerated 
this process by revolting and getting their goods confiscated. As an example to all.
The graces extended fit neatly into Walter Prevenier's political pardons, but the act of 
storytelling was hugely important. To establish a truth was not uncontested. Both Flemish Revolts 
sparked from evaluation of the past actions of Maximilian,  whether that was from his financial 
policy,  his  foreign  wars  or  his  treatment  of  previously  condemned  nobles.  What  the  revolters 
maintained was that Maximilian had repeatedly forsaken his duties and broken his promises; what 
Maximilian  maintained  was  that  he  saved  the  Burgundian  dynasty.  Both  sides  had  their  own 
arguments.  A victory  meant  the  capability  to  military  enforce  the  opposing  nobles  to  publicly 
recognise the king's arguments  as the right ones. As such, we're not just  dealing with conflicts 
between single men, but with effects that rewrote history for all.
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“Who controls the past,” ran the Party slogan in  Nineteen Eighty-four,  “controls  the 
future: who controls the present controls the past.”571 None of the parties involved in the Flemish 
Revolts was quite as sinister as that of George Orwell's novel, but the maxim held true for them all 
the same. The symbolism and rhetoric of the conflict was aimed at establishing its own origins. The 
question was what truth would be accepted in the end, and who was to judge it.
In the end, what were, as we have seen, conflicts with extremely complex and multi-
interpretable  causes,  were  reduced  to  common  tropes  and formulae,  that  of  the  king  beset  by 
envious traitors, that of the king and ever-loyal nobles, or that of the king extending grace solely out 
of his good will — chivalry as the way of making sense of the world, as Huizinga would have it. 
While life does not present itself with clear beginnings and endings, one can stage a moment to be 
more  acceptable  and  obvious  as  such.  One  can  make  clear  a  point,  search  for  its  universal 
acceptance by confession or by a Fleece knight verdict. To have the aristocracy mold, by enforced 
ritual, reality into the shape of the Weißkunig.
571George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-four, ch. 3. The Ministry of Truth is invoked by Sterchi in Über den Umgang, 391, 
527.
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